[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 27, 2008
No. 07-10121 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-10033-CR-SH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLINTON HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 27, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Clinton Harris appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Harris argues that the district
court denied him a fair trial by admitting evidence of a controlled drug buy that
was prejudicial under Fed.R.Evid. 403. Specifically, Harris claims that the district
court should have limited the introduction of details of Harris’s involvement in a
drug transaction that took place in his home where the firearm was later located.
Further, this evidence was confusing, cumulative, and prejudicial. Harris argues
that the district court failed also to give a limiting instruction relating to this
evidence. Also, Harris argues that the government’s statements to the jury,
combined with the extensive testimony about the controlled buy, the lack of a
limiting instruction, and the introduction of the actual crack cocaine purchased in
the controlled buy, rose to the level of reversible error.
The government responds that while Harris may have filed an ore tenus
objection to the drug trafficking evidence, he did not object at trial to the
introduction of such evidence, and he did not request a limiting instruction. Harris
replies that he preserved any error relating to the district court’s failure to give a
limiting instruction.
We review the district court’s rulings on admission of evidence for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000).
“[W]hen employing an abuse-of-discretion standard, we must affirm unless we
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find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the
wrong legal standard.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir.
2004).
Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. While respecting
the great degree of discretion a district court has in weighing probative value and
prejudice under Rule 403, “we have also recognized that Rule 403 is ‘an
extraordinary remedy which the district court should invoke sparingly and [t]he
balance . . . should be struck in favor of admissibility.’” United States v. Dodds,
347 F.3d 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). The risk of undue
prejudice can be reduced by a district court’s limiting instruction. United States v.
Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005). A district court’s erroneous
admission of evidence does not warrant reversal if the purported error had no
substantial influence on the outcome and sufficient evidence uninfected by error
supports the verdict. United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir.
1992). Finally, we have found that a prosecutor’s closing argument caused a
defendant no substantial prejudice where the district court informed the jury on
multiple occasions that a lawyer’s argument did not constitute evidence. See
United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 1998).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that
Harris engaged in a drug transaction as part of the government prosecution of a
felon-in-possession charge. First, evidence of the controlled buy was necessary to
show why law enforcement officials applied for a search warrant of Harris’s home.
Thus, its probative value does not appear outweighed by its potential prejudice.
Additionally, the Government needed to challenge Harris’s defense that although
he knew of the presence of the gun, it was not his. This court has recognized that
there is often a relationship between firearms and drug dealing that is probative of
knowing possession of the firearm. United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d 1028, 1031
(11th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the Government was entitled to put on evidence that
would demonstrate to the jury that Harris’s possession was not innocent. Second,
the district court gave a limiting instruction, albeit a general one, when it told the
jury that Harris was “on trial only for the specific offense alleged in the
indictment.” Thus, any prejudice was reduced. Harris failed to request a more
specific limiting instruction at the appropriate time, even after being invited to do
so by the district court. Third, even if the district court’s admission of the evidence
was erroneous, there is no evidence that the purported error had an substantial
influence on the outcome, and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the
verdict, so any error would be harmless.
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Further, Harris’s argument that the evidence of his drug trafficking was
cumulative is meritless because only two witnesses testified directly to Harris’s
involvement in the controlled buy, both of whom were necessary to complete the
story of a confidential informant’s purchase of crack cocaine from Harris and the
subsequent application for a search warrant. Additionally, the district court cured
any potential error by informing the jury several times that argument is not
evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.1
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Harris’s request for oral argument is denied.
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