Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Ulster County) to review a determination of respondents which found petitioner guilty of misconduct and dismissed him from the City of Kingston Fire Department.
Petitioner is a volunteer member of the City of Kingston
As a result of these letters, respondents charged petitioner pursuant to General Municipal Law § 209-Z with three charges of misconduct. Petitioner denied the charges and a hearing was held. Respondents found that petitioner knowingly, willfully and deliberately engaged in the charged misconduct and terminated his membership in the Fire Department. Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge respondents’ determination. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court.*
Initially, petitioner argues that the notice of discipline provided by respondents did not contain sufficient information to apprise him of the charges against him and failed to allege acts of misconduct which petitioner allegedly committed as a volunteer firefighter. It is undisputed that volunteer firefighters are considered public employees and must be afforded due process in disciplinary proceedings, which includes the right to a hearing held "upon due notice and upon stated charges” (General Municipal Law § 209-U "In order to satisfy due process, a notice of charges must reasonably apprise the accused of the claim being made so that an adequate defense may be mounted” (Matter of Benson v Board of Educ., 183 AD2d 996, 997, lv denied 80 NY2d 756 [citations omitted]). Significantly, where the charges against an individual are made only in the most general terms and no specific directive or established procedure is mentioned, the disciplinary action must be annulled (Montrois v City of Watertown, 115 AD2d 298, appeal dismissed 67 NY2d 757).
Here, our review of the disciplinary charges advanced by
Our decision in this matter renders petitioner’s remaining arguments either academic or premature.
Mikoll, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Crew III and Mahoney, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is annulled, with costs, and matter remitted to respondents for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.
*.
We note that Supreme Court failed to pass on all non substantial evidence issues which could terminate this proceeding prior to transfer as required by CPLR 7804 (g) (as amended by L 1990, ch 575). Nevertheless, in this instance we choose to retain jurisdiction in the interest of judicial economy (see, Matter of Bonded Concrete v Town Bd., 176 AD2d 1137,1138).