S. P. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-21-00349-CV S. P., Appellant v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee FROM THE 424TH DISTRICT COURT OF BURNET COUNTY NO. 50448, THE HONORABLE CHERYLL MABRAY, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION S.P. appeals the trial court’s final order terminating his parental rights to his child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. After a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for terminating his parental rights existed and that termination of those rights was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (Q), (2). On appeal, his court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw supported by an Anders brief, concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in appeals from terminations of parental rights). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). S.P.’s counsel has certified to this Court that he has provided S.P. with a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw and advised him of his rights to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. To date, S.P. has not filed a pro se brief. The Department of Family and Protective Services has filed a response to the Anders brief, stating that it will not file a brief unless requested by this Court. Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. We have conducted an independent review of the entire record, including the Anders brief submitted on S.P.’s behalf. We have found nothing in the record that might arguably support an appeal, and we agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We have specifically reviewed the trial court’s findings as to S.P. under parts (D) and (E) of Family Code section 161.001(b)(1), and we have found no nonfrivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating S.P.’s parental rights. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied.1 __________________________________________ Chari L. Kelly, Justice Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Kelly Affirmed Filed: January 26, 2022 1 The Supreme Court of Texas has held that the right to counsel in suits seeking the termination of parental rights extends to “all proceedings in th[e Supreme Court of Texas], including the filing of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). Accordingly, counsel’s obligation to S.P. has not yet been discharged. See id. If after 2 consulting with counsel S.P. desires to file a petition for review, his counsel should timely file with the Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27–28.