RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0904-MR
CHARLES STANFILL, JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JAMES T. JAMESON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CR-00212
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND JONES, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE: Charles Stanfill, Jr. appeals the Calloway Circuit
Court’s order denying his motion for relief under Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 60.02, 60.03, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. We affirm.
Stanfill is serving a twenty-year sentence for manufacturing
methamphetamine, second offense. On June 4, 2020, Stanfill filed a pro se motion
asking the Calloway Circuit Court to “relieve him of the remainder of his sentence
pursuant to CR 60.02(f), CR 60.03, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution” based on his being high-risk for severe
complications from the COVID-19 virus. The circuit court entered an order
denying Stanfill’s motion on June 9, 2020, determining that there were no facts in
evidence to show that Stanfill’s risks of contracting COVID-19 increased when
compared with the risks to which Stanfill would face if he were to be released from
custody. The circuit court further concluded that Stanfill had not shown facts to
justify relief under CR 60.02, CR 60.03, or Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 11.42. Thereafter, Stanfill filed this timely pro se appeal.
On appeal, Stanfill claims the circuit court should have granted an
evidentiary hearing before ruling on his motion. We review rulings on motions
made pursuant to CR 60.02 and 60.03 for an abuse of discretion. White v.
Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000) (citation omitted); Rogers
Group, Inc. v. Masterson, 175 S.W.3d 630, 636 (Ky. App. 2005) (citations
omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Foley v.
Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citation omitted). We review
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constitutional questions de novo. Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 290
(Ky. 2018) (citation omitted).
We see nothing in the facts of this case to conclude the circuit court
abused its discretion when it denied Stanfill’s motion. CR 60.02(f) permits a court
to vacate a final judgment if there is a “reason of an extraordinary nature justifying
relief.” Its purpose is to remedy “some significant defect in the trial proceedings or
evidence at trial” which resulted in “a substantial miscarriage of justice[.]” Wine v.
Commonwealth, 699 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Ky. App. 1985) (quoting Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1966)).
Here, the facts concerning COVID-19 that Stanfill alleges occurred
after entry of the judgment have nothing to do with remedying a “significant defect
in the trial proceedings or evidence at trial[.]” Id. Moreover, a separate panel of
this Court has held that a prisoner’s medical fears are not subject to the remedy
provided by CR 60.02 because they are unrelated to any ostensible trial error.
Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.3d 738, 739 (Ky. App. 2014). Specifically,
this Court stated that “[b]y extension of the Court’s holding in Wine, we thus hold
that physical ailments of a defendant are not tantamount to trial defects and
therefore do not amount to claims of an extraordinary nature justifying (CR 60.02)
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Similarly, Stanfill’s claims fail under CR 60.03, which permits a court
“to entertain an independent action to relieve a person from a judgment, order or
proceeding on appropriate equitable grounds.” However, CR 60.03 also states that
“[r]elief shall not be granted in an independent action if the ground of relief sought
has been denied in a proceeding by motion under Rule 60.02[.]” (Emphasis
added.) As discussed previously, because Stanfill’s claim is not subject to CR
60.02, relief is unavailable under CR 60.03. See Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 888.
Finally, Stanfill submits that his imprisonment encroaches upon the
Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. However,
this issue was not properly before the circuit court. Complaints regarding
conditions of confinement are civil matters and, under Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 454.415(1)(d), may not be brought by an inmate until such inmate has
exhausted the “administrative remedies as set forth in the policies and procedures
of the Department of Corrections, county jail, or other local or regional
correctional facility[.]” Stanfill has not produced evidence verifying that he has
exhausted such administrative procedures. See KRS 454.415(3).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Calloway Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Charles Stanfill, Jr., pro se Daniel Cameron
Burgin, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
E. Bedelle Lucas
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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