BATISTA

Interim Decision #3321

In re Juan BATISTA-HERNANDEZ, Respondent

File A91 548 877 - Oakdale

Decided July 15, 1997

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) The offense of accessory after the fact to a drug-trafficking crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3
(Supp. V 1993), is not considered an inchoate crime and is not sufficiently related to a con-
trolled substance violation to support a finding of deportability pursuant to section
241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
(2) The respondent’s conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 establishes his deportability as an
alien convicted of an aggravated felony under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, because
the offense of accessory after the fact falls within the definition of an obstruction of justice
crime under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (West Supp.
1997), and because the respondent’s sentence, regardless of any suspension of the imposi-
tion or execution of that sentence, “is at least one year.”

FOR RESPONDENT: H. Todd Nesom, Esquire, Oakdale, Louisiana

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Joyce L. Richard, Gen-
eral Attorney

BEFORE: Board En Banc: DUNNE, Vice Chairman; VACCA, HEILMAN, HOLMES,
HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, FILPPU, MATHON, and GUENDELSBERGER, Board Mem-
bers. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions: COLE, Board Member; ROSENBERG, Board
Member, joined by SCHMIDT, Chairman.

HOLMES, Board Member:

In a decision dated April 19, 1995, the Immigration Judge found the
respondent deportable as charged and certified the case to this Board pursu-
ant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (1995). The decision of the Immigration Judge will be
reversed in part and affirmed in part.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic who
originally entered the United States without inspection on or about May 1,
1985. On November 16, 1988, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
granted the respondent temporary resident status pursuant to section 210 of

955
Interim Decision #3321

the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1160 (1988). He thereafter
adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. The record reflects
that the respondent was convicted on April 5, 1993, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Connecticut, of the offense of accessory after the
fact in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V 1993). The Service charged that
the respondent was deportable pursuant to sections 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) and
(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2)
(A)(iii)and (B)(i) (1994), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and a
controlled substance violation. The Immigration Judge found the respondent
deportable on both grounds and certified his decision to the Board. On certifi-
cation, the Service has offered additional arguments in support of the deci-
sion of the Immigration Judge.

II. THE RESPONDENT’S CONVICTION
The respondent was convicted as an accessory after the fact pursuant to
section 18 U.S.C. § 3. This statute criminalizes the following behavior:
Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives,
relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial
or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.
[A]n accessory after the fact shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term
of imprisonment or fined not more than one-half the maximum fine prescribed for the pun-
ishment of the principal, or both . . . .
The respondent’s indictment tracks the statutory language and charges that
the respondent, knowing that both a conspiracy to distribute and the distribu-
tion of heroin had been committed, nonetheless received, relieved, com-
forted, and assisted the offender, Radhames Franco, in order to hinder and
prevent Mr. Franco’s apprehension, trial, and punishment. The Immigration
Judge found that the respondent’s conviction under this statute was one
“relating to a controlled substance” violation for purposes of establishing
deportability under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act because the respondent
assisted Mr. Franco, a controlled substance trafficker. Similarly, the Immi-
gration Judge found that the respondent has committed an aggravated felony
because his crime “directly relate[d]” to Mr. Franco’s underlying controlled
substance trafficking crime. While we find that the respondent’s conviction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 supports a finding that he is deportable as an aggra-
vated felon under current law, we do not find that the respondent was “con-
victed of a violation of . . . [a] law . . . relating to a controlled substance.” See
section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act.

956
 Interim Decision #3321

III. SECTION 241(a)(2)(B)(i) OF THE ACT
The respondent was charged with deportability under section
241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act,1 which provides:
Any alien who at any time after entry has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or
attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of
30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.

A. The Service’s Argument
Regarding Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
On certification, the Service initially argues that we should find that the
respondent’s conviction relates to a controlled substance because the under-
lying substantive crime committed by Mr. Franco relates to a controlled sub-
stance. In support of its argument, the Service cites to Board precedent
holding that if the underlying or substantive crime for which an alien is con-
victed involves moral turpitude, then a conviction for aiding in the commis-
sion of that crime or for otherwise acting as an accessory before the fact is
also a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. See Matter of Short,
20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989). The Service notes that in Matter of
Sanchez-Marin, 11 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 1965), the Board held that an alien
convicted for accessory to manslaughter after the fact had been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude because manslaughter is a crime involving
moral turpitude. See also Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193 (1st Cir. 1994).
However, the issue whether the respondent’s conviction might establish
his deportability arising from a conviction for a crime involving moral turpi-
tude is not before us, as the Service has not charged him under section
241(a)(2)(A) of the Act. Rather, the Service has charged him as an alien con-
victed of an aggravated felony and a controlled substance violation. Also, the
analysis in the cases cited above does not directly control the issue of the
respondent’s deportability under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, which
requires that he have been convicted of a violation of “any law . . . relating to
a controlled substance.” We do not find that the respondent was convicted of
violating such a law.

1 Section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act was amended by section 308(f)(1)(N) of the Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-621 (“IIRIRA”), and redesignated as section 237(a)(2)
(B)(i) of the Act by section 305(a)(2) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-598, applicable to cases
initiated on or after April 1, 1997. Thus, the respondent is not subject to the amended ground of
deportability.

957
Interim Decision #3321

B. Inchoate Crimes
The Service notes that laws pertaining to various inchoate crimes, such as
solicitation, facilitation, and accessory before the fact, have been found to
relate to controlled substance violations for deportability purposes. See
Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 108 F.3d 210 (9th Cir. 1997). It is true that we have
generally held that section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, and its predecessor,
section 241(a)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1988), encompasses
many inchoate or preparatory crimes when the underlying substantive crime
involves a drug offense. See Matter of Beltran, 20 I&N Dec. 521, 528 (BIA
1992)(solicitation); Matter of Del Risco, 20 I&N Dec. 109 (BIA 1989) (facil-
itation); Matter of Bronsztejn, 15 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1974) (attempt); Mat-
ter of N-, 6 I&N Dec. 557 (BIA, A.G. 1955) (conspiracy); Matter of G-, 6
I&N Dec. 353 (BIA 1954)(attempt). Many inchoate crimes “relate to” an
underlying controlled substance offense because, while these crimes are not
lesser included offenses of controlled substance violations, they nonetheless
involve acts closely related to the culmination of the substantive controlled
substance offense. In Matter of Beltran, supra, we discussed these “prepara-
tory crimes” and noted that the introduction to Article 5 of the Model Penal
Code, which deals with inchoate crimes, indicates that these offenses always
presuppose a purpose to commit another substantive offense. Similarly,
Barron’s Law Dictionary defines an inchoate crime as
that which is not yet completed or finished. Inchoate offenses are those offenses such as
attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a crime, all of which involve conduct
designed to culminate in the commission of a substantive offense but has either failed or has
not yet achieved its culmination because there is something that the actor or another still
must do.

Barron’s Law Dictionary 222 (1984); see also Model Penal Code art. 5 intro-
duction at 293 (1985).
In contrast to the crimes referenced in the Service’s appellate brief, the
respondent’s accessory after the fact offense does not constitute an inchoate
crime because the act criminalized by 18 U.S.C. § 3 must, by its nature, take
place subsequent to the completion of the underlying felony. Courts have
held that “(t)he gist of being an accessory after the fact lies essentially in
obstructing justice by rendering assistance to hinder or prevent the arrest of
the offender after he has committed the crime . . . . The very definition of the
crime also requires that the felony not be in progress when the assistance is
rendered because then he who renders assistance would aid in the commis-
sion of the offense and be guilty as a principal.” United States v. Barlow, 470
F.2d 1245, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Nava-
Maldonado, 566 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Nev. 1983). Given the nature of the
respondent’s crime, we do not find that his accessory after the fact conviction
“relates to” Mr. Franco’s distribution conviction in the same manner that
inchoate crimes relate to their principal crimes.

958
 Interim Decision #3321

C. Other Independent Statutes
Extending our analysis beyond the inchoate crimes cited by the Service,
we find it relevant to examine the federal crimes which immediately precede
and succeed the crime of accessory after the fact in the United States Code.
Like 18 U.S.C. § 3, under which the respondent was convicted of being an
accessory after the fact, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994), which criminalizes aiding and
abetting, and 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994), which criminalizes misprision, are not
included in any part of the federal code pertaining to drugs. Moreover, nei-
ther of these provisions of law, by their language, expressly involves con-
trolled substance violations. We will look to these statutes for some guidance
in determining the respondent’s deportability pursuant to section
241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 4—Misprision of a felony
An essential element of the crime of misprision is that the perpetrator must
know that a felony has already been committed. Therefore, misprision, like
accessory after the fact, is not an inchoate crime.2 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found in Castaneda de Esper v. INS, 557 F.2d
79 (6th Cir. 1977), that a conviction for misprision of a felony under 18
U.S.C. § 4 did not establish an alien’s deportability as a controlled substance
violator under former section 241(a)(11) of the Act. Following the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s rationale, this Board also ruled that a conviction for misprision does
not sufficiently relate to a controlled substance violation to render an alien
deportable pursuant to section 241(a)(11). See Matter of Velasco, 16 I&N
Dec. 281 (BIA 1977).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2—Aiding and Abetting
On the other hand, the courts have found that a conviction for the federal
crime of aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2 does constitute a conviction
for a controlled substance violation for purposes of section 241(a)(11) of the
Act.3 See Londono-Gomez v. INS, 699 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983); United

2 The crime of misprision of felony is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 4 as follows:

Misprision of felony. - Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible
make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under
the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.
3 The federal aiding and abetting statute, found at 18 U.S.C. § 2, provides as follows:

Principals
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

959
Interim Decision #3321

States v. Gonzalez, 582 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1978). Like both accessory after
the fact and misprision, the crime of aiding and abetting does not meet the
definition of an inchoate crime. See Matter of Beltran, supra. Rather, courts
have historically found that the crime of aiding and abetting “merely codified
the accepted principles governing who could be held liable for the commis-
sion of a substantive offense.” United States v. Gonzalez, supra, at 1165.
Because aiding and abetting is not considered a separate crime from the sub-
stantive offense, the crime of aiding and abetting a controlled substance vio-
lator has been found to be a deportable act pursuant to section 241(a)(11) of
the Act. See Londono-Gomez v. INS, supra; United States v. Gonzalez,
supra; see also Matter of Beltran, supra (noting that “’[u]nlike the misprision
of felony statute, the aiding and abetting statute does not define a separate
offense’”) (quoting the Ninth Circuit in Londono-Gomez v. INS, supra, at
476).

D. The Respondent’s Accessory After the Fact Conviction
Although accessory after the fact falls somewhere between misprision of a
felony and aiding and abetting in terms of its relation to the underlying crime,
we find that it is more akin to misprision. In Matter of Beltran, supra, and the
cases discussed therein, we focused our analysis on the historical treatment of
the crime in question and the penalties invoked therefor. While courts treat a
person who aids and abets others as an additional party to the substantive
crime, one who is an accessory after the fact, like an individual guilty of mis-
prision, has been found to have committed a separate and distinct crime from
the substantive offense committed by the principal. See Bollenbach v. United
States, 326 U.S. 607, 611 (1946)(distinguishing aiding and abetting from
accessory after the fact, and noting that while the criminal code “made aiders
and abettors of an offense principals, Congress has not made accessories after
the fact principals. Their offense is distinct and is differently punished.”); see
also United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub
nom. Willis v. United States, 405 U.S. 924 (1972); United States v. Varelli,
407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Saletko v. United States,
405 U.S. 1040 (1972); United States v. Nava-Maldonado, supra.
Our review of section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) cases also indicates that if the crime
in question is punishable equally as the underlying substantive crime, then it
is more likely to be a deportable offense. The penalty invoked for accessory
after the fact does not mirror that of the principal drug-trafficker, and as such
is more akin to the penalty for misprision. While an aider and abettor of drug
trafficking is punishable as a principal drug-trafficker, a conviction for mis-
prision mandates only a 3-year prison sentence, regardless of the underlying
offense. Similarly, the penalty for accessory after the fact is only “one-half
the maximum term of imprisonment or fine prescribed for the punishment of
the principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 3. This variance between the penalties for an

960
 Interim Decision #3321

accessory after the fact and the principal further distances the respondent’s
crime from that of Mr. Franco’s drug-trafficking crime.4
Lastly, as noted above, we find significant the fact that the respondent’s
accessory after the fact conviction is not an inchoate crime. In Matter of
Beltran, supra, we found that the crime of solicitation and the underlying
drug-trafficking offense are so interrelated that the solicitation “‘takes its
character and its quality from the nature of the law toward whose violation it
is . . . directed.’” Id. at 526 (quoting Matter of Bronsztejn, supra, at 282
(attempt)); see also Matter of Del Risco, supra (facilitation). Conversely,
inasmuch as the crime of accessory after the fact, by its nature, takes place
after the completion of the principal crime, it therefore does not require any
planning and involvement in the principal drug-trafficking crime. As the
Court pointed out in United States v. Barlow, supra, the crime of accessory
after the fact differs from aiding and abetting, as well as various inchoate
crimes, because the accessory does not aid in the commission of the offense.
In contrast to the various inchoate crimes discussed above, the nature of
being an accessory after the fact lies essentially in obstructing justice and pre-
venting the arrest of the offender. Id. The accessory after the fact offense is
therefore more akin to the crime of misprision, which also requires, as an
integral element, that the defendant, with full knowledge of the felony, take
an affirmative step to conceal the crime. See generally United States v.
Warters, 885 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1989).
In sum, we find that the respondent’s accessory after the fact offense
insufficiently relates to Mr. Franco’s underlying drug-trafficking crime to
establish the respondent’s deportability pursuant to section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of
the Act. In so finding, we have considered that the crime of accessory after
the fact has historically been treated as a crime separate and apart from the
underlying crime. Moreover, we have found significant the differences in
severity between the penalties levied against the accessory after the fact and
the principal offender. Lastly, we have considered the fact that the respon-
dent’s accessory after the fact offense is not an inchoate crime and does not
take its “character and quality” from the underlying drug crime.

4 In Matter of Beltran, supra, we found the crime of solicitation to be one relating to a
controlled substance violation even though solicitation does not share the same penalties as the
principal drug-trafficking offense. In our analysis, however, we deemed it significant that, “but
for the failure of the person solicited to commit the incited crime, a solicitor would share guilt
equally with the solicited perpetrator under the laws dealing with complicity.” Id. at 527 (citing
Model Penal Code § 5.02 commentary at 366). No such relationship exists between the
respondent’s accessory after the fact crime and the principal’s actions, since the respondent’s
offense is not an inchoate crime. In United States v. Nava-Maldonado, supra, the court noted
that “(t)he assistance given by the accessory after the fact is not in connection with the
commission of the crime by the offender.” Id. at 1438.

961
Interim Decision #3321

IV. SECTION 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) OF THE ACT
The Immigration Judge also found that the respondent’s accessory after
the fact offense is an aggravated felony that renders him deportable under
section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act. The Immigration Judge found that the
respondent’s crime “directly related” to the distribution of narcotics and,
thus, his conviction was for “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”
under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (1994).
Under present law, we agree with the Immigration Judge’s ultimate finding
that the respondent is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act.
The definition of an aggravated felony is set forth at section 101(a)(43) of
the Act. This section of law has been subject to many amendments since the
term “aggravated felony” was introduced into the Act in 1988. It was most
recently amended by section 321 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (“IIRIRA”). Section 321(b), which expands
the scope of the “aggravated felony” definition, provides that
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date),
the term applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on,
or after the date of enactment of this paragraph.” Moreover, section 321(c) of
the IIRIRA provides that “[t]he amendments made by this section shall apply
to actions taken on or after the date of the e.actment of this Act, regardless of
when the conviction occurred.” Inasmuch as this Board’s consideration of
the Immigration Judge’s certification of the case constitutes an “action,” the
respondent is subject to this current definition. Valderrama-Fonseca v. INS,
116 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1997).
The “aggravated felony” definition now includes “an offense relating to
obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a wit-
ness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” See section
101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (West Supp. 1997);
section 321(a)(11) of the IIRIRA (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(S)). Thus, Congress incorporated within the aggravated felony definition an
offense which encompasses the respondent’s accessory after the fact crime
because the respondent’s conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 clearly relates
to obstruction of justice. In so finding, we note that the wording of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3 itself indicates its relation to obstruction of justice, for the statute
criminalizes actions knowingly taken to “hinder or prevent [another’s]
apprehension, trial or punishment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3. Moreover, as the D.C. Cir-
cuit stated in United States v. Barlow, supra, the nature of being an accessory
after the fact lies essentially in obstructing justice and preventing the arrest of
the offender. This case law lends further support to our conclusion that the
respondent’s crime meets the definition of an obstruction of justice offense.5
5 We note three matters regarding Board Member Rosenberg’s separate opinion. First, the

respondent was charged in the Order to Show Cause with deportability under section

962
 Interim Decision #3321

Thus, the remaining issue concerns the imposition of the respondent’s
sentence for purposes of his deportability under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of
the Act. The record of conviction indicates that the respondent was sentenced
to 33 months’ imprisonment commencing on April 5, 1993. Under the new
IIRIRA definition of a “term of imprisonment,” found at section
101(a)(48)(B) of the Act,
[a]ny reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed
to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of
any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or
in part. IIRIRA § 322(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 3009-628.6 In accordance with section 101(a)(48)
of the Act, no further investigation of the respondent’s actual incarceration is required to
determine his deportability as an aggravated felon. His sentence of 33 months, regardless of
any subsequent suspension of its imposition, meets the definition of a “term of imprison-
ment” of more than one year, as required under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act.

V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we find that the respondent’s conviction pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3 does not relate to a controlled substance violation for purposes
of establishing deportability under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. How-
ever, we do find that it comes within the statutory definition of an aggravated
felony. Accordingly, the decision of the Immigration Judge will be reversed
in part and affirmed in part.
ORDER: The decision of the Immigration Judge finding the
respondent deportable under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act is reversed.
FURTHER ORDER: The decision of the Immigration Judge
finding the respondent deportable under section 241(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Act
is affirmed.
241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act in that, after entry, he “had been convicted of an aggravated felony
as defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Act.” This charge, which was based on the respondent’s
April 5, 1993, accessory after the fact conviction, was not tied to a specified subsection of
section 101(a)(43) of the Act; rather, it was founded on the conviction itself. Second, this case is
before the Board on certification by the Immigration Judge. It is not before us on appeal by
either party. In fact, the respondent has not challenged the Immigration Judge’s finding that he
is deportable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony after entry. Finally, we were obliged
to consider the nature of the respondent’s conviction by the very issue before us on
certification. In so doing, we found that the “gist of being an accessory after the fact lies
essentially in obstructing justice by rendering assistance to hinder or prevent the arrest of the
offender after he has committed the crime.” United States v. Barlow, supra, at 1252-53. In our
consideration of the issue before us, we have concluded that an accessory after the fact
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3 inherently relates to obstruction of justice given the conduct
criminalized under that section of law.
6 The enactment of section 101(a)(48)(B) of the Act overrules our previous holding, set forth

in Matter of Esposito, 21 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1995), wherein we had held that a sentence, for
excludability purposes under section 212(a)(10) of the Act, is not “actually imposed” if the
sentencing court suspends the imposition of an alien’s sentence. See also Matter of Castro, 19
I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988) (holding that when a court suspends the imposition of a sentence,
there is no “sentence actually imposed” for purposes of section 212(a)(9) of the Act.)

963
Interim Decision #3321

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Patricia A. Cole,
Board Member

I respectfully dissent.
While I agree with the majority that the respondent’s accessory after the
fact conviction constitutes an aggravated felony pursuant to section
101(a)(43) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West Supp. 1997), thus
establishing his deportability, I further believe that the respondent is also
deportable, pursuant to the plain meaning of section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994), for the violation of a law relating to a
controlled substance. I would therefore affirm the decision of the Immigra-
tion Judge and find the respondent deportable as charged.
I do not find that the respondent’s crime is a separate and distinct crime
“more akin to a misprision conviction,” but rather the respondent’s accessory
after the fact conviction is more analogous to an inchoate offense because the
character and quality of his crime is so interrelated to the underlying
drug-trafficking offense. The majority has erred in its evaluation of the inde-
pendent nature of the respondent’s crime. This accessory after the fact con-
viction is clearly related to the overall drug-trafficking endeavor. It is so
interrelated to the drug-trafficking crime that it even takes its penalty from
the law or penalty for the relevant principal offender. The penalty for acces-
sory after the fact is “one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or fine
prescribed for the punishment of the principle.” In this case the respondent
aided a drug trafficker and was sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonment,
one-half the maximum sentence prescribed for the drug-trafficking offense.
A violation resulting in an accessory after the fact conviction, by its very
nature, must relate to the underlying crime involved. In the respondent’s
case, the underlying crime consisted of drug trafficking. Without the seman-
tics of the majority’s analysis, the respondent’s crime clearly relates to drug
trafficking, and this result conforms with the actual language of the current
section 241(a)(2)(B)(i). I also believe that this result honors Congress’ intent
in expanding the reach of section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act.
The majority cites various cases in support of its analysis to find that the
respondent’s accessory after the fact conviction does not qualify as a con-
trolled substance violation. However, the majority fails to consider that such
cases address a prior, more limited interpretation of the controlled substance
deportability charge. For example, in prior case law, this Board, as well as
various circuit courts, analyzed former section 241(a)(11) of the Act to find
that misprision, a crime which the majority compares with the respondent’s
conviction, does not sufficiently relate to a controlled substance violation for
purposes of the prior language of section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. See, e.g.,
Matter of Velasco, 16 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1977). However, since that time
Congress has expanded the statutes’s reach over controlled substance
violators.

964
 Interim Decision #3321

Following the passage of section 1751 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3247-48, Congress expanded the
drug-related criminal activities that are deportable drug offenses. As we
noted in Matter of Beltran, 20 I&N Dec. 521 (BIA 1992), it is well recog-
nized that Congress has historically exhibited a strong national policy to
deport aliens convicted of drug offenses from our country, and the passage of
such amendments even more clearly manifests its intention to limit the ability
of drug offenders to remain in the United States. So, subsequent to Congress’
1986 amendment, the controlled substance deportability charge encom-
passed not only violations relating to possession or trafficking, but was
expanded to include violations of “any law . . . relating to a controlled sub-
stance.” In Flores-Arellano v. INS, 5 F.3d 360 (9th Cir. 1993), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the plain, unam-
biguous language of this phrase, “any law . . . relating to a controlled sub-
stance,” and I would argue that the majority’s decision fails to recognize the
expanded coverage of section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act with subsequent
congressional amendments to limit the ability of drug offenders to remain in
the United States. In fact, it would be consistent with Congress’ intent to find
that the respondent in Matter of Velasco, supra, convicted of misprision of a
felony, to wit, possession of marihuana with intent to distribute, would be
deportable today as a controlled substance violator. I would agree with the
Immigration Judge that any criminal activity that facilitates the possession,
use, or trafficking of illegal drugs should constitute a deportable offense
under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act.
The majority would also mandate a link between the respondent’s specific
conviction and a specific controlled substance law. However, section
241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act may also be read to link the respondent’s “viola-
tion,” rather than his “conviction,” with its relation to controlled substances,
and therefore the respondent’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V 1993)
clearly relates to the underlying drug-trafficking conviction. For a defendant
to violate 18 U.S.C. § 3, the statute criminalizing accessory after the fact, an
underlying crime must exist to which the defendant’s criminal behavior
relates. The respondent’s specific violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 involved “com-
mit(ing), receiv(ing), reliev(ing), comfort(ing) or assist(ing)” Mr. Franco in
his drug-trafficking endeavors and clearly relates to the underlying
drug-trafficking conviction. In fact, the respondent’s conviction for a viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 3 relates to nothing if not a drug-trafficking crime. The
respondent’s crime is not only “directly related” to the distribution of a nar-
cotic, it is also “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” under section
101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, rendering the respondent also deportable as an
aggravated felon under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act.
I would find, consistent with the plain meaning of section 241(a)(2)(B)(i)
of the Act, and with Congress’ intent, that the respondent’s conviction, pur-
suant to 18 U.S.C. § 3, establishes his deportability for a controlled substance

965
Interim Decision #3321

violation and that his offense constitutes an aggravated felony pursuant to
section 101(a)(43) of the Act.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Lory D. Rosenberg,
Board Member, in which Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman, joined.
The respondent was convicted of the offense of accessory after the fact
under 18 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V 1993). In the Order to Show Cause and Notice
of Hearing (Form I-221) (“OSC”), the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice alleged that the indictment under which the respondent was convicted
indicated that the respondent knew an offense against the Government had
been committed, to wit: a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute her-
oin. The OSC goes on to state that “on the basis of the foregoing allegations,”
it is charged that the respondent is subject to deportation under sections
241(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) (1994).
In proceedings before the Immigration Judge below, the respondent
denied that he was deportable for having been so convicted, either under sec-
tion 241(a)(2)(B)(i) or under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act. The Immi-
gration Judge found him to be deportable on these charges and certified the
record to the Board for review.
I agree with the majority that the respondent is not deportable under sec-
tion 241(a)(2)(B)(i). I concur in the decision of the majority with respect to
the distinctions between inchoate offenses and those which, like the offense
of accessory after the fact under section 18 U.S.C. § 3, are distinct offenses
requiring evidence of an independent intent or conduct on the part of the
offender to obtain a conviction. In other words, the respondent was convicted
under a statute in which the offense he committed does not rely on and is sep-
arate from the “the fact,” i.e., the particular character of the substantive
offense that was committed by the principal whom he received, relieved,
comforted, or assisted. Id. His conviction is not, therefore, one “relating to a
controlled substance.” See section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act.
I disagree, however, that the respondent is deportable under section
241(a)(2)(A)(iii), as charged. I must dissent from the majority’s holding that
the respondent is deportable on account of having been convicted of an
offense “relating to obstruction of justice,” which is an aggravated felony
under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act. See section 101(a)(43)(S) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (West Supp. 1997). Such a finding of
deportability is dependent upon three predicate factors, none of which is
present here.
(1) The Service must have properly alleged and charged that the respon-
dent is deportable on account of a particular conviction which is classifiable
under the statute as an aggravated felony. Sections 242(b), 242B of the Act,
8 U.S.C. § § 1252(b), 1252b (1994), as amended; see also sections 239(a)(1),
240(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1229(a)(1), 1229a(a)(2) (West Supp.

966
 Interim Decision #3321

1997), (effective in proceedings initiated after April 1, 1997, pursuant to sec-
tion 309(a)(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibil-
ity Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-625 (“IIRIRA”)).
(2) The respondent must have been notified of the allegations and
charges, and given the opportunity to respond to and defend against them.
Section 242(b) of the Act; see also sections 239(a)(1), 240(a)(2), (b)(4)(B) of
the Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1229(a)(1), 1229a(a)(2), (b)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1997)
(effective April 1, 1997).
(3) The evidence in the record must establish that the Service met its
burden of proving such allegations and charges by evidence which is clear,
unequivocal, and convincing. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); 8 C.F.R
§ 242.14(a) (1997); cf. section 240(c)(3)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1229(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring “clear and convincing” evi-
dence under the IIRIRA, effective April 1, 1997).
Although the preceding elements may appear to be self-evident and non-
controversial factors, fundamental to the statute and regulations which gov-
ern findings of deportability and orders of deportation, I do not believe that
the majority can reach the decision it does without abrogating them. The
majority rules that the respondent’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3 does not
support a finding of deportability as charged under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i). It
concludes, however, that the same conviction does support such a finding
under the statutory definition listing those convictions which constitute
aggravated felonies.
The majority reaches this result not because the conviction is, as alleged, a
controlled substance trafficking conviction which necessarily involves
knowledge of the principals’ involvement in a heroin conspiracy. See section
101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. That cannot be the case, since we have found con-
clusively that the respondent’s accessory after the fact offense does not
“relate to” a controlled substance. Consequently, it certainly cannot be classi-
fied as a controlled substance offense in its own right. The majority reaches
the result it does because, as an alternative basis to constitute an aggravated
felony, it concludes that the underlying conviction is one “relating to obstruc-
tion of justice.” See section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act.

I. A FINDING OF DEPORTABILITY ON A GROUND NOT
ALLEGED AND CHARGED VIOLATES THE RESPONDENT’S
RIGHT TO NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
The Service did not either allege or charge that the respondent’s convic-
tion constituted an aggravated felony on this basis of being one “relating to
obstruction of justice” either prior to or during the course of the hearing that
concluded with the decision of the Immigration Judge on April 19, 1995.
Indeed, it could not have done so, since a conviction relating to obstruction of

967
Interim Decision #3321

justice did not exist in the statute either independently or as constituting an
aggravated felony at the time either that the allegations were made and the
charges initially were lodged, or at any time during the deportation hearing
before the Immigration Judge. The respondent was never notified of such
allegations or charges during the course of the hearing, nor was he afforded
an opportunity to respond to or defend against such an allegation and charge.
An alien in deportation proceedings is to be afforded due process under
the Constitution. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Wong Yang
Sung v. McGraff, 339 U.S. 33, modified on other grounds, 339 U.S. 908
(1950); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)(stating that deportation
“visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay
and live and work in this land of freedom . . . . Meticulous care must be exer-
cised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the
essential standards of fairness.”). In determining the constitutional suffi-
ciency of deportation procedures in relation to due process protections, we
must look to the risk of the erroneous deprivation of the alien’s interest
through the procedures used and the probable value of additional procedural
safeguards. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Compliance with due process in immigration proceedings has been
accomplished historically through the observance of the statutory and regula-
tory safeguards which govern the procedural aspects of the deportation hear-
ing. In particular, the Service must initiate proceedings by issuing an Order to
Show Cause, which is required to contain a statement of the nature of the pro-
ceeding, the legal authority under which the proceeding is conducted, a con-
cise statement of factual allegations informing the respondent of the act or
conduct alleged to be in violation of the law, and a designation of the charge
against the respondent and of the statutory provisions alleged to have been
violated. See section 242(b) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(b) (1997); see also
sections 239(a)(1), 240(a)(2) of the Act (applicable to proceedings initiated
after April 1, 1997).
The regulations provide that the factual allegations and the charges in the
OSC are to be explained to the respondent in “nontechnical language.”
8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a)(1997); see also 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,375 (1997) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 240.48(a). The respondent is to be afforded an
opportunity to examine and contest both the factual allegations and the
charges lodged against him by the Service. In this case, the respondent denied
the charges, leaving the Service with the burden of proving that the respon-
dent was deportable as charged. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.14(a), 242.16(c) (1997);
see also 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,375 (1997) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§§ 240.46(a), 240.48(c)).
The opportunity to lodge additional charges in a deportation hearing is a
right reserved by the Service. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.30, 242.16(d) (1997). The
Service may amend the OSC to add additional factual allegations and charges
at any time during the hearing. Such allegations and charges must be in

968
 Interim Decision #3321

writing and entered as an exhibit in the record. Id. Under these circum-
stances, however, the respondent is to be afforded an opportunity to respond
to and present evidence to rebut such new charges, including being granted a
reasonable continuance to prepare his response to them. 8 C.F.R. § 3.30; see
also 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(d) (requiring that upon the lodging of additional
charges, the Immigration Judge is to explain them to the respondent, advise
the respondent that he may seek representation by counsel, and advise him
that he may have an additional period of time to “meet the additional factual
allegations and charges”).
Upon receiving these new factual allegations and charges, the respondent
may be afforded a continuance in order to either secure counsel or properly
respond. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(d). In this case, the respondent was charged with
having been convicted of an aggravated felony. The only allegation made and
the only evidence in the record in support of that charge, however, reflects
that it was lodged under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act.
The Service neither presented new charges during the course of the hear-
ing nor offered the respondent written notice that his conviction for accessory
after the fact was alleged to be an aggravated felony under the recently
amended section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. Indeed the Service cannot be
expected to have done so, as such a ground of deportability did not exist when
the conviction occurred, when the OSC was issued, or at any time during the
period in which the proceedings before the Immigration Judge were con-
ducted and his decision was rendered.
Only recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that “the INS may not substitute alternative grounds for deportation at this
stage in the proceedings.” Choeum v. INS, 118 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1997). In that
case, the court addressed the effort of the Service to substitute charges fol-
lowing appeal to the federal circuit court. Here, although the case remains on
administrative appeal and it is not the Service who seeks to substitute
charges, the result is no different.
Although they do not expressly so state, the majority’s finding that the
respondent’s conviction is not an aggravated felony by virtue of being a con-
trolled substance trafficking conviction is a necessary conclusion. Having
found that the respondent’s conviction is not one related to a controlled sub-
stance for purposes of section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, the majority cannot
find that the respondent is deportable as an aggravated felon under section
241(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of a controlled substance viola-
tion as described in section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. I agree, and find there-
fore, that the proceedings should be terminated.
Nevertheless, appearing to inappropriately usurp the function of the Ser-
vice, the majority in this case “sub silentio” charges the respondent with an
additional charge of deportability—conviction of a crime relating to obstruc-
tion of justice. See section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. We are without the statu-
tory or regulatory authority to amend the OSC to include additional charges

969
Interim Decision #3321

of deportability. That function is reserved to the Service. Not only do neither
the statute nor the regulations sanction such a practice on the part of the adju-
dicating body, but such action certainly conflicts head on with due process
considerations. See Choeum v. INS, supra.
The ordinary and obvious meaning of a phrase is not to be lightly dis-
counted. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (citing Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)). The statute states specifically that
the respondent “shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circumstances
of nature of the charges.” Section 242(b) of the Act; see also section
239(a)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229 (West Supp. 1997). Moreover,
the respondent “shall have the opportunity to examine evidence against him,
to present evidence on his own behalf.” Id. Here, the only “notice” the
respondent received that he is being charged as an aggravated felon under
section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act (obstruction of justice), instead of section
101(a)(43)(B) of the Act (controlled substance trafficking), is an administra-
tively final order of deportation.
Even were such a prosecutorial function to be appropriate when taken by
the adjudicating body, which it is not, the majority cannot simply substitute
new allegations and charges as a basis for its decision finding the respondent
deportable. The respondent was provided no prior notice in writing, nor was
he afforded any opportunity to either examine this new allegation or to
respond to it in support of the aggravated felony charge. This violation of the
regulations prejudiced respondent directly by resulting in a finding of
deportability by the majority on allegations regarding which he had neither
notice nor an opportunity to respond.
We are bound to follow regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.
Matter of Ponce de Leon, 21 I&N Dec. 154 (BIA 1996). We also may take
appropriate action when the regulations that function to secure a respon-
dent’s rights are not followed or when an improper implementation of those
regulations violates fundamental fairness. Matter of Garcia-Flores, 17 I&N
Dec. 325 (BIA 1980); see also Matter of Santos, 19 I&N Dec. 105 (BIA
1984). Such is the case here. A determination that the respondent is
deportable on an allegation and charge never presented to him, or heard by
the Immigration Judge below, cannot support the decision of the majority.

II. THE RESPONDENT’S CONVICTION HAS NOT BEEN
PROVEN TO BE AN AGGRAVATED FELONY UNDER
SECTION 101(A)(43)(S) BY CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL, AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE
The majority’s reliance on section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act as support for
its disposition in this case is erroneous, as there is no substantial evidence in
the record on which to come to such a conclusion. See section 242(b) of the
Act; see also IIRIRA § 321(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-627. That the respondent’s

970
 Interim Decision #3321

accessory after the fact conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3 possibly could be
shown to be one “relating to obstruction of justice,” an aggravated felony
under the Act as now amended, is not clear, unequivocal, or convincing evi-
dence of such a fact.
The burden of demonstrating that such a conviction comes within the
aggravated felony definition rests with the Service, 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a), and
it has provided absolutely no evidence indicating that the conviction in ques-
tion is one “relating to obstruction of justice.” The Service has alleged only
that the “accessory after” offense in question relates to a controlled substance
conviction, and has provided no more than an indictment referring to the
respondent’s knowledge of a conspiracy involving controlled substance in
support of the allegation.
As noted above, even were one inclined to consider that such an “acces-
sory after” conviction might be, per se, one “relating to obstruction of jus-
tice” within the terms of section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, the state of the
record before us would not allow a conclusion that such is the case. This is
because the respondent has had no opportunity to consider or respond to such
an allegation, or to provide evidence or authority in support of a defense that
it is not, necessarily, such a conviction. Although we need not determine that
question to resolve the case before us, I note that the term “obstruction of jus-
tice” is a term of art used in the federal statute to refer to a series of specific
offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1517 (1994).1
We have recognized that, in determining whether or not a specific offense
falls within a classification described in deportation provisions under the Act,
it is proper to look to the federal definition. See Matter of L-G-, 21 I&N Dec.
89 (BIA 1995) (holding that our determination of which controlled sub-
stance crimes constitute a “felony” for purposes of the aggravated felony def-
inition requires reference to the federal criminal statute); Matter of
Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995)(holding that our determination of the
nature of a disposition resulting from certain state offenses is properly made
according to its possessing the same or similar characteristics as those found
in the federal statute). This approach is consistent with that taken by the
Supreme Court of the United States which holds that a generic definition
based on a federal standard is an appropriate mechanism by which to deter-
mine whether or not there has been a conviction for a particular crime. See
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (holding that a state conviction
for burglary only constitutes such an offense for purposes of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), when the offense’s statutory defini-
tion substantially corresponds to the generic federal definition).
1 These provisions refer to specific interference in the administration of justice relating to

perjury, bribery, interference in investigation of financial transactions, jury tampering,
threatening or intimidation of witnesses, and other specific forms of impeding justice not
necessarily entirely encompassing the respondent’s undifferentiated offense of receiving,
comforting, or assisting in order to hinder or prevent apprehension, trial, or punishment.

971
Interim Decision #3321

In addition, we have considered the language “relating to” in this very case
and in prior precedent decisions in which the identical language has been
used in relation to other offenses. Consequently, whether or not the respon-
dent’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3 is one “relating to obstruction of jus-
tice” under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, may very well turn on evidence,
either on the face of the conviction, or in the record of conviction, demon-
strating that the conviction is one that corresponds to a federal offense
described under 18 U.S.C. § 1501, et seq., or, at the very minimum, relates to
such an offense.
Moreover, the legislative mandate in section 321(b) of the IIRIRA that
aggravated felony convictions shall be considered to be such without regard
to the fact that they occurred before, on, or after the date of the IIRIRA, pro-
vides no authority to the contrary. I note that this retroactive classification is
tempered by section 321(c) of the IIRIRA which provides that the retroactive
definition applies to “actions taken” after the enactment date of the IIRIRA,
but that this limitation has been essentially obviated in the regulations, which
define the clause as meaning all pending matters. See 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312,
10,330 (1997) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(t)); cf. Valderrama-Fonseca v.
INS, 116 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that contrary to the Service’s liti-
gation position, “actions taken” cannot reasonably apply to federal court
review since that would render an arbitrary result dependent only on when
appeals might “percolate” up to the court). Nevertheless, neither the defini-
tion nor the effective date of the retroactive definition is either relevant or
dispositive here, as the predicate basis for consideration of the new “relating
to obstruction of justice” aggravated felony provision was neither alleged nor
charged in the appeal before us.
I find no basis on the record to conclude that the respondent is deportable
for an aggravated felony conviction as alleged or charged. Therefore, I would
dismiss the charges and terminate the proceedings, finding that the respon-
dent is not deportable.

972