[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 10, 2008
No. 07-12677 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00184-CV-1-MMP-AK
ANN M. SHELDON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 10, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ann M. Sheldon appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of her application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She contends that the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) (1) erred in finding that her orthopedic impairment could not
reasonably be expected to produce pain, and (2) failed to provide adequate reasons
for discrediting her testimony.
We review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference and legal
conclusions with close scrutiny. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2001). We treat the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision
when the ALJ denies benefits and, as here, the Appeals Council denies review. Id.
We do not reweigh evidence presented to the ALJ or substitute our judgment for
that of the ALJ; instead, we review the entire record to determine if the decision
reached is reasonable and is supported by substantial evidence. Cornelius v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
finding. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. “[A] mere scintilla” of evidence does not
suffice. Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998).
A three-part “pain standard” applies when a claimant attempts to establish
disability through her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. Brown
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v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991). The standard requires
(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical
evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition
or (3) the objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can
be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Id.
A “claimant’s subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that
satisfies the pain standard is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Id.
“Indeed, in certain situations, pain alone can be disabling, even when its existence
is unsupported by objective evidence.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th
Cir. 1995). If the ALJ decides not to credit such testimony, he must do so
explicitly, explaining why the testimony is not worthy of belief. Brown, 921 F.2d
at 1236. If the ALJ fails to articulate the reasons for discrediting the claimant’s
subjective pain testimony, the testimony must be accepted as true, as a matter of
law. Id. A claimant’s daily activities may be considered in evaluating complaints
of disabling pain. Cf. Harwell v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir. 1984).
A claimant’s failure to seek medical treatment is also relevant in assessing
credibility. Watson v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1984). A doctor’s
conservative medical treatment for a particular condition tends to negate a claim of
disability. Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1996).
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In this case, the ALJ articulated the reasons for discrediting Sheldon’s
testimony regarding her orthopedic impairments and her complaints of pain.
Because substantial evidence fully supports the ALJ’s decision, the judgment of
the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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