United States v. Cheeseman

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

No. 09-1756
_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JAMES L. CHEESEMAN,
Appellant

___________

On Appeal from the District Court
for the District of Delaware
(No. 09-cr-00124-001)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
___________

Argued October 27, 2009

Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and HARDIMAN,
Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: March 2, 2010)

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Chandra J. Williams (Argued)
Charles M. Oberly, III
Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP
1100 North Market Street
Suite 1000
Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for Appellant

Keith M. Rosen (Argued)
Lesley F. Wolf
Office of the United States Attorney
1007 N. Orange Street
Suite 700
P.O. Box 2046
Wilmington, DE 19899

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:

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 Appellant, James L. Cheeseman, pled guilty to violating
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which criminalizes possession of
firearms and ammunition by an unlawful user or addict of a
controlled substance. He appeals from the District Court’s
judgment directing the forfeiture of over 600 firearms and
ammunition enumerated in Count I of the indictment to which
he pled guilty. Cheeseman raises two arguments on appeal. He
first contends that forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1)
was improper because the property was neither “involved in”
nor “used in” a knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
Alternatively, Cheeseman argues that forfeiture of his property
violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Because we find that the firearms and ammunition specifically
identified in Count I of the indictment were involved in
Appellant’s § 922(g)(3) violation, and because we conclude that
the forfeiture of Cheeseman’s property was not grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the § 922(g)(3) offense, we
will affirm the District Court’s Order of Forfeiture.

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 I. Background1
From 1994 through August 2007, Cheeseman was the
owner and sole proprietor of X-Ring Supply, a sporting goods
and firearms store located in Newark, Delaware. The federal
firearms license (“FFL”) for X-Ring was held in Cheeseman’s
name. X-Ring maintained an inventory of approximately 600
firearms. The premises included a separate warehouse located
next to the store.
Cheeseman’s drug abuse began in 2003 after his wife
ended their marriage. Between 2005 and 2007, as his crack
cocaine addiction worsened, Cheeseman converted X-Ring’s
warehouse into his home, storing inside it an air mattress,
sleeping bag and bedding. The District Court found that fellow
crack cocaine abusers occasionally stayed with Cheeseman in
the warehouse and that he occasionally turned off X-Ring’s
security system. Although Cheeseman argues to the contrary,
the District Court found that ammunition and gun boxes were

1
These facts are derived from the indictment and the
District Court’s opinion. See United States v. Cheeseman, 593
F. Supp. 2d 682 (D. Del. 2009). Although Cheeseman’s
recitation of the facts surrounding his access and use of X-Ring
differs slightly from the District Court’s findings of fact, he does
not allege that those findings are clearly erroneous, nor does he
point to any factual error. He merely presents the facts in a light
more favorable to his legal arguments. After reviewing the
record, including the portions cited by Cheeseman in support of
his factual assertions, we discern no clear error in the District
Court’s findings of fact.

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stored in the warehouse.
In 2005, Cheeseman completed a renewal application for
his FFL, on which he indicated that he did not unlawfully use
narcotics. Answering this question falsely subjects an applicant
to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) penalties. Because of Cheeseman’s
erratic behavior due to his severe drug habit, his sister Nancy
Macknatt assumed power of attorney over her brother and
began to manage X-Ring’s daily operations. Accordingly,
Cheeseman’s presence in the store was “sporadic and
unpredictable.” Cheeseman, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
Nonetheless, employees found crack pipes on X-Ring’s
premises on at least three separate occasions.
A.
The incident prompting this case occurred on August 5,
2007, when Delaware police officers observed a woman
urinating in the parking lot of a pharmacy. The woman was
Cheeseman’s companion. After the police officers found drugs
on her person, Cheeseman consented to a pat down, during
which officers located a crack pipe and crack cocaine. A
subsequent search of his vehicle revealed a second crack pipe
and additional crack cocaine. Cheeseman told the police
officers that he abused drugs and had recently returned from a
rehabilitation facility.
Shortly thereafter, federal agents executed a search
warrant at X-Ring and seized approximately 609 guns and
ammunition; an estimated sixty-seven of the firearms were
identified as comprising Cheeseman’s personal collection.
Some of the seized weapons were antique firearms. In the
warehouse, agents recovered a crack pipe, a mirror with cocaine

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residue, a burnt spoon with cutting residue, an ashtray with
white residue, ammunition, a butane torch and a scale with
white residue. Consequently, a federal grand jury returned a
three-count indictment against Cheeseman with notice of
forfeiture, accusing him of: (1) possession of a firearm by an
unlawful drug user in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3); (2)
possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and (3) distribution of crack cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Relevant to this appeal, § 922(g)(3) makes it unlawful
for any person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act . . .) . . . to . . . possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
Count One of the indictment identified individually the 609
firearms and a quantity of ammunition that Cheeseman was
accused of illegally possessing. In December 2007, Cheeseman
divested himself of all of his interest in X-Ring, selling it to
Macknatt and to his other sister, Pamela Rhoades.2

2
Now a convicted felon, Cheeseman cannot lawfully
possess a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). If we were to rule
that the forfeiture was improper or unconstitutional, it is less
than certain that the firearms and ammunition would be returned
to Cheeseman’s sisters, the owners of X-Ring. Cf. United States
v. Felici, 208 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2000) (ruling that
convicted felons cannot constructively possess firearms).

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 B.
In February 2008, Cheeseman pled guilty to violating §
922(g)(3). In his plea agreement he admitted that:
[I]f there were a trial, the Government would
have to prove three elements of the offense: (1)
that from on or about August 5, 2007, through
August 14, 2007, the defendant possessed a
firearm or ammunition; (2) that the defendant was
a regular user of, or addicted to, a controlled
substance during a period of time proximate to or
contemporaneous with the possession of the
firearm or ammunition; and (3) the
above-described firearm affected interstate
commerce. The defendant knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently admits for purposes of his guilty
plea and sentencing that, from on or about August
5, 2007, through August 14, 2007: (a) he actually
and constructively possessed the firearms and
ammunition set forth in [Count One] of the
indictment; (b) he was a regular unlawful user of,
and addicted to, cocaine base; and (c) the firearms
and ammunition at issue affected interstate
commerce.
Cheeseman, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 683 (internal quotation marks
& citation omitted). The District Court delayed sentencing in
order to hold a forfeiture hearing to determine whether the
firearms and ammunition specifically enumerated in Count One
of the indictment were forfeitable pursuant to § 924(d)(1), and
if so, whether forfeiture would violate the Excessive Fines

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Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Section 924 is the penalty provision of the Gun Control
Act of 1968 (“Gun Control Act”). Section 924(d)(1) provides
that “any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any
knowing violation of subsection . . . (g) . . . of section 922 . . .
shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture.” Section 924(d)(2)(c)
mandates that “[o]nly those firearms or quantities of
ammunition particularly named and individually identified as
involved in or used in any violation of the provisions of this
chapter . . . shall be subject to seizure, forfeiture, and
disposition.” Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 5872(b), any firearms or
ammunition forfeited may be destroyed, sold to a state, or used
by the federal government.
C.
Although the District Court did not clearly identify
which portion of § 924(d) it found satisfied, i.e., whether
Cheeseman “involved” or “used” the firearms in a knowing
violation of § 922(g)(3), the District Court, after holding a
hearing on the forfeitability of Cheeseman’s property,
concluded that Cheeseman’s guilty plea sufficiently satisfied the
statute’s forfeiture requirements. The District Court first noted
that the Government must prove forfeitability by a
preponderance of the evidence and establish a sufficient nexus
between the § 922(g)(3) violation and the property sought to be
forfeited. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (providing that
when “the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the
court must determine whether the government has established
the requisite nexus between the property and the offense”).
Next, the District Court rejected Cheeseman’s contention that

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“there [was] no evidence that he ever used or involved a firearm
in any manner to facilitate his cocaine addiction.” Cheeseman,
593 F. Supp. 2d at 687.
Rather, the District Court made the following findings of
fact linking Cheeseman’s drug abuse to his § 922(3)(g)(3)
violation:
[I]t is clear from the evidence and testimony
presented at the evidentiary hearing as well as the
uncontested [Pre-Sentencing Report] that: (1)
defendant has been using cocaine since 2003; (2)
he was living and using crack cocaine at X-Ring;
(3) during after[-]business hours, defendant
allowed users of crack cocaine to stay with him at
X-Ring; (4) drug paraphernalia was found at
X-Ring; (5) defendant lied about his addiction on
his FFL renewal; (6) after defendant’s FFL was
renewed-on false pretenses-he continued to
operate X-Ring, including purchasing and selling
firearms; (7) he compromised the security of
X-Ring by turning off the security alarm in order
to allow himself and crack addicts into the retail
store; (8) he stored his personal gun collection
unsecured; and (9) although not actively involved
in the day-to-day business of X-Ring, defendant
used drugs on the premises and had unfettered
access to the inventory of firearms and

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 ammunition.3
Id. Thus, the District Court ruled that the firearms and
ammunition specifically identified in Count One of the
indictment were forfeitable pursuant to § 924(d)(1).
Next, the District Court rejected Cheeseman’s contention
that forfeiture of the firearms and ammunition would violate the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines. While
Cheeseman contended that the seized firearms were worth
approximately $500,000 and the Government countered that
they were valued at $371,500, the District Court assumed,
arguendo, that the actual value was the higher figure.
Reasoning that the Government could have charged each
individual possession as a separate offense, thereby exposing
Cheeseman to multiple special assessments and statutory fines,
the District Court concluded that the Government’s restraint in
charging rendered the forfeiture constitutional. Cheeseman was
then sentenced to eight months time-served and three years of
supervised release. The District Court declined to impose a
fine.
II. Discussion
Cheeseman raises two arguments on appeal. First, he
contends that forfeiture of his firearms and ammunition
pursuant to §924(d)(1) was improper because the property was
neither involved in nor used in a knowing violation of § 922(g).
Cheeseman alternatively avers that the forfeiture violates the

3
Cheeseman offers “innocent” explanations for his
behavior. For example, he contends that he would occasionally
turn off X-Ring’s security cameras for privacy reasons when he
had female companionship at the store. (See Appellant’s Br.
17.) He does not, however, explain why the District Court’s
finding constitutes clear error.

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Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines.4 We do
not find either argument persuasive.
A. Statutory Arguments
Cheeseman first argues that forfeiture pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 924(d) was improper because the contraband was not
“involved in” or “used in” a knowing violation of the
substantive provision of the Gun Control Act to which he pled
guilty. We will first address the second of the two alternatives
in the statute, which permits forfeiture of firearms and
ammunition “used in” a § 922(g)(3) violation.

4
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
this criminal case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We exercise
jurisdiction over this appeal from the final judgment of
conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Even though
Cheeseman no longer owns the firearms or ammunition, Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(4)(A), which governs criminal
forfeiture, provides that a forfeiture becomes final at sentencing
and that a defendant may appeal a forfeiture order once
sentenced. See United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271, 275 (3d
Cir. 2005) (holding that a final order of forfeiture can only be
imposed as part of a defendant’s criminal sentence); United
States v. Pelullo, 178 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that
“the order of forfeiture entered at sentencing is a final order with
respect to the defendant from which he can appeal”).
We review a district court’s factual findings for clear
error and exercise plenary review over a district court’s
interpretation of a statute. See United States v. Rivera Constr.
Co., 863 F.2d 293, 295 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). We review de novo
a district court’s determination of whether a forfeiture
constitutes an excessive fine in violation of the Constitution’s
Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 336-37 (1998).

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 The first step in interpreting the meaning of § 924(d)(1)
is analyzing the statutory text. See Bailey v. United States, 516
U.S. 137, 144-45 (1995). Because neither “involved in” nor
“used in” is defined in the statute, we look to the ordinary and
natural meaning of the words, as well as the “placement and
purpose [of the phrases] in the statutory scheme.” Id. at 145
(internal quotation marks & citation omitted). Thus, the
“meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on
context.” Id. at 144-45 (instructing interpreting courts to review
the “language, context, and history” of a statute). In turn, it is
appropriate to examine similar language in the statute to
ascertain the meaning of undefined terms. See id. (noting that
“using a firearm should not have a different meaning in §
924(c)(1) than it does in § 924(d)”) (internal quotation marks &
citation omitted).
If a statute is ambiguous and punitive in nature, “the rule
of lenity requires that any ambiguity in the statute be resolved in
favor of the claimant.” United States v. $734,578.82 in United
States Currency, 286 F.3d 641, 657 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 801 (3d
Cir. 1994)). The rule of lenity, however, is inapplicable if there
is only a mere suggestion of ambiguity because most “statutes
are ambiguous to some degree.” See id. at 658 (internal
quotation marks & citation omitted). Furthermore, any
“[j]udicial perception” that the result in a case is unreasonable
may not enter into our interpretation of an unambiguous statute.
See Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987).
1. “Used In” Prong of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)
Cheeseman argues that forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(d)(1) was improper because the seized firearms and
ammunition were not “used in” his § 922(g)(3) violation.
Although no precedential case law directly addresses the
meaning of “used in” with respect to a § 922(g)(3) violation, in
a trilogy of cases the Supreme Court has extensively explored

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the meaning of “uses” in the § 924(c) context. Section 924(c)
adds five years to a sentence for anyone who uses, carries, or
possesses a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence
or a drug trafficking crime. Because the meaning of “use” is
presumed to be the same in §§ 924(c) and 924(d)(1), these cases
guide our interpretation of the meaning of the phrase “ used in
any knowing violation of subsection . . . (g) . . . of section 922”
in § 924(d)(1). See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs.,
Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007) (“A standard principle of
statutory construction provides that identical words and phrases
within the same statute should normally be given the same
meaning.”).
The first case in which the Supreme Court addressed the
definition of “uses” in the context of § 924(c) was Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). In Smith, the Court ruled
that trading a firearm for drugs constituted a “use” for purposes
of applying § 924(c)’s enhanced penalty. 508 U.S. at 225. The
Court looked at the dictionary definition of “use,” noting that it
is defined, variably, as “[t]o make use of; to convert to one’s
service; to employ; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a
purpose or action by means of.” Id. at 229 (internal quotation
marks & citation omitted). Thus, according to the plain
language of the term, the Smith Court ruled that “use” of a
firearm is not limited to firing a firearm. Id. To the contrary,
the Court held that Smith used the firearm when he traded it for
drugs. See id. at 240-41.
Two years later in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137
(1995), the Court addressed whether mere possession of a
firearm constituted a “use” of a firearm during and in relation to

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drug trafficking.5 Ruling in the negative, the Court concluded
that “evidence of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to
drugs or drug proceeds is alone [in]sufficient to support a
conviction for ‘use’ of a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking offense.” Bailey, 516 U.S. at 138-39. Invoking the
canon of statutory interpretation that “a legislature is presumed
to have used no superfluous words,” the Court reasoned that the
expansive reading of “use” urged by the government would also
encompass carrying a firearm, thereby rendering the term
“carry” superfluous. Id. at 145-46. Because the Court discerned
no intention by Congress for these terms to be redundant, it
rejected the government’s expansive reading of “use.” Thus,
according to Bailey, “use” requires more than mere possession
of a firearm; rather, “use” entails active employment or
utilization of a firearm to bring it within the meaning of §
924(c). See id. at 143.
Finally, in United States v. Watson, the Court ruled that
trading drugs for a firearm did not constitute a use within the
meaning of § 924(c). 552 U.S. 74, 76 (2007). Building upon
Smith and Bailey, the Watson Court noted that in a bartering
situation, a “seller does not ‘use’ a buyer’s consideration.” 552
U.S. at 79 (citation omitted). Thus, receipt of a gun in trade for
drugs does not constitute a “use” of a firearm for § 924(c)
purposes.
Citing this trilogy of cases, Cheeseman contends that
forfeiture was inappropriate because the seized firearms and
ammunition were not “used in” a knowing violation of §

5
At the time Bailey was decided, § 924(c) did not
include the term “possess.” It only included the terms “carry”
and “use.” After the Court ruled that mere possession did not
constitute a “use” for § 924(c) purposes, Congress amended the
statute to criminalize possession of a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense.

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922(g)(3). The Government counters that Cheeseman employed
the firearms by “purchasing them, offering them for sale
[through X-Ring], and using the proceeds to support his crack
cocaine addiction.” (Appellee’s Br. 23.) According to the
Government, like the defendant in Smith, Cheeseman bartered
with his firearms to purchase drugs. To adopt this argument, we
must accept that (1) illegally purchasing guns on behalf of
X-Ring (2) in order to sell those guns to lawful buyers (3) for
the purpose of using the proceeds from the sales to purchase
drugs, is similar to the facts of Smith, in which the defendant
gave his gun directly to a drug dealer for cocaine. This
reasoning stretches Smith too far and therefore must be rejected.
There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Cheeseman
actively employed the firearms or traded his firearms to drug
dealers to purchase crack cocaine. Rather, the record supports
a finding that Cheeseman unlawfully possessed the firearms
while addicted to narcotics. Indeed, unlawful possession due to
his status as a drug abuser was the basis for Cheeseman’s guilty
plea. Because Bailey dictates that mere possession does not
constitute “use” for § 924(d)(1) purposes, forfeiture cannot be
based upon this portion of the statute.
2. “Involved In” Prong of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)
Cheeseman’s next argument, that the District Court’s
order should be reversed because the seized firearms and
ammunition were not “involved in” a violation of the Gun
Control Act, is less persuasive. Like “used in,” “involved in” is
not defined in § 924(d)(1). Therefore, our analysis again begins
with the plain meaning of “involved.” Merriam-Webster defines
“involved” as: (1) “to engage as a participant”; (2) “to relate
closely”; (3) “to have within or as part of itself”; and (4) “to
require as a necessary accompaniment.” Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 660 (11th ed. 2003). The term’s plain
meaning leads to the conclusion that the seized firearms
specifically identified and enumerated in Count I were

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“involved in” the offense to which Cheeseman pled guilty
because the firearms served as the foundation of his criminality
and conviction. Indeed, without the firearms, there would have
been no crime. Accordingly, the firearms were related closely
to and were a necessary accompaniment to the crime charged in
Count One.
Nonetheless, Cheeseman contends that the firearms were
not “related at all to,” nor “involved in,” his addiction. (See
Appellant’s Br. 25.) This argument exposes Cheeseman’s
misunderstanding of § 924(d)(1). The forfeiture statute does not
require that the firearms be “involved in” Cheeseman’s
addiction in order to be subject to forfeiture. To the contrary, §
924(d)(1) permits forfeiture of all firearms that are involved in
the § 922(g)(3) offense. In other words, the object of “involved
in” is not Cheeseman’s addiction. Rather, “involved in”
addresses the offenses enumerated in § 924(d)(1), including the
§ 922(g)(3) violation to which Cheeseman pled guilty.
Furthermore, as the Government notes, possession of
firearms is a necessary element of a § 922(g)(3) offense. See
United States v. 13 Firearms & Ammunition Seized from 7438
KY 718 Dewitt, Ky., No. 06-cv-51, 2006 WL 1913360, at *2
(E.D. Ky. July 11, 2006) (noting that “involved in . . . includes
firearms possessed by prohibited persons”); see also United
States v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 n.8 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(reasoning that in § 922(g)(3) the firearm is the corpus delicti)6 ;
cf. United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1056 (8th Cir. 2005)
(noting that the laundered money is the corpus of a money
laundering violation and is therefore “involved in” the offense).

6
Corpus delicti means “the substance of the crime.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 369 (8th ed. 2004).

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 Indeed, all § 922(g)(3) requires for a violation is mere
possession of firearms by an unlawful drug abuser, and
Cheeseman admitted unlawful possession in his guilty plea.
Cheeseman’s argument that the very firearms that serve as the
basis for his underlying conviction are not “involved in” or
“related to” that conviction strains credulity.
Nor is the phrase “involved in” ambiguous, which would
otherwise merit application of the rule of lenity, because when
read in the context of the entire statute, interpreting “involved
in” to include possession of firearms does not render §
924(d)(1)’s “used in” clause redundant. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at
146 (“We assume that Congress used two terms [‘carry’ and
‘use’] because it intended each term to have a particular,
nonsuperfluous meaning.”). When read in the context of the
entire statute and in conjunction with the Gun Control Act’s
legislative history, it is clear that both terms “used in” and
“involved in” have particular meanings.
A central goal of the Gun Control Act was restricting
public access to firearms. It was enacted to “strengthen Federal
controls over interstate and foreign commerce in firearms and to
assist the States effectively to regulate firearms traffic within
their borders.” H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577, at 6 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4411. Congressional action was
prompted by the “increasing rate of crime and lawlessness and
the growing use of firearms in violent crime.” Id. at 7.
Additionally, the Gun Control Act amended Title IV of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Acts of 1968 to include
unlawful users of narcotics in the class of individuals whose
access to, and possession of, firearms Congress deemed contrary
to public interest. Id.; see also Huddleston v. United States, 415
U.S. 814, 824 (1974). This purpose is illustrated by
Congressman Celler’s floor statement, entered into the
Congressional Record during the Act’s debate, wherein he noted
that:

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 [W]e are convinced that a strengthened [firearms
control system] can significantly contribute to
reduc[ing] the danger of crime in the United
States. No one can dispute the need to prevent
drug addicts, mental incompetents, persons with
a history of mental disturbances, and persons
convicted of certain offenses from buying,
owning, or possessing firearms. This bill seeks to
maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out
of the hands of such persons.
Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 828 (internal quotation marks &
citation omitted). Therefore, § 922(g) was enacted to keep
firearms “out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess
them” due to their status of falling into one of § 922(g)’s
prohibited categories. Id. at 824 (internal quotation marks &
citation omitted).7 In other words, § 922(g) “simply strikes at
the possession of firearms by the wrong kind of people.”
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 573 (1977)
(internal quotation marks & citation omitted). The regulation
interpreting this section of the Gun Control Act defines an
unlawful user of a controlled substance as someone who “uses
a controlled substance and has lost the power of self-control.”

7
Significantly, under the Senate version of the bill, an
amendment removed the prohibition on drug abusers from
owning, possessing or receiving firearms or ammunition. H.R.
Rep. No. 90-1577, at 30, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410,
4430. The House version of the bill, however, preserved the
broad exclusion and was ultimately adopted by the Conference
Committee, passed by both Chambers of Congress and signed
into law. Id. Thus, despite a challenge from the Senate, the
proscription against unlawful drug users possessing firearms
remained intact.

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27 C.F.R. § 478.11. Cheeseman’s guilty plea makes plain that
he is just such a person.
In 1986, Congress passed the Firearms Owners
Protection Act (“FOPA”), which amended the Gun Control Act.
FOPA was designed to relieve the “burdens” the 1968 Act
imposed on lawful firearms users while simultaneously
strengthening “the ability of law enforcement to fight violent
crime and narcotics trafficking.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-495, at 1
(1986), printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1327. FOPA also
limited the forfeiture provision of the Gun Control Act to
firearms or ammunition “particularly named and individually
identified as involved in or used in specified violations of law.”
Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). FOPA
did not define the term “involved in” in either the definitions
portion of the bill or in the accompanying report language. Nor
did FOPA remove the prohibition on drug abusers owning,
possessing or receiving firearms or ammunition.
This legislative history supports our conclusion that our
interpretation of “involved in” does not render the “used in”
clause superfluous. In Smith, the Supreme Court opined that
Congress varied the statutory language in § 924(d)(1) and
included the broad term “involved in” to apply to crimes in
which the firearm’s involvement in the enumerated offense
would not require a use of the firearm. 508 U.S. at 235
(Congress “carefully varied the statutory language [in §
924(d)(1)] in accordance with the guns’ relation to the
offense.”). Consequently, the term “involved in” necessarily has
a more expansive meaning than the term “use” in order to
effectuate Congress’ intention that forfeiture apply to the unique
crimes enumerated in § 922, which may be committed without
ever using a firearm. Id. In this way, Congress ensured that the
class of individuals it deemed should not possess weapons
would have their firearms forfeited upon a violation of § 922.

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As an example, the Smith Court noted that § 922(a)(6)
criminalizes “making of a false statement material to the
lawfulness of a gun’s transfer.” Id. “Because making a material
misstatement in order to acquire . . . a gun is not ‘use’ of the gun
even under the broadest definition of the word ‘use,’” the
Supreme Court concluded that “Congress carefully expanded the
statutory language” by including the term “involved in” in the
statute. Id. Therefore, Congress chose such a broad term to
ensure forfeiture of firearms for offenses where, as in
Cheeseman’s case, “use” is not a necessary - or sometimes even
a possible - element of the crime. Thus, when read in context of
the entire statute and with Congress’ intent in mind, the terms
“involved in” and “used in” retain separate meanings.
In sum, we hold that possession of firearms and
ammunition is sufficient for a district court to find that the
property was “involved in” a § 922(g)(3) offense. This
interpretation of “involved in” makes sense in light of Congress’
intent to keep firearms out of the possession of drug abusers, a
dangerous class of individuals, and supports a finding that the
seized firearms and ammunition were “involved in”
Cheeseman’s § 922(g)(3) offense. This conclusion is bolstered
by the District Court’s findings that: (1) Cheeseman had
unfettered access to the full panoply of weapons located in
X-Ring; (2) he used crack cocaine in and around those weapons;
and (3) he brought other drug abusers to the store and warehouse
to smoke crack. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s

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determination that the specified firearms and ammunition were
“involved in” Cheeseman’s § 922(g)(3) violation.8
3. “Knowing” Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)
Cheeseman’s final statutory argument, that he did not
knowingly violate § 922(g)(3), also fails. Cheeseman contends
that while he pled guilty to violating § 922(g)(3), his guilty plea
“does not provide an admission of ‘knowingly’ violating Section
922(g) for purposes of forfeiture.” (Appellant’s Br. 26.)
Cheeseman argues, without citation to any supporting case law,
that knowledge is especially important in cases, such as his,
where the forfeiture is a criminal punishment. (Id. at 27.)
This argument is unpersuasive because it discounts firmly
established case law construing the term “knowing” to require
“only that the act be voluntary and intentional and not [to
require] that a person knows he is breaking the law.” United
States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 408 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks & citation omitted). Cheeseman does not
contend that his drug use or firearm possession was involuntary
or unintentional.
In essence, Cheeseman invites the Court to read into §
924(d)(1) a willfulness requirement, which, if applied, would
require him to have had actual knowledge that his prohibited
conduct was illegal in order for the firearms to be forfeitable.
(Appellant’s Br. at 26-27). We reject this argument. “Congress
[is] presumed to know the meanings of the words and phrases it
uses in drafting statutes.” Pope by Pope v. E. Brunswick Bd. of
Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1249 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, Congress used

8
For the same reasons that the forfeited firearms and
ammunition were “involved in” a knowing violation of §
922(g)(3), the District Court correctly found, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2, that a sufficient nexus existed
between the forfeited property and the offense.

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the term “knowing” and not “willful,” clearly indicating its
preference for the lower scienter. Further undermining
Cheeseman’s argument is the fact that Congress included a
willful mens rea in another clause of 924(d)(1). Therefore, if
Congress intended the first clause of § 924(d)(1) to also contain
a heightened scienter, it would have used the term willful
instead of knowing.
Second, despite his protestations to the contrary, in his
plea agreement Cheeseman unambiguously admitted that he was
an unlawful user of narcotics who knowingly possessed firearms
and ammunition. Prior to enactment of FOPA, courts often
considered § 922(g) strict liability crimes. See, e.g., United
States v. Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 352 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996). After
FOPA became law, however, courts read into § 922(g) a mens
rea requirement. Id. While the statute is silent as to its requisite
mens rea, the elements of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violation are:
(1) that the defendant is an unlawful user or addicted to any
controlled substance; (2) who thereafter knowingly possessed a
firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate
commerce. Cf. United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d
Cir. 2000) (reading into the felon-in-possession portion of §
922(g)(1) a “knowing” scienter ); Capps, 77 F.3d at 352 (same).
Therefore, because Cheeseman pled guilty to Count One, he
admitted that he knowingly violated § 922(g)(3).
Third, to the extent that Cheeseman’s argument is based
on his contention that he had not been adjudicated an unlawful
possessor of firearms at the time he committed the § 922(g)(3)
offense, and was therefore not on notice that he was knowingly
violating the statute, this argument also fails. This is essentially
a variant on the losing argument that ignorance of the law
excuses illegal conduct. Cf. United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d
394, 398 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[A] legally relevant status under §
922(g) may arise in the absence of any formal proceeding. For
example, § 922(g)(3) prohibits an individual addicted to

-22-
controlled substances from possessing a firearm, yet an
individual attains the status of a drug addict without a court
proceeding of any kind.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that the firearms and
ammunition enumerated in Count One of the indictment are
subject to forfeiture because they were “involved in”
Cheeseman’s knowing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violation.
B. Excessive Fines Claim
Having concluded that § 924(d)(1) permits forfeiture of
Cheeseman’s firearms and ammunition, we must determine
whether that forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive fines.
1. History of the Excessive Fines Clause
The Eighth Amendment provides that: “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
There was little debate surrounding the adoption of the Eighth
Amendment and no discussion regarding the inclusion within
the Amendment of the Excessive Fines Clause. See Tillman v.
Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 420 n.9 (3d Cir.
2000). Still, the Excessive Fines Clause traces its roots as far
back as the Magna Carta. See United States v. Premises Known
as RR No. 1 Box 224, Dalton, Scott Twp. & North Abington
Twp., Lackawanna, Pa., 14 F.3d 864, 875 n.12 (3d Cir. 1994)
(“Blackstone says that the reasonableness of a fine must be
determined by reference to Magna Carta’s prohibition on
excessive amercements [a common criminal sanction].
Specifically, Blackstone says ‘no man shall have a larger
amercement imposed upon him, than his circumstances or
personal estate will bear: saving to . . . the trader his
merchandize.’”) (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*372). Thus, at the time of the Framing, the Founders
understood “‘fine’ . . . to mean a payment to a sovereign as

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punishment for some offense.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 327
(internal quotation marks & citation omitted); see also Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609 (1993) (“The purpose of the
Eighth Amendment . . . was to limit the government’s power to
punish.”). In turn, the Excessive Fines Clause restricts “the
Government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in
kind, as punishment for some offense.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at
328 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). The Eighth
Amendment is applicable if the forfeiture constitutes a “fine”
and is violated only if that fine is “excessive.” See Tillman, 221
F.3d at 420.
While the Excessive Fines Clause was initially applied
only to in personam actions, the Supreme Court expanded its
applicability to civil in rem forfeiture proceedings if the
forfeiture constituted, in part, punishment. See Austin, 509 U.S.
at 610 (noting that sanctions can serve both a remedial and
punitive purpose). This holding was narrowed somewhat by the
Supreme Court in Bajakajian, wherein the Court noted that
traditional in rem forfeitures were not punitive and would
therefore fall outside of the Eighth Amendment’s protections.
524 U.S. at 331. The Court further noted, however, that
“[b]ecause some recent federal forfeiture laws have blurred the
traditional distinction between civil in rem and criminal in
personam forfeiture, we have held that a modern statutory
forfeiture is a ‘fine’ for Eighth Amendment purposes if it
constitutes punishment even in part, regardless of whether the
proceeding is styled in rem or in personam.” Id. at 331 n.6.
Thus, while the Court has classified § 924(d)(1) as remedial and
therefore a civil sanction, see United States v. One Assortment
of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363-65 (1984), forfeiture
pursuant to this section nonetheless is subject to Eighth
Amendment scrutiny. Here, the Government and Cheeseman
agree that the forfeiture is criminal in nature since it is part of
his criminal judgment and sentence. A defendant bears the
burden of establishing that a forfeiture constitutes an

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unconstitutional excessive fine. See, e.g., United States v. Jose,
499 F.3d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 2007).
2. United States v. Bajakajian: Gross Disproportionality
In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court held that the forfeiture
of a sum of money grossly disproportionate to the underlying
crime constituted an Excessive Fines Clause violation.
Bajakajian involved the forfeiture of $357,144 for failure to
report to the United States government sums over $10,000
transported by an individual leaving the country in violation of
31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A). See Bajakajian, 524 U.S at 324-25.
Bajakajian argued that forfeiture of the entire $357,144 sum
involved in the reporting offense ran afoul of the Constitution.
Id. at 324.
After first determining that the forfeiture was punitive,
the Bajakajian Court reasoned that the next step in an Excessive
Fines Clause analysis was to ascertain whether it was excessive.
According to the Court, the “touchstone of the constitutional
inquiry . . . is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the
forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the
offense that it is designed to punish.” Id. at 334. The Court
further reasoned that because “judgments about the appropriate
punishment for an offense belong . . . to the legislature” and
because “any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a
particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise[,] . . .
[b]oth of these principles counsel against requiring strict
proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and
the gravity of a criminal offense.” Id. at 336. In turn, the Court
adopted a gross disproportionality standard. Id.
To analyze proportionality, the Bajakajian Court first
examined the nature of the substantive crime, noting that it was
solely a reporting offense, unrelated to any other illegal activity,
which required a “willful” mens rea for conviction. Id. at 337.
Next, the Court opined that Bajakajian did “not fit into the class

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of persons for whom the statute was principally designed,” i.e.,
money launderers, drug dealers, or tax evaders. Id. at 338.
Third, the Court noted that the six-month maximum sentence
and $5,000 maximum fine recommended by the Sentencing
Guidelines evidenced a “minimal level of culpability.” Id. at
338-39. The Court also indicated that it was appropriate to
compare the amount the government sought to forfeit with the
maximum fine permitted under the statute. Id. at 339 n.14.
Finally, the Court concluded that the harm Bajakajian caused
was minimal since his offense only injured the government in “a
relatively minor way.” Id. at 339; see also Premises Known as
RR No. 1 Box 224, 14 F.3d at 875 (noting that a reviewing court
should evaluate the gravity of the offense, the harshness of the
penalty, the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction, the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions and the culpability of the offender).
After considering all these factors, the Supreme Court ruled the
$357,144 forfeiture unconstitutional.
3. The Forfeiture was Not Grossly Disproportionate to
Cheeseman’s Crime
Applying the factors outlined in Bajakajian, we conclude
that the forfeiture of Cheeseman’s firearms and ammunition was
not grossly disproportionate to his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)
violation.9 Here, unlike the reporting offense in Bajakajian, the
illegal possession of the firearms was not the only illegality
associated with Cheeseman’s crime. Rather, in addition to
unlawfully possessing firearms, Cheeseman was also abusing
illegal narcotics.

9
Though our reasoning differs from that of the District
Court, because we review a district court’s interpretation of the
Constitution de novo, we may affirm the District Court’s ruling
based upon the alternative reasoning discussed in this section.

-26-
 Next, Cheeseman’s protestation that his crime was
victimless because he did not possess the firearms as a means to
procure drugs is unpersuasive because it demonstrates a
misunderstanding of § 922(g)(3)’s purpose. (See Appellant’s
Br. at 32.) Cheeseman is exactly the type of individual for
whom the statute was designed. Section 922(g)(3) of the Gun
Control Act reflects Congress’ view that certain types of
individuals, including drug abusers, mental incompetents, and
violent felons, should not possess firearms. This is eminently
reasonable considering that intoxicated individuals should not
have access to, nor possess, firearms because of public safety
concerns. Therefore Cheeseman, a crack cocaine addict with
unfettered access to an arsenal of weapons and ammunition,
who facilitated other crack cocaine addicts’ access to that
arsenal, squarely fits within the class of persons whose behavior
the statute aims to criminalize. Additionally, Cheeseman’s
contention that he legally owned and operated a firearms
dealership for many years is disingenuous at best since he was
abusing drugs during his ownership of X-Ring. Cheeseman’s
misrepresentation on his FFL application further undermines
this argument.
Finally, even assuming the firearms and ammunition
were worth approximately $500,000, this sum is not grossly
disproportionate to the crime to which Cheeseman pled guilty.
While Cheeseman correctly notes that $500,000 exceeds the fine
range of $7,500 to $75,000 recommended by the Sentencing
Guidelines, when weighed against the circumstances
surrounding Cheeseman’s crime, this factor is not dispositive.
In Bajakajian, the amount the government sought to forfeit was
$357,144, over seventy times the $5,000 maximum fine
authorized by his Guideline. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-
38. Here, although $500,000 is roughly seventy times greater
than the low end of Cheeseman’s Guideline range, it is less than
seven times greater than the high end of his Guideline range. In
any event, when considered in light of all the factors that

-27-
Bajakajian instructs courts to consider, the fact that the worth of
the guns is a larger sum than the Guideline fine does not
sufficiently outweigh the remaining factors that militate against
a finding of unconstitutionality. Furthermore, as noted in
Bajakajian, the Guideline fine alone is not dispositive and we
may also consider the statutory maximum fine that Cheeseman
faced. See id. at 339 n.14. Here, the statutory maximum fine
was $250,000. Thus, a forfeiture valued at $500,000 is only two
times greater than the maximum fine permitted by the statute.
Cf. United States v. Wallace, 389 F.3d 483, 486-87 (5th Cir.
2004) (ruling forfeiture of a $30,000 plane willfully operated
without a federal registration by an individual with no criminal
history would not violate the Eighth Amendment when the
statutory maximum fine was $15,000). Thus, any discrepancy
between the value of the firearms and the Guideline fine is not
controlling and therefore does not serve as the basis for finding
an Excessive Fines Clause violation.
In sum, we conclude that the forfeiture of Cheeseman’s
firearms and ammunition was not grossly disproportionate to his
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) offense because he was abusing drugs
while illegally possessing firearms, he was part of the class of
persons whose behavior the statute criminalized, and the value
of the firearms was at most two times the maximum penalty
imposed by the statute. In turn, forfeiture of Cheeseman’s
firearms and ammunition did not violate the Excessive Fines
Clause.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s Order of Forfeiture.

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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I join the Majority’s thoughtful and comprehensive
opinion in every respect save one: because I agree with the
Majority that the phrase “involved in” as used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(d)(1) is unambiguous, I do not believe recourse to
legislative history is necessary or proper.

When interpreting a statute, it has long been accepted that
courts should only examine legislative history when the statutory
text is ambiguous or otherwise unclear. See Ex Parte Collett,
337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949). If the text is clear and unambiguous,
our inquiry ends. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176,
183, 186 (2004); Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp.,
360 F.3d 404, 406 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover, we have observed
that reliance on legislative history “is to be avoided whenever
possible due to the inherent unreliability of using legislative
history as a basis for ascertaining legislative intent.” Roe v.
Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 842 (3d Cir. 1980).

Here, after a convincing analysis of the text of
§ 924(d)(1), the Majority quite rightly concludes that the plain
meaning of the phrase “involved in” authorizes the forfeiture of
Cheeseman’s firearms. Maj. Op. Typescript at 14. In rejecting
Cheeseman’s request that we apply the rule of lenity, the
Majority states: “Nor is the phrase ‘involved in’ ambiguous.”
Id. at 15. Despite this conclusion, the Majority expounds upon
the legislative histories of the Gun Control Act and the Firearm
Owners Protection Act to buttress its textual interpretation of

1
§ 924(d)(1). Id. at 16-18. At least six of the sitting Justices of
the Supreme Court have counseled against this approach. See,
e.g., Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2246 (2009) (Alito,
J.) (“Because the statutory language is clear, there is no need to
reach petitioner’s remaining arguments based on . . . legislative
history . . . .”); Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509-10
(2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“Here, the Court looks to legislative history even
though the remainder of its opinion amply establishes that the
[statute] is unambiguous . . . Use of legislative history in this
context . . . conflicts . . . with this Court’s repeated statements
that when the language of the statute is plain, legislative history
is irrelevant.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
119 (2001) (Kennedy, J.) (“As the conclusion we reach today is
directed by the text of [the statute], we need not assess . . .
legislative history . . . .”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135,
147-48 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative
history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”); Connecticut Nat.
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (Thomas, J.)
(“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, . . . [the]
judicial inquiry is complete.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v.
Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.)
(quoting Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991))
(“‘[A]lthough a court appropriately may refer to a statute’s
legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity, there is no
need to do so’ if the statutory language is clear.”).

For the foregoing reasons, I do not join that portion of the
Court’s opinion that delves into legislative history.

2