UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 92-2809
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH JEROME WILLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
(October 20, 1993)
Before KING and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges, and PARKER,1 District
Judge.
BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
The primary issue before us is the use of prior convictions,
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), as part of the proof for the
charged offense. Joseph Jerome Willis appeals his drug-trafficking
and weapons convictions, contending, inter alia, that his two prior
drug convictions were inadmissible, under the rule, to show that he
intended to exercise dominion and control over the cocaine base
found in the possession of his companion. We AFFIRM.
1
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
I.
On the afternoon of March 9, 1992, before executing an
unrelated arrest warrant, officers conducted surveillance of
Willis. They observed him get into a car with a woman (later
identified as America Mercedes Falcon) and a small child. Willis
drove in an evasive manner, causing the officers to believe that he
was attempting to evade surveillance. They followed the vehicle
(driven by Willis) to an apartment complex, where Willis, Falcon,
and the child exited the car and entered an apartment. Willis and
Falcon returned to the car about 15 minutes later. Officers then
followed it to a condominium. Willis and Falcon both got out of
the car, but Willis remained near it and appeared to be standing
lookout while Falcon entered a condominium; she returned about 15
minutes later. Willis and Falcon then drove to a house that was
for sale or lease. Willis was arrested while he and Falcon were
standing on its porch.
One of the officers noticed a .25 caliber semi-automatic
pistol in plain view in the open ashtray of the car in which Willis
and Falcon had been riding. The ashtray was closer to the driver's
side of the car than to the passenger's, and the pistol was within
easy reach of a person sitting in the driver's seat. The pistol
was unloaded, and the officers found no ammunition clip or bullets
in the car. Also in the car ashtray were small pieces of pink or
coral-colored cardboard with the letters "L.A." (an alias used by
Willis) and a telephone number written on them. A cellular
telephone and two digital pagers were found during a search of the
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car. Small manila envelopes containing marijuana, and plastic
baggies containing cocaine and cocaine base ("crack" cocaine), were
found in Falcon's purse; and another baggie containing 12.4 grams
of crack cocaine was found in her pants. Willis was taken to the
police station, advised of his rights, and interviewed. During the
interview, he admitted that the drugs carried by Falcon belonged to
him, but denied owning the pistol.
Willis was charged and convicted (by a jury) for possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) (count one); possession with the intent to distribute
more than five grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) (count two); and using or carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (count three). He was
sentenced, inter alia, to 120 months on count one and 150 months on
count two, to run concurrently, and to a consecutive 60-month term
on count three.
II.
Willis raises four issues: admissibility of his prior drug
convictions pursuant to Rule 404(b); denial of his motion for a
mistrial based on an unresponsive answer; prosecutorial misconduct
during closing argument; and sufficiency of the evidence on count
three (using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime).
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A.
Notwithstanding admitting in his post-arrest interview that
the drugs found on Falcon were his, Willis reversed course before
trial, placing possession in issue for count two -- possession with
intent to distribute. He contends that, in light of his offer to
stipulate to intent to distribute, his two prior drug convictions
were not admissible under Rule 404(b),2 asserting that their
probative value on, inter alia, his intent to exercise dominion and
control over (constructively possess) the drugs was outweighed by
unfair prejudice.
This court has set forth a two-part test for
determining the propriety of admitting evidence of
"bad acts" not alleged in the indictment. First,
it must be determined that the extrinsic offense
evidence is relevant to an issue other than the
defendant's character. Second, the evidence must
possess probative value that is not substantially
outweighed by its undue prejudice and must meet the
other requirements of rule 403.3
2
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident, provided that upon request
by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce
at trial.
3
Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by
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United States v. Dula, 989 F.2d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979)). "The district court's
determinations on these matters will not be disturbed absent a
clear showing of abuse of discretion". United States v. Robichaux,
995 F.2d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also United States v. Dula, 989 F.2d at 778 ("The
balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, a decision
that is final in the absence of abuse of discretion").
Willis stipulated that he was a convicted felon. Prior to
trial, the Government gave notice that, pursuant to Rule 404(b), it
intended to offer into evidence his state convictions in 1991 (the
offense in issue was in March 1992) for possession of cocaine and
possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. Willis moved to
exclude the convictions, offering to stipulate to intent to
distribute if the Government proved possession. Before trial, the
district court conducted a hearing regarding the admissibility of
the prior convictions. The Government urged that they were
relevant not only as to Willis' intent to distribute, but also,
noted supra, as to his knowledge and intent to constructively
possess the cocaine base found on Falcon. The district court
denied Willis' motion, holding that the prior convictions were
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
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probative on the issue of his intent to possess and that the
probative value was not substantially outweighed by any unfair
prejudice. Shortly after trial, the district court, in a very
thorough opinion, further explained her ruling.
The two prior convictions were admitted into evidence pursuant
to a written stipulation. Immediately after the stipulation was
read to the jury, the district court gave a very comprehensive
limiting instruction;4 and the charge included a similar
4
That instruction provided:
Ladies and gentlemen, the evidence you have
just heard has been admitted by me for a limited
purpose only and you must take that evidence with
the limited purpose I am about to tell you about.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith.
In other words, it is not admitted to show somebody
is a bad person and therefore, has committed a
crime. It is ... admitted for the limited purpose
of assisting you in determining the intent with
which a defendant may have acted. In this regard,
you are instructed that evidence of an alleged
similar transaction may not be considered by the
jury in determining whether an accused committed
the acts or participated in the activity alleged in
the indictment. Nor may evidence of such an
alleged similar transaction of a like nature be
considered for any other purpose whatever unless
the jury first finds that the other evidence in the
case standing alone establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused participated in the activity
alleged in the indictment. If the jury should find
beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence in
the case that the accused participated in the
activity alleged in the indictment, then the jury
may consider evidence as to transactions of a like
nature in determining the state of mind or intent
with which the accused did the act charged in the
indictment and for only that purpose.
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instruction.5 Willis does not challenge the form of either. And,
before the jury retired to deliberate, the court, at Willis'
request, again instructed the jury that the evidence of similar
acts could be considered only for the purpose of determining
whether the defendant had the state of mind or intent necessary to
commit the crime charged in count two (possession with intent to
distribute).
In support of his contention that the prior convictions should
not have been admitted, Willis relies primarily, if not totally, on
United States v. Yeagin, 927 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1991). Yeagin was
5
The charge stated in pertinent part:
During this trial, you have heard evidence of
acts of the defendant which may be similar to those
charged in the indictment, but which were committed
on other occasions. You must not consider any of
this evidence in deciding if the defendant
committed the acts charged in the indictment.
However, you may consider this evidence for
another, very limited, purpose.
Evidence of some other act of a like nature
may not be considered for any other purpose
whatsoever unless you first find that the other
evidence in the case, standing alone, establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did the
particular act charged in the particular count of
the indictment then under deliberation.
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from
other evidence in the case that the accused did the
act charged in the particular count under
deliberation, then you may consider evidence of the
similar acts committed on other occasions to
determine whether the defendant had the state of
mind or intent necessary to commit the crime
charged in count two of the indictment.
This is the limited purpose for which evidence
of other similar acts may be considered.
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convicted for violations almost identical to those charged against
Willis: possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine,
use of a firearm in connection with a drug-trafficking offense, and
possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Id. at 799. And, as
here, in an effort to prevent the Government from introducing
evidence of his nine prior felony convictions, Yeagin offered to
stipulate that he had the requisite intent to distribute if the
Government proved that he possessed methamphetamine, and that he
had prior felony convictions if the government proved that he
possessed a firearm. Id. at 800. The Government refused to accept
the stipulations, and a list of all nine of the convictions was
read to the jury. Id. at 800.
On Yeagin's appeal, the Government conceded that the district
court erred in admitting four of the nine convictions, because they
were non-drug-related and, therefore, irrelevant. Id. at 801.
"[T]o provide guidance to the district court in retrying the case,"
our court considered the admissibility of Yeagin's other five prior
convictions, and concluded that, in light of Yeagin's offer to
stipulate to intent to distribute if the Government proved
possession, the prior convictions were not relevant to that
element. Id. at 801-02.
The Government waited until the appeal in Yeagin to assert
that Yeagin's prior drug-related convictions were admissible
because they were relevant to the issue of knowledge or intent
required for constructive possession. Id. Our court responded:
We agree that constructive possession includes
some element of knowledge or intent. We also agree
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that Yeagin's past drug-related crimes might have
been relevant on the issue of whether Yeagin
intended at the time of his arrest to exercise
dominion or control over the drugs.... This
evidence, however, was highly prejudicial to
Yeagin. It provided direct support only for the
one inference specifically forbidden by rule
404(b): that because Yeagin had committed drug
crimes in the past, he had a bad character and a
propensity to commit such crimes again.
Other crimes evidence is not admissible merely
because the government manages on appeal to
identify some broad notion of intent lurking behind
the element of possession. A trial judge faced
with the problem of admissibility of other crimes
evidence should exercise caution and should require
the government to explain why the evidence is
relevant and necessary on a specific element that
the government must prove. Otherwise, the accused
might be convicted because of his participation in
other crimes rather than because he is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime alleged.
Id. at 803 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Our
court held in Yeagin that the "need to introduce evidence of [the]
nine prior convictions was negligible in comparison to the
extremely prejudicial effect that this evidence must have had on
the jury." Id. Such is not the case here. The result in Yeagin
is controlled by two factors not present in the case before us.
First, four of Yeagin's nine prior convictions were not drug-
related. That fact alone might have been sufficient to warrant
reversal. Id. at 801. Second, although Yeagin's prior convictions
were offered at trial to prove that he intended to distribute the
cocaine, the Government waited until the appeal to assert that the
convictions were admissible to prove that he intended to
constructively possess the cocaine.
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As discussed, although Willis admitted ownership of the drugs
in a post-arrest interview, his defense at trial was that he did
not possess them. And, because the drugs were found on Falcon,
Willis' constructive possession was a critical issue. As noted in
Yeagin, knowledge and intent are elements of constructive
possession, id. at 803: i.e., the Government was required to prove
that Willis knew that Falcon possessed the drugs and that he
intended to exercise dominion and control over them.6 "Because
intent is subjective, it is often difficult to prove. This was the
rationale behind allowing evidence of other crimes to show intent
under 404(b)". Robichaux, 995 F.2d at 568. Therefore, Willis'
convictions in 1991 for possession of cocaine and possession with
the intent to distribute cocaine were highly probative on that
issue and thus clearly relevant. See United States v. Osum, 943
F.2d 1394, 1404 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911)
("where the issue addressed is the defendant's intent, extrinsic
offenses that are similar in nature are admissible because `the
relevancy of the extrinsic offense derives from the defendant's
indulging himself in the same state of mind in the perpetration of
6
With respect to constructive possession, the jury was
instructed as follows:
A person who, although not in actual
possession, knowingly has both the power and the
intention at a given time to exercise dominion or
control over a thing, either directly or through
another person or persons, is then in constructive
possession of it.
The jury was instructed that the term "`knowingly' ... means that
the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of
mistake or accident or any other innocent reason".
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both the extrinsic and charged offenses. The reasoning is that
because the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense,
it is less likely that he had lawful intent in the present
offense.'").
An even more important distinction between this case and
Yeagin is that Willis' prior convictions were expressly offered,
admitted, and presented to the jury for the purpose of showing his
intent to constructively possess the cocaine base. Unlike Yeagin,
the Government did not wait until appeal to urge that basis for
admissibility.
The district court applied Yeagin and, as mandated by it,
required the Government to explain why Willis' prior convictions
were relevant and necessary, and then carefully conducted the
required balancing, concluding at the hearing and in its post-trial
opinion, that the jury's knowledge that Willis was a convicted
felon, pursuant to the stipulation on count one (possession of
firearm by convicted felon), mitigated the prejudicial effect of
learning the nature of his prior convictions. The danger of unfair
prejudice to Willis was minimized by the district court's careful
instructions to the jury, which made it clear that the prior
convictions could not be considered unless and until the jury first
found that Willis had participated in the charged acts, and, even
then, could be considered only for the purpose of determining
whether Willis had the state of mind or intent necessary to commit
the crime of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base.
See United States v. White, 972 F.2d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 1992)
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("danger of prejudice to the defendant is minimal so long as it is
clear to the jury that the extrinsic evidence is being introduced
for the sole purpose of showing intent"), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 113 S. Ct. 1651 (1993); United States v. Elwood, 999 F.2d 814
(5th Cir. 1993). The district court did not abuse its discretion.
B.
Willis contends that the district court erred by denying his
motion for a mistrial, based on the following exchange between the
prosecutor and a Government witness (a police officer) during
direct examination (concerning the pistol found in the car in which
Willis had been riding):
Q Did you remove this pistol?
A Yes, I did.
Q Tell the jury how you did that.
A I opened the door and reached in and took
custody of the pistol. Again, that is for our
safety. I didn't know if there was other weapons
or not in this vehicle. I had prior knowledge that
there would be weapons, either on the person or in
the vehicle.
The court sustained Willis' objection that the last part of the
answer was unresponsive, and, at his request, struck that part and
instructed the jury to disregard it. But, it overruled Willis'
motion for mistrial.
Willis maintains that the unresponsive answer was grounded in
inadmissible hearsay and was so prejudicial that a mistrial should
have been granted.7 "The grant or denial of a mistrial is, of
7
Willis also contends, for the first time on appeal, that the
unresponsive answer violated the spirit and intent of an in limine
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course, a matter left to the discretion of the district court. We
review only for abuse of that discretion". United States v.
Coveney, 995 F.2d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 1993). Moreover, "[a]ny
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded". Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).
Based on our review of the transcript, we are convinced that
the statement in issue did not have a substantial impact on the
jury's verdict. Among other things, when the statement was made,
the jury already knew that Willis was a convicted felon and that,
when the pistol was found, the police were there to serve Willis
with an arrest warrant. Moreover, any potential prejudice was
cured by the district court's striking the testimony and
instructing the jury to disregard it. See Zafiro v. United States,
___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 933, 939 (1993) ("juries are presumed to
follow their instructions").
ruling. Prior to trial, the district court granted Willis' request
to prohibit the Government from mentioning either the nature of the
arrest warrant the police were attempting to execute (assault with
a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm) or that, at the time
of his arrest, Willis was wanted for questioning in a homicide
investigation. Because Willis did not urge this ground in the
district court as a basis for a mistrial, we review it only for
plain error. See United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1462
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., Crain v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2354 (1993). "In order to constitute plain
error, the error must have been so fundamental as to have resulted
in a miscarriage of justice". United States v. Garcia, 995 F.2d
556, 561 (5th Cir. 1993). The witness' statement did not reveal
any information concerning the nature of the arrest warrant or that
Willis was wanted for questioning in an unrelated homicide
investigation. Therefore, to say the least, it is most
questionable whether the in limine prohibition was breached. In
short, there was no plain error.
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C.
Next, Willis asserts that the prosecutor deprived him of a
fair trial by referring to him during closing argument as a "man
that is not employed".8 He asserts that this was an inflammatory
inference, based on evidence outside the record, that he sold drugs
for a living; was in blatant disregard of the court's instruction;
and deprived him of a fair trial.
"Counsel is accorded wide latitude during closing argument,
and this court gives deference to a district court's determination
regarding whether those arguments are prejudicial and/or
inflammatory". United States v. Murphy, 996 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir.
1993). "Our task in reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct
is to decide whether the misconduct casts serious doubt upon the
correctness of the jury's verdict." United States v. Kelley, 981
F.2d 1464, 1473 (5th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2427 (1993). "In
making that determination, we consider: (1) the magnitude of the
prejudicial effect of the statements; (2) the efficacy of any
cautionary instructions; and (3) the strength of the evidence of
the appellant['s] guilt." Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). "[T]he comments complained of must be viewed
within the context of the trial in which they are made". United
States v. Dula, 989 F.2d at 776.
8
Willis objected, and the court instructed the jury that it had
the sole duty to recall the evidence. Willis did not move for a
mistrial.
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The claimed improper reference is asserted by Willis to have
its genesis in the recross examination of one of the arresting
officers. Earlier on redirect, when the prosecutor asked the
officer if he had questioned Willis about his employment, he
responded: "I knew that he was unemployed". Willis' counsel did
not object or seek voir dire to determine the basis of the witness'
knowledge. On recross, however, Willis' counsel questioned the
officer about that basis:
Q [W]hen you told this jury that -- you didn't
ask my client whether he did any work, you just
assumed that he was unemployed?
A No, sir, I had done a background check and I
had that information to follow.
Willis' counsel objected that the officer's knowledge was based on
hearsay, and asked the court to instruct the jury to disregard any
opinion of the witness about Willis being unemployed. The court
rejected the Government's assertion that the objection was
untimely, and instructed the jury to disregard any testimony by the
witness concerning Willis' employment. On second redirect, the
prosecutor again asked the witness about Willis' employment:
Q Did you find anything on him indicating any
sort of employment?
A No, sir.
Q For any company or anything like that?
A No, sir.
Q During your interview with him, did he mention
anything about being employed?
A No, sir.
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This testimony was not objected to. Accordingly, even assuming
that the prosecutor's reference during closing to Willis'
unemployment was not fully supported by the evidence, it does not
come close to casting doubt, much less "serious doubt[,] upon
[either] the correctness of the jury's verdict" or the fairness of
Willis' trial.
D.
Finally, Willis contends that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain his conviction for using or carrying a firearm during and
in relation to a drug trafficking crime (count three). "In
reviewing a verdict challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence,
this Court views the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial,
and all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict ... [to] determine whether `a
rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence
established the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt'". United States v. Madison, 990 F.2d 178, 181
(5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449,
1454 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2980
(1992)).
For count three, the Government was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt (1) that Willis committed the drug-trafficking
crime of possession with the intent to distribute more than five
grams of cocaine base, and (2) that he knowingly used or carried
the .25 caliber semi-automatic weapon, (3) during and in relation
to that crime. United States v. Blankenship, 923 F.2d 1110, 1114
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(5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2262 (1991).
"Conviction under [18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)] does not depend on proof
that the defendant had actual possession of the weapon or used it
in any affirmative manner[,] [but only that] the firearm was
available to provide protection to the defendant in connection with
his engagement in drug trafficking". United States v. Mora, 994
F.2d 1129, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Although, as discussed supra, Willis challenges unsuccessfully
the use of extraneous offenses to support his conviction for
possession with the intent to distribute (count two), he does not
otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to that
count. Accordingly, for purposes of the first element of count
three, the evidence is sufficient to prove that Willis committed a
drug-trafficking crime.
Concerning the second element (knowing possession of a
firearm), Willis maintains that the evidence is insufficient to
show that he possessed the gun, because Falcon, who was carrying
the drugs, had ample opportunity to put the gun in the car ashtray
after Willis got out of the car. This contention is meritless.
Willis has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on count
one (felon in possession of a firearm); knowing possession of the
firearm is an essential element of that offense. United States v.
Murray, 988 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, his
knowing possession of the weapon for purposes of count three is
established.
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Finally, for the third element of the offense, Willis contends
that the evidence is insufficient to establish a nexus between the
weapon and the drug-trafficking. According to Willis, there is no
evidence that drugs were being distributed on the day of his
arrest, or that a small, unloaded .25 caliber pistol would serve
any immediate purpose in facilitating drug trafficking. We
disagree. Willis' "business cards" (the pieces of cardboard with
his alias and pager number) were in the car ashtray where the gun
was found; two digital pagers and a cellular telephone also were
found in the car. This evidence amply supports an inference that
Willis conducted his drug-trafficking business from his car. The
evidence also supports an inference that Falcon was delivering
drugs to customers while Willis remained near the car and gun.
Although "the government had to prove as an essential element
of the offense that a relationship existed between" the weapon and
the drug-trafficking offense, it did not have to show (as Willis
concedes) that Willis actually used or brandished the weapon.
United States v. Coburn, 876 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1989). The
evidence is sufficient if it shows that the "firearm facilitated or
had a role in the crime, such as emboldening an actor who had the
opportunity or ability to display or discharge the weapon to
protect himself or intimidate others". Id. "The fact that a
weapon is `unloaded' or `inoperative' does not insulate the
defendant from the reach of section 924(c)(1)". United States v.
Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 241 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2276 (1992). Even though the gun was
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unloaded, the jury could have found that Willis had the opportunity
or ability to use it for intimidation and protection, thus
facilitating his possession with the intent to distribute cocaine
base.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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