—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Starkey, J.), rendered November 3, 1995, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
During the polling of the jury, one of the jurors responded that he did not wish to continue discussing the matter. Upon specific questioning by the court, the juror affirmed emphatically that the verdict of guilt as to the defendant with respect to one of the incidents was his verdict. A second juror also expressed uncertainty concerning his verdict and the court proceeded to question him. That juror responded that he agreed with some of the verdict but not all of it. Upon further questioning by the court, the juror stated that he agreed with the verdict of guilt as to this defendant, but disagreed with one of the verdicts of guilt as to the codefendant. At that juncture, the court recorded the verdict of guilt as to the one incident for the defendant and his codefendant, but sent the jury back to further deliberate on the remaining counts of the indictment. The court refused to accept the second verdict of guilt with respect to the codefendant, and there was no objection to the taking of a partial verdict at that time. The jury continued its deliberations through the following day, and rendered the remainder of its verdict finding the defendant guilty with respect to a second incident and acquitting him on the third.
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the manner in which the trial court conducted the polling of the jury, including the questioning of two of the jurors, does not require reversal. The trial court followed the proper procedure to determine that the verdict, as rendered, reflected the unanimous conclusion of the jury. Furthermore, the procedure as conducted by the court was not coercive (see, CPL 310.80; People v Horn, 196 AD2d 886; People v Mercado, 230 AD2d 488, affd 91 NY2d 960).
Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15 [5]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v Suitte,