[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 25, 2008
No. 07-12153 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
BIA Nos. A98-733-900 & A98-733-901
MARTHA CRISTINA LAVERDE,
FREDY SANABRIA,
ANDRES JIMENEZ,
JUAN SANABRIA,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(March 25, 2008)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Martha Laverde and her family, natives of Colombia, through
counsel, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA’s”) decision
summarily affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) order denying her
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We initially consider which issues, if any, are
preserved for appellate review, before reviewing the merits of Laverde’s preserved
claims.
I.
“When an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is
abandoned” and passing references to the issue are insufficient to prevent
abandonment. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir.
2005). A party’s failure “to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in
support” waives the argument for appellate purposes. Flanigan’s Enter., Inc. v.
Fulton County, 242 F.3d 976, 987 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001).
We conclude from the record that Laverde fails to adequately raise her
asylum claim based on past persecution, or her withholding of removal and CAT
relief claims in her appellate brief. We also conclude that she fails to sufficiently
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Although Laverde’s husband and two children are also named as petitioners, their
claims for asylum are based on derivative status. Accordingly, the petitioners will be
collectively referred to as “Laverde.” Derivative status is unavailable under the withholding
statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1231; Delgado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007).
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challenge the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, which was largely dispositive
regarding her request for asylum. Accordingly, these issues are deemed
abandoned, and Laverde’s petition for review is denied in this respect. See
Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1228 n.2; Flanigan’s Enter., Inc., 242 F.3d at 987 n.16.
As a result, it is not necessary to decide whether the IJ’s adverse credibility
finding was based on specific, cogent reasons or supported by substantial
evidence.2 Nevertheless, we analyze the remaining question of whether the IJ
properly denied Laverde’s claim for asylum based on a well-founded fear of
persecution.
II.
We review the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that it expressly adopts
the opinion of the IJ. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
“Insofar as the [BIA] adopts the IJ’s reasoning, we will review the IJ’s decision as
well.” Id. Here, because the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision, we review
the IJ’s decision. See id.
Factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence test, and
we will affirm if the IJ’s decision is supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
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In any event, we have independently reviewed the IJ’s credibility determination and
conclude, in the alternative, that it is supported here by substantial evidence.
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401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2005). In order to reverse the IJ’s decision, we
must conclude that the record compels reversal. Niftaliev v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504
F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2007) (involving sua sponte reconsideration of an
earlier appeal). The substantial evidence test is “deferential” and does not allow
“re-weigh[ing] the evidence from scratch.” Mazariegos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 241
F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
An adverse credibility determination alone may be the basis for denying an
asylum application if the applicant produces no evidence other than her testimony.
Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287. If the applicant produces evidence then it must also be
considered by the IJ. Id.
An alien who arrives in or is present in the United States may apply for
asylum. INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Attorney General or
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has discretion to grant asylum
if the alien meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.” INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A “refugee” is defined in the INA as an individual who is
unwilling or unable to return to his country of nationality “because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” INA §
101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
The asylum applicant carries the burden of proving statutory “refugee”
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status. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284. To establish asylum eligibility, the alien must,
with specific and credible evidence, establish (1) past persecution on account of a
statutory factor, or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the statutory factor will cause
such future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b). Demonstrating such a connection
requires the alien to present specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear
that he or she will be singled out for persecution “on account of” a statutory factor.
Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287 (emphasis added).
The asylum applicant does not need to show that she will be singled out for
persecution if she establishes a “pattern or practice” in her country of “persecution
of a group of persons similarly situated” and a reasonable fear of persecution on
account of a protected ground based on her inclusion in that group. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(2)(iii).
Persecution on account of political opinion refers to persecution based on the
victim’s political opinion, not persecution based on the persecutor’s political
opinion. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2006).
“[E]vidence that either is consistent with acts of private violence or the petitioner’s
failure to cooperate with guerillas, or that merely shows that a person has been the
victim of criminal activity, does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a
statutorily protected ground.” Id.
Neither the INA nor the regulations define “persecution,” but we have
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indicated that “persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few
isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, and that mere harassment
does not amount to persecution.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted). “Not all exceptional treatment is persecution.”
Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000). For example, menacing
telephone threats do not rise to the level of past persecution. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d
at 1231. We have held that the cumulative effect of beatings, kidnaping, and
threatening phone calls constituted past persecution. Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 479 F.3d
762, 766 (11th Cir. 2007).
An applicant may establish a “well-founded fear” by demonstrating that her
fear of future persecution is “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Al
Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2).
Because Laverde’s testimony was deemed to be not credible, it cannot be
used to find that she had a well-founded fear of persecution. See Forgue, 401 F.3d
at 1287. Laverde also submitted evidence, however, including a written statement,
a police report, and a Country Report, and the IJ was required to consider these
materials. See id. The IJ did so, even though most of the evidence was not directly
relevant to her application.
Although the IJ did not expressly consider whether the written statement and
police report by themselves were grounds for granting her asylum claim, the IJ
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made clear that Laverde had failed to satisfy her burden of proof, noting, for
example, that these documents were inconsistent with her testimony and that she
had not provided medical documentation related to the kidnaping incident.
Furthermore, the IJ specifically found that Laverde had failed to produce
“sufficient and concrete evidence” to demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution. Having reviewed the IJ’s findings, we conclude that they are
supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, we deny Laverde’s Petition for Review.
PETITION DENIED.
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