IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
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v. )
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TERRANCE STOKES, ) ID NO. 1706006325B
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Defendant. )
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Date Decided: January 13, 2022
Upon the Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Rule 61.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED. Upon the Defendant’s Motion for a Modified
Sentence. DENIED.
ORDER
Rebecca Song, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State of Delaware.
Terrance Stokes, Pro Se.
SCOTT, J.
1
This 13th day of January 2022, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for
Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and Rule 35, it
appears that:
1. Terrance Stokes (“Stokes”) has filed a second pro se Motion for
Postconviction Relief, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. For the
reasons set forth below, Stokes’ Motion is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
2. On February 13, 2018, Stokes pled guilty to one count of Possession of a
Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”). He was immediately sentenced
to fifteen (15) years at Level V incarceration, suspended after the minimum-
mandatory term of five years at Level V for eighteen (18) months supervision
Level III. Stokes did not file a notice of appeal for the conviction or sentence.
3. Instead, Stokes filed an original Motion for Postconviction Relief raising
among other things, an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that
Motion was DENIED on August 5, 2020. Stokes appealed to the Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court AFFIRMED on March 26, 2021.
4. On August 27, 2020, Stokes filed this Second Motion for Postconviction
Relief, again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Stokes contends he
should be afforded postconviction relief because his counsel was ineffective
as he did not object to the Court’s consecutive sentencing as Stokes would not
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have accepted the plea if he was aware of a consecutive sentence. Also
contained in his Second Motion for Postconviction Relief is a Motion to
Modify Sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35. Stokes
believes he should be afforded a modified sentence because the “sentences
ordered to be served consecutive rather than concurrent” and “court failed to
apply minimum sentencing procedures.”
5. Before addressing the merits of any postconviction relief claim, the Court
must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural
requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and is not procedurally
barred.1 If a procedural exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of
the postconviction claim.2
6. The Court assessed the procedural bars of Rule 61 and finds Stokes’ second
Motion for Postconviction Relief must be summarily dismissed under Rule
61(d)(2).3 As previously recognized, this is Stokes’ second motion for
postconviction relief. Rule 61(d)(2) provides a second or subsequent
postconviction motion under Rule 61 shall be summarily dismissed.4 Rule
61(d)(2) further explains two exceptions to summary dismissal, however,
1
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
2
Id.
3
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
4
Id.
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these exceptions are only available to defendants who were “convicted at a
trial.”5 Defendants who were convicted at trial may avoid summary dismissal
by:
(i) plead[ing] with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a
strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts
underlying the charges of which he was convicted; or
(ii) plead[ing] with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States
Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant's
case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.6
7. Under these facts, Stokes may not attempt to use either exception because
he pled guilty, he was not convicted after a trial.7 Regardless to finding either
exception would not be available to Stokes, neither exception applies. Stokes
attempts to claim his counsel was ineffective at his sentencing hearing for not
objecting to a consecutive sentencing. This is not pleading with particularity
new evidence is in existence to create a strong inference of an actual
innocence claim nor is it pleading with pleading with particularity a claim that
5
Id.
6
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i)–(ii).
7
Norwood v. State, 2017 WL 4001838, at *1 (Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (citation
omitted) (“Rule 61(d)(2) provides that a second or subsequent motion for
postconviction relief shall be summarily dismissed unless the movant was
convicted after a trial and the motion satisfies the pleading requirements of
subsections (2)(i) or (2)(ii). Here, because the motion was Norwood's second
motion for postconviction relief following a guilty plea, the motion was subject to
summary dismissal under Rule 61(d)(2).”)
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a new retroactive rule of constitutional law applies to his case and renders his
conviction invalid. Therefore, even if the Court were to set aside the
requirement Stokes be convicted at trial, Stokes does not satisfy Rule
61(d)(2)(i) or Rule (61)(d)(ii) to avoid summary dismissal. Thus, Stokes’
Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
8. As for Stokes’ Motion for a Modified Sentence, the sentence in this case
was imposed pursuant to a Plea Agreement. Pursuant to Criminal Procedural
Rule 11(c)(1), the Court addressed the defendant personally in open court and
determined that the defendant understood the nature of the charge to which
the plea was offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, and
the maximum possible penalty provided by law. Accordingly, the defendant
acknowledged in open court that the range of possible penalties included the
sentence that was imposed by the Court in this case. Additionally, under
Superior Court Criminal Rule 35, Stokes’ Motion for Reduction of Sentence
must have been made within 90 days of the imposition of the sentence unless
extraordinary circumstances exist.8 The Motion was filed more than 90 days
after the imposition of the sentence and is, therefore, time barred. The Court
does not find the existence of any extraordinary circumstances. The sentence
8
Super. Ct.Crim. R. 35(b).
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is appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time of sentencing. No
additional information has been provided to the Court which would warrant a
reduction or modification of this sentence.
9. The Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentencings.
The Sentencing Order clearly indicated that all sentences of confinement shall
run consecutive. Stokes fails to present an argument as to why the Court
should have sentenced concurrently. Stokes’ Motion for a Modified Sentence
is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Calvin L. Scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
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