Case: 20-60830 Document: 00516181318 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/26/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 26, 2022
No. 20-60830 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Jasvir Singh,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals
No. A 029 489 843
Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Jasvir Singh, a native and citizen of India, unlawfully entered the
United States in 1989. He petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen the in absentia
deportation proceedings. Singh avers that the BIA abused its discretion in
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opin-
ion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-60830 Document: 00516181318 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/26/2022
No. 20-60830
denying his motion to reopen based on its finding of no changed country con-
ditions. Singh further posits that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to
apply equitable tolling to his motion to reopen based on his claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel (“IAC”). “This [c]ourt reviews the denial of a
motion to reopen under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
Barrios-Cantarero v. Holder, 772 F.3d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted).
“Showing changed country conditions requires making a meaningful
comparison between the conditions at the time of the removal hearing and
the conditions at the time the alien filed [his] motion to reopen.” Nunez v.
Sessions, 882 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2018). Neither Singh’s motion to re-
open before the BIA nor his brief provides any meaningful comparison of
country conditions since his 1989 in absentia deportation order. Though
Singh contends that the reports in Exhibit F attached to his motion to reopen
address “the country conditions in place over a historical period[,] including
1989,” those reports show that conditions for Sikhs in India have generally
improved since he was ordered deported. The BIA did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to reopen Singh’s deportation proceedings based on changed
country conditions. See Barrios-Cantarero, 772 F.3d at 1021.
Singh also urges that the BIA did not perform a meaningful analysis of
his evidence of changed country conditions. That theory is not supported by
the record. The BIA specifically referred to Exhibit F when concluding that
Singh had failed to demonstrate changed country conditions. The BIA also
acknowledged that the new materials in Exhibit F showed “evidence of prob-
lems that Sikhs face in India, particularly in the Punjab region, and that there
had been an upswing in Khalistan-related terrorism in recent years.” None-
theless, the BIA concluded that there was “no evidence of the conditions for
Sikhs, or anyone else similarly situated to [Singh], at the time of his 1989 in
absentia proceeding.”
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No. 20-60830
The BIA is not required to “write an exegesis on every contention.
What is required is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its
decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has
heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899,
908 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
BIA’s consideration of Singh’s Exhibit F was sufficient.
Singh claims that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to apply
equitable tolling to his motion to reopen because he failed to pursue his claim
of IAC with due diligence. According to Singh, the BIA’s decision to impose
a due-diligence requirement on his motion to reopen contradicts Rodriguez-
Manzano v. Holder, 666 F.3d 948 (5th Cir. 2012).
This court noted in Rodriguez-Manzano “[C]urrent regulations that
impose timing requirements on motions to reopen do not apply to motions to
reopen deportation proceedings that commenced before 1992.” Id. at 954.
Because the BIA in Rodriguez-Manzano considered the petitioner’s due dili-
gence in pursuing his claim of IAC, the BIA had imposed what was, in effect,
“a timing limitation on motions to reopen pre-1992 deportation proceed-
ings.” Id.
But Singh conceded before the BIA that his motion to reopen was sub-
ject to the time and number limitations of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), so he did
not “fairly present” the issue to the BIA. Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 321
(5th Cir. 2009). This court therefore lacks jurisdiction to consider his due-
diligence argument. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
The petition for review is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in
part for want of jurisdiction.
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