The principal question is on the meaning of a clause in the lease. The lease is in the form of a landlord and tenant’s agreement. The agreement signed by the defendant states that the rent is “$1,000, payable quarterly, and the ordinary taxes and water rents and repairs necessary with all alterations, if any needed.” There is the usual agreement to “ surrender the premises * * * in as good state and condition as reasonable use and wear will permit, damages by the elements excepted.” The landlord’s agreement states the rent at “ $1,000, payable quarterly, and the ordinary taxes and water rents and all repairs or alterations necessary.” It is plain, then, that the defendant was to pay for “ necessary repairs.” The defendant claims that this means only such repairs as the defendant should find to be necessary. The plaintiff claims that this means all the repairs which the premises needed at the time of making the lease, or which should become necessary during the term.
The argument of the plaintiff is that, without this agreement as. to repairs, the defendants would be bound to do all which they claim this agreement binds them to ; and that the agreement is of no effect, unless it has the meaning claimed by the plaintiff.
At common law the landlord, without special covenant, was not-bound to repair. The tenant ivas bound to treat the premises, so that no injury be done ; not to make substantial, lasting or general but only ordinary repairs. (Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N. Y., 450.) That obligation did not’extend to making the premises better than they were when the lease began.
The case of Green v. Eden (2 T. & C., 582) cited by the plaintiff differs from the present. In that case the tenant covenanted “ as a further rent to keep the premises in good repair and condition.” The words “ good repair ” were held to make him liable* to repair defects existing at the commencement of the lease. In the case of Lockrow v. Morgan (58 N. Y., 635), also cited by the* plaintiff, the lessee agreed to make necessary repairs, and to keep' the premises tenantable at his own costs. The defect which this-agreement was held to cover was the settling of a wall, owing to-defective construction, a matter which took place after the commencement of the lease. Neither of these cases, therefore, shows-that an agreement to do necessary repairs requires the lessee to make the premises better than they were. In the case of Myers v. Burns (35 N. Y., 269), the landlord covenanted to keep the hotel and premises in good, necessary repair, at his own expense. He was held liable to do what was necessary, although the defect had existed at the commencement of the lease. It will be seen, however, that the repairs, for which he was thus liable, were those necessary to the tenants use of the premises ; and as there is no doubt, in the present case, that the tenant was to do whatever he deemed necessary for himself, that case is but little guide on the present question.
Nor do we think that much weight is to be given to the argument that the defendant would have been bound to do necessary repairs, without any express agreement. Parties wisely insert such clauses, that there may be no misunderstanding• sometimes, too, because they mistake, or axe uncertain as to the law.
"We think, therefore, that the referee erred in giving damages for the failure of the defendants to make the repairs needed at the time the lease was taken. The referee has found that there is no ■evidence from which can be determined the amount of expense of repairing such damages as accrued during the term, apart from' that which existed at the time the lease was made. Of course, therefore, we cannot determine this.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, and reference discharged, costs to abide event, unless the plaintiff
Ordered accordingly.