J-A21021-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: M.M., FATHER :
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:
:
: No. 933 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000233-2021
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2022
M.M. (Father) appeals1 from the order granting the petition filed by the
Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) to involuntarily terminate
his rights to his minor child, A.M.M. (Child), born in May of 2019. After careful
review, we affirm.
The trial court accurately summarized the facts of this matter as follows:
[DHS] first became aware of this family on May 19, 2019, when it
received a General Protective Services (GPS) report concerning
allegations that Mother tested positive for Percocet at Child’s birth,
for which she did not have a prescription. The GPS report stated
that although [Child] did not test positive for any substances at
her birth, she would be assessed for withdrawal and possibly
started on a morphine treatment because [Child’s] Neonatal
Abstinence Syndrome (NAS) score was 10, which was high. The
GPS report alleged that Mother also had two male children that
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1Mother filed separate appeals from the order, which are docketed at 1121
EDA 2021 and 1120 EDA 2021 and addressed in a separate memorandum.
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were residing with relatives in Bucks County, Pennsylvania.[2] The
GPS report also alleged [that] Mother was diagnosed with anxiety
and depression, but was not receiving treatment or prescribed
medication.
On May 20, 2019, DHS visited [Child] at Einstein Medical Center
(EMC), and hospital staff confirmed that [Child] was suffering from
severe withdrawal. Hospital staff stated that [Child] was receiving
morphine maintenance and would need to remain hospitalized for
further treatment. . . .
DHS visited Mother and Father at [Child’s] paternal grandmother’s
home on May 20, 2019. Mother denied having a history of
substance abuse issues. Mother stated that she used one 15
milligram Percocet pill, which she purchased illegally, to treat back
pain. Father denied awareness of Mother’s drug use. Father also
stated that he used drugs for 12 years until 2018, when he
became sober.[3]
On June 5, 2019, DHS received a supplement to the GPS report
alleging that Mother’s drug of choice was heroin or Phencyclidine
(PCP). The GPS report alleged that Mother had not been able to
maintain sobriety. The report also stated that the adoptive parent
of [Child’s] siblings was willing to be a placement resource for
[Child].
[After spending several weeks in the NICU, Child was discharged
from EMC on June 24, 2019. That same day, the trial court held
a shelter care hearing, at which] the temporary commitment to
DHS was ordered to stand. On that date, [Child] was placed in
the care of her siblings’ adoptive parent, where she remains. On
July 1, 2019, [Child] was adjudicated dependent and committed
to DHS.
A Single Case Plan (SCP) meeting was held on July 10, 2019, at
which time the permanency goal was reunification. The parental
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2Mother’s two older children are Child’s half-brothers. Both siblings reside
with their adoptive parent and that family’s biological children.
3 At that meeting, Father told DHS that he was in violation of the terms of his
probation sentence for a prior criminal matter. The record reflects that Father
was arrested for violating his probation on June 13, 2019, and subsequently
incarcerated.
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objectives for Father were to comply with court-ordered dual
diagnosis treatment; to participate in three random drug screens;
to participate in visits; and to complete parenting classes.
Father’s single case plan objectives remained consistent
throughout the life of the case.
On July 29, 2020, Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) changed
the permanency goal for [Child] to adoption.
On April 26, 2021, DHS filed petitions to change the goal from
reunification to adoption and to involuntarily terminate Father’s
parental rights.
[On May 10, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on DHS’s
petitions.] At the hearing, the court heard testimony from
[Nathan Kipp, a case manager from] Community Umbrella Agency
(CUA), [Robert Buchofer from] Community Behavioral Health
(CBH), [and Mother and Father, who testified on their own behalf.]
. . . Mr. Kipp testified that he [had been assigned to] this case
since its inception at [Child’s] birth on May 17, 2019. N.T.
Termination Hr’g, 5/10/2021, at 13. Mr. Kipp testified that [Child]
came into care because Mother tested positive for Percocet at [the
time of Child’s] birth. Mr. Kipp testified that although [Child] did
not test positive for any substances at birth, she was placed on
morphine maintenance to help with withdrawal symptoms. Id.
Mr. Kipp further testified that Father’s single case plan objectives
were as follows: (1) maintain housing and employment, (2)
participate in visitation, (3) complete parenting classes through
ARC; (4) comply with court-ordered dual diagnosis treatment, and
(5) submit random drug screens. Id. at 21-25. Mr. Kipp testified
that throughout the life of the case, CUA [had] attempted to make
outreach with Father via phone calls and text messages at least
once per week, but [Mr. Kipp] stated that he had difficulty
reaching Father. Id. at 24, 27. Mr. Kipp described the process of
getting in contact with Father as a “struggle” and stated that, in
his opinion, Father was “avoiding” him. Id. at 24, 28. Mr. Kipp
testified that Father’s phone number and residence changed
several times, and that Father was incarcerated several times
throughout the life of the case. Id. at 24.
Mr. Kipp rated Father’s compliance with his single case plan
objectives as “minimal” and Father’s progress towards alleviating
the reasons that brought [Child] into care as “none.” Id. at 31.
Father was referred for a forthwith drug screen on October 9,
2019, which he submitted. Id. at 23 at 19-25. Additionally, Mr.
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Kipp testified that CUA also referred Father to the Clinical
Evaluation Unit (CEU) for six random drug screens, for which
Father has never appeared. Id.
Mr. Buchhofer, from CBH, testified that Father was admitted to
Ambrosia for an inpatient drug and alcohol treatment program on
February 11, 2021 and was successfully discharged on March 2,
2021. Id. at 49, 50. At the time of his discharge from Ambrosia,
Mr. Buchhofer testified that Father’s diagnosis was “opioid use
disorder, severe.”
Father did not engage in a mental health program other than
Ambrosia. Id. at 26. As part of his discharge plan from Ambrosia,
Father was to attend an Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP)
through NET, but neither Mr. Buchhofer nor Mr. Kipp had any
documentation that Father attended an IOP. Id. at 24, 50. Mr.
Kipp testified that after Father was released from prison, he
completed an inpatient drug and alcohol program at Beacon Point
Recovery. Id. at 24. He provided a certificate of completion dated
March 11, 2021. Id. Mr. Kipp also testified that Father reported
that he overdosed on fentanyl in April [of] 2020, which paternal
grandmother confirmed. Id. at 25, 26.
Mr. Kipp testified that Father was referred to BHS for a mental
health evaluation. Id. at 27. CUA has no documentation
indicating that Father ever obtained an evaluation. Id. Mr. Kipp
further testified that Father did not engage in parenting or any
other services through ARC, nor did Father provide CUA with
certificates from previous parenting classes Father claimed to
attend. Id. at 27. Similarly, Mr. Kipp testified that Father’s
current housing and employment status is unknown due to
Father’s sporadic contact with Mr. Kipp. Id. at 27.
Mr. Kipp testified that Father’s visits with [Child] were to be
supervised weekly at the agency for one hour. Id. at 28. Father’s
visits remained supervised throughout the life of the case. Id. at
28, 29. Mr. Kipp testified that Father attended approximately one
quarter of his agency visits and rarely attended virtual visits with
[Child]. Id. at 29. With regard to Father’s ability to comfort
[Child], Mr. Kipp stated, “I’ve seen a time when she was in distress
and he tried to comfort her, but she just didn’t really recognize
him as a source of comfort.” Id. at 29, 30. Regarding Father’s
relationship with [Child], Mr. Kipp testified that there was no bond
between [Child] and Father and that [Child] never asked to see
Father. Id. at 30. Contrarily, [Child] is bonded with her kinship
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parents and everyone in the kinship family. Id. at 33. [Child]
looks to her kinship parents for her basic needs as well as love,
support, care, and comfort. Id. Mr. Kipp testified that the kinship
parents’ home is a pre-adoptive home for [Child]. Id. Ms. Kipp
advised the court that [Child] has lived with her kinship parents
her entire life except when she was in the hospital. Id. at 32. He
stated that she was doing very well in the home, and that it was
in [Child’s] best interest to change her goal to adoption. Id. at
30, 33. Mr. Kipp stated that if the Court were to involuntarily
terminate Father’s rights, there would be no irreparable harm to
[Child]. Id. at 30.
Trial Ct. Op., 10/20/21, at 1-6.
On May 10, 2021, the trial court issued an opinion and order granting
DHS’s petition to terminate Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b). Father filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).4
On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
[§] 2511(a)(1) where Father presented evidence that he tried
to perform his parental duties.
2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
[§] 2511(a)(2) where Father presented evidence that he has
remedied his situation by maintaining housing, taking
parenting classes and intensive drug treatment counselling and
has the present capacity to care for [Child].
3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
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4 On September 27, 2021, this Court issued an order remanding this matter
to the trial court for a Rule 1925(a) opinion. The trial court timely complied
and issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion stating the reasons for the termination and
goal change orders and addressing the issues raised in Father’s Rule 1925(b)
statement.
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[§] 2511(a)(5) where evidence was provided to establish that
the children were removed from the care of the Mother and
Father is now capable of caring for [Child].
4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
[§] 2511(a)(8) where evidence was presented to show that
Father is now capable of caring for [Child] after he completed
parenting classes, maintained housing at his mother’s home
and completed his inpatient drug treatment program.
5. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
[§] 2511(b) where evidence was presented that established the
child had a close bond with her Father.
Father’s Brief at 7 (some formatting altered).
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
apply the following standard of review:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. [In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010)]. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision
may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an
abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where
the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
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dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist
the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own
credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer
to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by
the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of
an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations
omitted).
The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) . . . .
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we “may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
2511(a).” In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1179 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)
(citation omitted).
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Section 2511(a)(2)
We first address Father’s challenge to the evidence supporting
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Father’s Brief at 17. Father argues
that he “substantially completed his [SCP] goals of parenting classes, drug
and mental health treatment, and employment.” Id. Further, Father
contends that he “continues to attend his drug and mental health treatment
program.” Id. Finally, Father asserts that he “resides with his mother and
can now provide a safe home for himself and his child.” Id. Therefore, Father
concludes that “grounds to terminate his rights under [Section] 2511(a)(2) do
not exist.” Id.
Section 2511(a)(2) provides as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
To satisfy the requirements of [Section] 2511(a)(2), the moving
party must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. The
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grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct,
but concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied.
In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Further, this Court has explained:
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied,
are “not limited to affirmative misconduct.” In re A.L.D., 797
A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not
emphasize a parent’s refusal or failure to perform parental
duties, but instead emphasizes the child’s present and
future need for essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being.
Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be
read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable
home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy
of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This
is particularly so where disruption of the family has already
occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting
it.
In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Thus, while “sincere efforts to perform parental duties,” can
preserve parental rights under subsection (a)(1), those same
efforts may be insufficient to remedy parental incapacity under
subsection (a)(2). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts
toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities.” [A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340]. A “parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the
necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as
untimely or disingenuous.” Id.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some citations
omitted and formatting altered).
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Here, the trial court addressed Section 2511(a)(2) as follows:
Father’s incapacity under [Section] 2511(a)(2) existed given that
Father failed to demonstrate a concrete desire or ability to remedy
the conditions that led to [Child’s] placement. Father has a history
of many years of drug use and Mr. Buchhofer testified that at the
time of Father’s discharge from Ambrosia’s drug and alcohol
program on March 1, 2021, his diagnosis was severe opioid use
disorder. While Father completed an inpatient drug and alcohol
program, he failed to provide documentation that he attended an
[Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP)], as required under his
discharge plan. Father has never progressed beyond one-hour
supervised visits per week with [Child], has not engaged in ARC
services, and did not engage in a mental health program.
Additionally, due to Father’s sporadic contact with Mr. Kipp, his
current housing and employment status is unknown. This [c]ourt
found that Father’s failure to fully or substantially comply with his
single case plan objectives throughout the duration of the case
left [Child] without essential parental care, control, and
subsistence necessary for her physical or mental well-being, and
the causes of the incapacity will not be remedied by Father. For
these reasons, the [c]ourt found that clear and convincing
evidence existed to justify the involuntary termination of Father’s
parental rights pursuant to [Section] 2511(a)(2).
Trial Ct. Op. at 12.
Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in
the trial court’s conclusion that DHS presented clear and convincing evidence
to support termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2).
See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; see also R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276.
The record reflects that after Child was placed in kinship care in June of
2019, Father’s SCP objectives were as follows: (1) maintain housing and
employment, (2) participate in visitation, (3) complete parenting classes
through ARC, (4) comply with court-ordered dual diagnosis treatment, and (5)
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submit random drug screens. See N.T. Termination Hr’g at 21-25. The trial
court credited Mr. Kipp’s testimony that Father minimally complied with his
permanency objectives and made no progress in achieving them. See id. at
31.
Specifically, with respect to housing, although Father claimed to be
living with paternal grandmother, Mr. Kipp testified that he was unaware of
any information concerning Father’s housing as of the date of the termination
hearing. Id. at 27. Notably, Mr. Kipp testified that communicating with Father
was “a struggle,” in part because Father’s phone number and residence
“changed several times.” Id. at 24. Mr. Kipp also stated that at the time of
the hearing, he had not spoken to Father in several months. Id. at 27.
Regarding visitation, Mr. Kipp testified that Father had weekly,
supervised visits for one hour. Id. at 28-29. However, Father only attended
“about a quarter” of the visits that were available to him. Id. at 29.
Additionally, Mr. Kipp testified that Father did not complete any
parenting classes at ARC. Id. at 27. Although Father claimed that he
completed a parenting course while he was incarcerated, he did not submit
any proof of such completion as required by DHS. Id. at 70-71.
Finally, with respect to Father’s dual diagnosis treatment and drug
screens, Mr. Kipp testified that Father failed to attend any of the six random
drug screens that were requested. Id. at 23. Father self-reported that he
overdosed on fentanyl in April of 2020. Id. at 24-25. Father was
subsequently re-incarcerated and upon his release on March 11, 2021, he
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completed an inpatient drug and alcohol program at Beacon Point Recovery.
However, Mr. Kipp testified that Father never engaged in a mental health
program. Id. at 26. Further, Father was referred to Behavioral Health
Services for evaluations, but he did not attend any evaluations. Id. at 27.
Under these circumstances, the record supports the trial court’s
conclusion that Father’s continued incapacity has caused Child to be without
essential parental care and that the causes of that incapacity cannot or will
not be remedied. See C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 262; Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117-18.
Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in determining that
Father’s conduct warrants termination under Section 2511(a)(2). See S.P.,
47 A.3d at 826-27; see also R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. Accordingly, Father is
not entitled to relief. See M.T., 101 A.3d at 1179 (stating that we may affirm
a termination order based on any subsection of Section 2511(a)).
Section 2511(b)
Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusions regarding Child’s best
interests under Section 2511(b). Father merely argues that he has a bond
with Child and that he “should have been provided with visits while he was
incarcerated.” Father’s Brief at 19.
Section 2511(b) states:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
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income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. . . .
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under
Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but the focus of Section 2511(b) is on the
child. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under Section 2511(b),
our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” In In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481,
485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the
child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently
severing the parental bond.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (some citations omitted).
Nonetheless, the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a
parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition, as
“[e]ven the most abused of children will often harbor some positive emotion
towards the abusive parent.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, “[t]he continued
attachment to the natural parents, despite serious parental rejection through
abuse and neglect, and failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders
which are harming the children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” Id.
(citation omitted).
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As this Court has noted, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the
custody and rearing of his . . . child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his
. . . parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment
of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re
B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
Nonetheless, “[w]hen examining the effect upon a child of severing a
bond, courts must examine whether termination of parental rights will destroy
a ‘necessary and beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a child to suffer
‘extreme emotional consequences.’” In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d
937, 944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “In the case of an unhealthy
bond, ‘attention must be paid to the pain that inevitably results from breaking
a child’s bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we
must weigh that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact.’”
Id. (quoting T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267).
Here, the trial court addressed Child’s best interests as follows:
Based on the evidence, this [c]ourt determined that [Child] would
not suffer any irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were
terminated. After spending several weeks in the NICU on
morphine maintenance, [Child] was discharged from the hospital.
She was placed in her current kinship home, where she has
resided since then. There was compelling testimony presented at
the TPR hearing that [Child] is not bonded with Father and has no
parent-child relationship with him. Father’s visits with [Child]
were to be supervised weekly at the agency for one hour, and his
visits have never progressed further throughout the duration of
the case. Additionally, Father has been inconsistent with
visitation, attending only about a quarter of his visits with [Child].
This has impacted Father’s relationship with [Child]. Mr. Kipp
testified that [Child] does not recognize Father as a source of
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comfort. By failing to fully comply with his single case plan
objectives, Father has demonstrated that he is not interested in
maintaining a parent-child relationship with [Child]. In
determining the best interest of the child, this [c]ourt must
consider both the needs and welfare of the child such as love,
comfort, security, and stability. [Child] does not look to Father to
meet these needs. [Child’s] kinship family, however, does provide
[Child] with love, support, care, comfort, and stability. [Child]
looks to her kinship parents to meet her basic needs. Mr. Kipp
testified that [Child] is bonded with her kinship family, is very
happy in the home, and has lived there her entire life except when
she was hospitalized. Additionally, the kinship parents’ home is a
pre-adoptive home and [Child] lives there with her siblings.
Clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish that
there would be no irreparable harm caused to [Child] if this [c]ourt
terminated Father’s parental rights. For these reasons, this
[c]ourt properly found that it would be in the best interest of
[Child] to grant DHS’s petition to terminate the parental rights of
Father pursuant to [Section] 2511(b).
Trial Ct. Op. at 15-16.
Based on our review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb the
trial court’s conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights would best
serve Child’s needs and welfare. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. The trial court
credited Mr. Kipp’s testimony that Father and Child do not share a healthy
bond and that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental
rights were terminated. See N.T. Termination Hr’g at 29-30. The trial court
also referred to Mr. Kipp’s testimony that a bond existed between Child and
her kinship caregivers. Mr. Kipp recommended that Child be adopted by the
kinship caregivers because “she’s with a loving family who has taken very well
care of her for the past two years. She’s been there her whole life.” Id.
Indeed, Mr. Kipp testified that Child is in a pre-adoptive home and that, at the
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age of two, the foster parents are the only parents she has known. Id. at 33,
35. Child shares a bond with her kinship parents and that their relationship
is “very good. She goes to- she refers to them for comfort. She’s comfortable
with everybody in the family. She’s happy. She’s on a schedule. You know,
I’ve seen them putting her down for naps, picking her up from naps, giving-
feeding her. To her, that’s her family.” Id. At 33. Further, this Court has
stressed that “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts
to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities.”
Interests of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 914 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted
and formatting altered).
For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in applying Section 2511(b). See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Clear and
convincing evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination of
Father’s parental rights would best serve Child’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare. See R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/1/2022
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