NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AUG 23 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
ERNESTO G. LIRA, No. 09-17446
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:00-cv-00905-SI
v.
MEMORANDUM *
HERRERA, Lt.; FIELDER; M. PILAND;
J. BRIDDLE; J. STOKES; K. MANN; D.
BEST; EDWARD S. ALAMEIDA, Jr.;
BUSSER, Asst. Warden; TERESA
SCHWARTZ; RICHARD J. KIRKLAND;
JUDY OLSON; DONALD SCHMIDT,
Defendants,
and
MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of CDCR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 18, 2011
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: SCHROEDER and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN, District
Judge.**
Defendant appeals the district court’s declaratory judgment entered after a
bench trial. We affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and
procedural history of the case, we need not recount it here.
I
The district court did not err in concluding that the action was not moot
given the evidence of continuing harm to the plaintiff. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523
U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (holding that the live controversy requirement is satisfied when
the plaintiff suffered an actual injury traceable to the defendant throughout the
litigation). The district court was persuaded by the evidence that declaratory and
injunctive relief would have a significant mitigating impact on the continuing
adverse impact to the plaintiff. This factual finding is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement that plaintiff’s injury should be “likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision” in order to avoid being deemed moot. Id. Given the extensive
record, we see no clear error in these factual findings as to injury and
redressability. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating
**
The Honorable Lynn S. Adelman, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for Eastern Wisconsin, Milwaukee, sitting by designation.
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standard). The district court’s factual finding of a “specific” and “concrete” effect
on the plaintiff’s mental health distinguishes this case from Munoz v. Rowland, 104
F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that speculative consequences were too
“ephemeral to constitute a collateral consequence for mootness purposes.”).
II
The district court’s extensive factual findings support the conclusion that
Lira was denied procedural due process. When a prisoner is to be administratively
segregated, due process requires that he receive “some notice” of the charges and
“an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding
whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
460, 476 (1983); see also Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir.
1990) (upholding a district court order requiring a hearing).1 Lira had no notice or
hearing with the appropriate prison officials prior to his validation as a gang
member, and there was no further re-investigation or re-evaluation of the validation
evidence after his transfer to administrative segregation. The defendant does not
dispute the district court’s finding that Lira never had a meaningful opportunity to
1
Although Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), abrogated Hewitt’s
“methodology for establishing the liberty interest,” Hewitt “remain[s] instructive
for [its] discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards.” Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005).
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present his views. The record supports the district court’s conclusion that the
prison’s post-segregation actions were not sufficient to cure the due process
violation.
III
To the extent that the district court relied on extrinsic evidence in concluding
that the “some evidence” standard of Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455
(1985) was not satisfied, it erred. “The Hill standard is minimally stringent.” Cato
v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987). Even evidence susceptible to more
than one logical conclusion suffices to meet the Hill standard. See Hill, 472 U.S. at
457. Courts “do not examine the entire record, independently assess witness
credibility, or reweigh the evidence.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.
2003).
However, to the extent that the district court considered extrinsic evidence in
assessing whether Lira was prejudiced by the procedural due process violation, the
supplemental evidence was relevant and properly considered. See
Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 858, 877 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(superceded on other grounds by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)) (noting the
consideration of supplemental evidence in assessing prejudice resulting from a
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procedural due process violation). In that context, the record overwhelmingly
supports the conclusion that Lira was prejudiced from the due process violation.
IV
Given the procedural due process violation, the district court did not err in
its entry of a declaratory judgment, and its remedy was appropriately tailored to the
unique circumstances of this case. Given this resolution we need not, and do not,
reach any other issue urged by the parties, and we express no opinion on those
questions.
All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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