Maddox v. Love

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1139

M ANNIE M ADDOX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

T IMOTHY L OVE, JASON G ARNETT, and L EE R YKER,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 06-cv-700-JPG—J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

A RGUED F EBRUARY 8, 2011—D ECIDED A UGUST 24, 2011

Before SYKES, T INDER , and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
T INDER, Circuit Judge. Inmate Mannie Maddox, a
member of the African Hebrew Israelite (AHI) faith
since 1998, was incarcerated at Illinois Lawrence Cor-
rectional Center (Lawrence) from March 2004 to
August 2007. When he arrived to serve his sentence, he
no doubt was pleased to discover that an AHI minister
performed religious services for AHI inmates bimonthly.
Maddox regularly attended these religious services until
2 No. 10-1139

September 2004, when the prison announced over its
television channel that AHI services were cancelled
until further notice. Maddox, upset about the cancella-
tion, filed a grievance asserting a denial of religious
fellowship. Lawrence denied his grievance, explaining
that the service was cancelled due to budget cuts.
Maddox appealed to the Grievance Officer and then to
the Department Director to no avail; they upheld the
denial of his grievance on the merits. During the three
stages of review, Maddox was never informed that his
grievance was incomplete or procedurally deficient.
Maddox filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against
the prison chaplain, Timothy Love, and prison wardens,
Jason Garnett and Lee Ryker (Ryker took over as warden
in 2005), in their individual and official capacities
alleging violations of his rights under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. He also
asserted related state law claims under the Illinois Con-
stitution, Art. I, §§ 2 and 3. Maddox sought declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief. In screening Maddox’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district
court reorganized Maddox’s allegations to structure
them into four separate counts, summarized as follows:
Count 1—failure to provide reasonable access to religious
materials; Counts 2 and 3—two manifestations of dis-
crimination in allocation of the prison religious budget;
and Count 4—failure to provide group worship services.
This restructuring did not distinguish between federal
and state law theories.
No. 10-1139 3

The district court dismissed Counts 2 and 3 for failure
to state a claim at the screening stage. The defendants
then moved for summary judgment on Counts 1 and 4,
arguing that Maddox didn’t properly exhaust his admin-
istrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), because he didn’t
indicate on his grievance form who the defendants were
that violated his rights, nor did he attempt to describe
them. The district court granted the defendants’ motion.
Maddox appeals the court’s dismissal of Counts 2 and 3
and grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on Counts 1 and 4.
We affirm in part and reverse and vacate in part. We
reverse the dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 and vacate entry
of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
Count 4 with respect to Maddox’s § 1983 claims against
the defendants in their individual capacities. Because
Lawrence processed Maddox’s grievance that he was
denied religious fellowship (Count 4) on the merits with-
out rejecting it for procedural deficiencies, the grievance
served its function of providing prison officials a fair
opportunity to address his complaints; we therefore
find that Maddox sufficiently exhausted his administra-
tive remedies on that claim. We further find that the
district court’s characterization of Counts 2 and 3 was
too narrow a reading of Maddox’s complaint and led
to premature dismissal of his claims at the screening
stage. We, however, affirm the court’s dismissal of
Count 1 because Maddox only complained of a failure
to provide religious services in his grievance, not a
failure to provide religious materials, so he didn’t
properly exhaust that claim.
4 No. 10-1139

I. Facts 1
Maddox was an inmate at Lawrence from March 2004
until he was transferred to Danville Correctional Center
in August 2007. He brings this complaint against three
Lawrence employees: Defendant Jason Garnett, who
was the warden from January 2004 through July 2005,
Defendant Lee Ryker, who succeeded as the warden
in October 2005, and Defendant Timothy Love, who has
been the chaplain since the prison opened in 2001. Law-
rence is a Level 2 secure-medium adult facility housing
about 2,000 inmates. As of May 2009, the inmates at
Lawrence had declared 46 different religious affiliations,
which included 647 inmates who identified themselves
as Christians, 313 as Baptists, 299 as Catholics, 119 as

1
The defendants ask this court to strike portions of Maddox’s
brief that do not comply with Circuit Rule 28(c), which requires
that “[n]o fact shall be stated in [the Statement of Facts] unless
it is supported by a reference to the page or pages of the
record or the appendix where that fact appears.” As the de-
fendants point out, Maddox in numerous places cites to the
entire summary judgment record (or sometimes nothing at
all) to support some of his factual contentions. See Casna v.
City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 2009) (striking “fact”
section and all portions of argument that relied on unsup-
ported facts). Although striking Maddox’s factual statements
would be permissible here, because the relevant facts for
purposes of this appeal are easily found within the record and
are largely undisputed, we merely admonish counsel for
Maddox to properly comply with Circuit Rule 28(c) in subse-
quent filings with this court.
No. 10-1139 5

Muslims, 32 as Moorish Science Temple followers, 30 as
Jehovah’s Witnesses, 28 as AHIs, and 5 as Jews. In 2004,
the prison offered approximately 17 regularly scheduled
religious services for various religions, including services
for AHI inmates.
Maddox, an AHI adherent 2 since 1998, began attending
AHI services when he first arrived at Lawrence. The
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) had a contract
with an AHI minister 3 in Chicago who traveled to Law-
rence (nearly a 250 mile drive) to provide service to
AHI inmates. Lawrence held services bimonthly for
members of the AHI religion, as well as additional
services during religious holiday periods; the AHI services
were supervised by Love and a security officer. The
AHI minister provided inmates with religious literature
and fresh fruits for religious holidays. Maddox reg-
ularly attended these services until September 2004,
when he saw a message displayed on the prison’s televi-

2
The record doesn’t provide much information about this
religion and because the tenets of the religion are not im-
portant to this opinion, we don’t discuss them here other than
noting that it is a belief system following certain practices
of Judaism. See e.g., United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489,
493 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The Original African Hebrew Israelite
Nation of Jerusalem is a small religious group which
believes that its members are descendants of the original
Hebrews.”).
3
There might be some debate about whether the term “rabbi”
may be more appropriate, but we use the term “minister” to
conform with Maddox’s deposition testimony.
6 No. 10-1139

sion channel that AHI services were cancelled until
further notice. As Maddox later discovered, the IDOC
terminated the AHI minister’s contract because of
budget cuts. Decisions regarding the employment of
chaplains are made at the departmental level. At the
time the AHI services were cancelled, the IDOC con-
tinued its contract with a rabbi from Chicago to minister
to Jewish inmates in all Illinois prisons, including Law-
rence.
After viewing this announcement, Maddox had two
brief conversations with Warden Garnett about the can-
cellation of AHI services. Garnett first told Maddox
there was nothing he could do and that he should talk
to Chaplain Love. Garnett later told him to file a griev-
ance. Maddox also briefly spoke with Ryker about
the cancellation and Ryker told him to “talk to the person
in charge of it.” Despite not having religious services,
Maddox still practiced his faith by receiving religious
guidance from his mother over the phone and reading
religious literature, including two Bibles, 4 previously
provided to him by the AHI minister. He also testified
that he prayed in his cell and received a religious diet.
Maddox, heeding Garnett’s advice, filed a grievance
dated October 29, 2004, on a 2001 form provided by
the IDOC. (The date of the form is significant because
in 2003, Illinois Administrative Code was amended to

4
Maddox used the term “Bible” to refer to AHI’s religious
text; we assert no opinion on whether that is the proper termi-
nology.
No. 10-1139 7

require the inmate’s grievance to include the name of the
individual who is the subject of or involved in the com-
plaint. More on this later). The form requests that the
inmate provide a brief summary of the grievance.
Maddox filled out the form, but did not name or attempt
to describe any individual involved in his complaint.
He stated that on September 10, 2004, an announce-
ment was posted on the institution’s television channel
that AHI Services were cancelled until further notice.
He asserted denial of religious fellowship, stating “[i]n
each and every religious doctrine, one of the most funda-
mental concepts is in the act of ministering to those in
need, to educate those who seek, and to [outwardly]
pray with those who so request.” He asserted that his
“right to freely exercise his religion [was] abrogated,
limited, and rescinded”; he sought transfer to another
facility or $20,000 in damages.
Three days after filing his grievance, a grievance coun-
selor responded that “Chaplain Love was contacted and
stated this service was cancelled due to budget cuts.”
Maddox’s grievance was formally denied on January 12,
2005, by the Grievance Officer who issued a report
stating that “[t]he facility cancelled the services due to
budget cuts. While the facility has several volunteers
to help with religious services, the leader of the African
Hebrew Israelite services was being compensated.” The
report recommended the grievance be denied. It stated:
“The facility is in compliance with DR 425.30 Accom-
modation of Religious Beliefs which is based in part
on availability of resources.” See 20 Ill. Admin. Code
§ 425.30(a) (prisoners “shall be provided reasonable
8 No. 10-1139

opportunities to pursue their religious beliefs and prac-
tices subject to concerns regarding . . . resources”).
Garnett, as Chief Administrative Officer, concurred with
the recommendation and denied the grievance. Maddox
appealed to the IDOC Director who concurred with a
recommendation by the IDOC Administrative Review
Board Office of Inmate Issues to deny the grievance.
During these three stages of review, Maddox was
never informed that his grievance was incomplete or
procedurally infirm in any way.
At some point, Maddox asked Love if the AHI
inmates could just meet in a group with supervision;
Love rejected the idea because, according to Love, there
was no one who could properly supervise the meeting.
Love attested that his schedule would not accommodate
the addition of another service or prayer meeting, particu-
larly for a faith that has so few members. Love spends
half his time conducting or supervising services and
religious study periods for Catholics, other Christians,
Muslims, Moorish Science Temple followers, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and Jews, as well as non-denominational
events; he also monitors services conducted by volun-
teers to ensure that the inmates follow their pre-approved
lesson plan. Love spends his remaining time making
rounds to talk to inmates about their religious needs,
responding to religious request slips, placing inmates on
call-pass for services, delivering death notices to
inmates, and enforcing prison regulations as they relate
to religious services and symbols. Love’s salary
comprises nearly all of Lawrence’s budget for religious
related matters. Garnett attested that prison officials
No. 10-1139 9

“looked at other options for providing the services, but
could not find a satisfactory solution.” Love asked AHI
inmates (the record is unclear whether Maddox was
one) to provide him with names of outside faith represen-
tatives so he could ask them to volunteer to provide
services, but they never provided him with any names.
For security reasons, the prison has required the
chaplain or a religious program volunteer to conduct
or supervise religious activities, which are also moni-
tored by security staff. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 425.60(a)
(“Religious activities approved by the Chief Administra-
tive Officer shall be conducted or supervised by a chap-
lain or religious program volunteer.”). The chaplain
or religious volunteer is in a better position to recognize
if the inmates deviate from their pre-approved lesson
plan. For example, Love attested that “although the 119
Muslim inmates and the 32 Moorish Science Temple
inmates meet without an outside faith representative,
they do not meet unsupervised. I have monitored their
meetings since 2001 and 2002, respectively.” The prison
has recently (in 2009) made exceptions to this rule on a
trial basis by occasionally allowing some religious
groups to meet with only security officers when the
chaplain is unavailable due to vacation or illness as long
as the chaplain pre-approves their lesson plan. The de-
fendants averred, however, that the prison doesn’t
allow groups of inmates to meet regularly without the
supervision of the chaplain. These rules are intended
to reduce gang-related activity.
10 No. 10-1139

II. Discussion
Before proceeding to the merits, we must pause to
consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
See Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“[W]e have an independent duty to determine that
jurisdiction exists before we can proceed to the merits.”).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over “all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States.”
A final judgment, for purposes of section 1291, is one
that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”
McMillian v. Sheraton Chi. Hotel & Towers, 567 F.3d 839,
842 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).
The district court dismissed Maddox’s Counts 1 and 4
“without prejudice” on exhaustion grounds. A dismissal
without prejudice normally “does not qualify as an
appealable final judgment because the plaintiff is free
to re-file the case.” Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718, 721
(7th Cir. 2001). But certain circumstances allow us to
consider such a dismissal as final. For example, “if the
plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his complaint, the
dismissal in effect was with prejudice and is final for
purposes of appellate review.” Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d
673, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). There is
nothing to indicate that Maddox can fix his grievances
and he has no more remedies to exhaust. Accordingly,
the dismissal without prejudice does not preclude our
appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 677 (district court’s dis-
missal of complaint without prejudice for failure to ex-
haust administrative remedies was final appealable
No. 10-1139 11

order where inmate filed grievances and pursued them
to conclusion and there was no indication that Illinois
would allow him to file another).
It is apparent that the district court is finished with this
case. When the district court dismissed Counts 1 and 4
for failure to exhaust, it stated: “All the other matters and
issues, once the Court makes the finding, the failure to
exhaust the other matters, become moot and the Court
cannot address those. So you will have a right to
appeal this decision, Mr. Maddox, but that will be the
finding and ruling of this Court.” The court made the
following entry: “The Court after hearing argument from
parties, hereby GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all ad-
ministrative remedies by failing to name[] Love, Garnett
and Ryker in his grievances[.] The Court finds that all
other matters are Moot, and advises the plaintiff of
his appeal rights.” The court then entered judgment,
dismissing Counts 2 and 3 with prejudice and Counts 1
and 4 without prejudice. The court could have at that
point declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Maddox’s state law claims, but it didn’t do that. Instead,
it in effect dismissed those claims as moot.5

5
The defendants correctly point out that the district court
didn’t separately address Maddox’s state law claims that
defendants violated the Illinois Constitution. The defendants
argue that the district court never had subject matter jurisdic-
tion over Maddox’s state law claims, citing to Illinois State
Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat 5/0.01 et seq. We
(continued...)
12 No. 10-1139

Satisfied that our jurisdiction is secure, we move on
to the merits. We can quickly dispose of several of Mad-
dox’s claims. Maddox’s prayers for injunctive relief
are moot because he is no longer an inmate at Lawrence.
See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2009).
Maddox has not shown a realistic possibility that he
will again be incarcerated in the same state facility and
therefore be subject to the actions of which he com-
plains here. As such, “[a]ny relief that our judgment
might permit would be purely speculative in nature.” See
id. Further, the defendants are immune from suit under
§ 1983 for monetary damages in their official capacities.
See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 917-18 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“To the extent [the plaintiff] seeks monetary damages
from defendants acting in their official capacity, those
claims . . . are dismissed as they are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.”).
Maddox’s RLUIPA claim also fails. Sovereign
immunity shields state officials from monetary damages
in their official capacity under RLUIPA. See Sossamon v.
Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-59 (2011); see also
Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2009). We
have also held that RLUIPA does not allow for suits
against prison officials in their individual capacity.
Nelson, 570 F.3d at 886-89. Because Maddox has no claim

5
(...continued)
don’t need to address whether this immunity applies here or
the mootness dismissal of the state law claims because
Maddox abandoned those claims on appeal.
No. 10-1139 13

to injunctive relief in light of his transfer to Danville,
he cannot seek relief under RLUIPA.
So that leaves us with Maddox’s 1983 claims for mone-
tary damages against the defendants in their individual
capacities. It is to those claims we now turn.

A. Section 1915A Screening—Dismissal of Counts 2
and 3
Maddox’s complaint alleges that the defendants sub-
stantially burdened the free exercise of his religion as
an AHI and discriminated against his religion in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment. (Pl.
Compl., App. 1, preliminary statement). He set forth a
number of factual allegations in support of his claims. He
asserted that the “study of the [AHI] religion both by
Plaintiff and with other [AHI] members is an integral
part of the daily practice of his sincere beliefs.” (Id. at
App. 3, ¶ 14). He stated that the defendants discrim-
inated “between Christian and [AHI] inmates by pro-
viding reasonable access to religious materials to the
former and not to the latter.” (Id. at App. 4, ¶ 17). He
further stated that the defendants refused to com-
pensate the AHI minister in the same manner as other
religious leaders and allocated “a disproportionately
small share of the Lawrence religious budget . . . to
[AHI] activities . . . .” (Id. at App. 4, ¶ 18). The defendants
exaggerated their response, according to Maddox, by
stating that the prison lacked resources due to budget
cuts when Love could have supervised their meetings
since he was available and already being compensated
14 No. 10-1139

by the prison. (Id. at App. 4, ¶ 19). Maddox complains
that his “right to freely exercise his religion has been
infringed on by Defendants because their acts and omis-
sions substantially diminished his qualitative spiritual
experience(s) as an [AHI] at Lawrence.” (Id. at App. 4,
¶ 20).
Maddox then set forth two counts. In his first “count,” he
asserted that the “[t]he restrictions and cancellation of
the [AHI] services at Lawrence by the Defendants were
and are arbitrarily imposed and has put a substantial
burden on Plaintiff’s right to freely exercise his religion”
in violation of the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and Art. I,
§ 3 (Religious Freedom) of the Illinois Constitution. (Id.
at App. 5, ¶ 27). In his second “count,” he asserted that
the defendants violated his rights under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RLUIPA,
and Art. I, § 2 (Due Process and Equal Protection) of
the Illinois Constitution “in discriminating between
Christian and [AHI] inmates by both providing the
former and not the latter with reasonable access to reli-
gious reading materials, and by refusing to propor-
tionately distribute to . . . the [AHI] group at Lawrence . . .
funds allocated for religious purposes, as well as by
failing to compensate an outside religious leader and/or
faith representatives at Lawrence.” (Id. at App. 5, ¶ 28).
In screening Maddox’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, the district court restructured it to assert
four separate counts: Count 1: the defendants provided
reasonable access to religious materials for members of
Christian faiths, but not to adherents of the AHI faith;
No. 10-1139 15

Count 2: the defendants failed to compensate the
outside leader of the AHI faith in the same manner as
leaders of other religious groups; Count 3: the defendants
allocated a disproportionately small portion of the avail-
able religious budget at Lawrence to the AHI faith;
and Count 4: the defendants failed to permit members
of the AHI faith to participate in group worship services
even under the auspices of defendant Love. In the re-
mainder of this opinion, we refer to Maddox’s counts
as restructured by the district court. The district court
dismissed Counts 2 and 3 for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The court reasoned that the constitution doesn’t re-
quire prisons to “provide each religious group or sect
the exact same personnel, facilities, or other resources” or
that “state resources allocated for religious activities in
prisons be equally or proportionally distributed among
the various religious groups.” Maddox v. Love, No. 06-700-
JPG, 2007 WL 3333251, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2007) (citing
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972)).
We review a failure to state a claim under § 1915A in
the same manner as an “ordinary 12(b)(6) dismissal,” so
our review is de novo. Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626,
626 (7th Cir. 1999). To satisfy the notice-pleading
standard, a complaint must provide a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” which is sufficient to provide the
defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and its basis.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))). Recent cases instruct us to
16 No. 10-1139

examine whether the allegations in the complaint state a
“plausible” claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___,
___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (to survive a motion
to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. . . . A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”). The complaint “must actually suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations
that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech.
Fin. Servs., 536 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Tamayo
v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008)). We,
however, construe pro se complaints liberally and hold
them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citation
omitted); Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n. 2 (7th
Cir. 2008).
If the district court’s restructuring and narrowing of
Maddox’s complaint in Counts 2 and 3 are accepted, a
conclusion that these counts fail to state a claim perhaps
can be understood. “Prison walls do not form a barrier
separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution, but prisoners’ constitutional rights may
be restricted by the fact of confinement and the needs
of the penal institution.” Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 374
(7th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted). Prisons need not provide every religious sect or
group within a prison with identical facilities or per-
No. 10-1139 17

sonnel and need not employ chaplains representing
every faith among the inmate population. See Cruz, 405
U.S. at 322 n. 2. “[T]he free exercise clause guarantees
a liberty interest, a substantive right; it does not
guarantee that all religious sects will be treated alike in
all respects.” Young, 922 F.2d at 377 (citing Cruz, 405 U.S.
at 322 n. 2). A plaintiff doesn’t state a cause of action
under the First Amendment merely because a prison
allocates a disproportionately smaller amount of its
religious budget to certain sects or provides clergy for
one religion and not another. See id. at 377-78 (finding
no precedent that would require defendants to
reimburse rabbis for their travel expenses when they
constituted less than one percent of the prison population
even though defendants reimbursed other clergy
visiting the prison). After all, if a budget for religious-
related matters were to be divided too many ways, the
result could be an inadequate provision of religious
access for the prisoners as a whole.
Maddox, however, urges us on appeal to read these
counts more broadly in the context of his overall com-
plaint and allegations that defendants denied AHI ad-
herents a reasonable opportunity to pursue their faith
by allocating a disproportionally small amount of the
religious budget to AHI services and signaling out those
services for cancellation. We agree with Maddox that his
complaint should be read more broadly. The problem,
as we see it, is trying to separate Maddox’s claim for
religious fellowship (the subject of his grievance)
into separate counts (Counts 2, 3, and 4). The better
approach is to examine the facts in the aggregate to
18 No. 10-1139

determine whether, based on the totality of the situa-
tion, the defendants “denied [Maddox] a reasonable
opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the
opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to
conventional religious precepts.” Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322;
see, e.g., Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1312 (7th Cir.
1988) (remanding for determination whether prison
officials unreasonably delayed making arrangements for
Moorish ministers to visit prison and finding “troubling”
that prison pays for full-time Catholic and Protestant
chaplains, but would not reimburse visiting Moorish
minister for travel expenses). Maddox alleges that the
defendants singled out AHI services for cancellation
purportedly due to budget cuts, disproportionally al-
located the prison’s religious budget and resources (in-
cluding Chaplain Love’s time) to other religions, and
failed to pursue alternatives to allow the inmates to
pursue their faith. These facts, as set forth in Maddox’s
complaint, sufficiently state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.
Prisons must permit inmates the reasonable oppor-
tunity to exercise religious freedom. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322
& n. 2. However, prison restrictions that infringe on an
inmate’s exercise of his religion are permissible if they
are reasonably related to a legitimate penological
objective, such as security and economic concerns. See
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (listing factors
relevant in determining whether the “reasonableness” test
has been met); see also Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680,
686 (7th Cir. 1991). The court must balance Maddox’s
right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise
No. 10-1139 19

the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments against the legitimate penological
goals of the prison. See Young, 922 F.2d at 374. Within
these confines, a prison is required to make “only rea-
sonable efforts” to provide “some opportunity” for reli-
gious practice. Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1040-41
(7th Cir. 1994). This test is less restrictive than that ordi-
narily applied to infringements on constitutional rights
in consideration of the need to give appropriate defer-
ence to prison officials, avoiding unnecessary judicial
intrusion into security problems and other prison con-
cerns. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1987).
“In providing this opportunity, the efforts of prison
administrators, when assessed in their totality, must be
evenhanded.” Al-Alamin, 926 F.2d at 686. Prisons cannot
discriminate against a particular religion “except to the
extent required by the exigencies of prison administra-
tion.” Johnson-Bey, 863 F.2d at 1312. “The rights of
inmates belonging to minority or non-traditional re-
ligions must be respected to the same degree as the
rights of those belonging to larger and more tradi-
tional denominations. Of course, economic and, at
times, security constraints may require that the needs of
inmates adhering to one faith be accommodated dif-
ferently from those adhering to another.” Al-Alamin,
926 F.2d at 686. “[T]he treatment of all inmates must be
qualitatively comparable.” Id.; see, e.g., Williams v. Lane,
851 F.2d 867, 885 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming trial court’s
determination after bench trial that defendants violated
protective custody inmates’ First Amendment rights
20 No. 10-1139

by denying them, but not general population inmates,
opportunities for regular communal worship, religious
instruction, and private religious counseling without
legitimate penological interests).
Whether the defendants made reasonable efforts to
provide Maddox some opportunity for religious practice
or whether they were justified in signaling out AHI
services for cancellation because of budgetary restric-
tions remains to be seen. It is premature to make that
determination at the pleading stage. See e.g., Ortiz v.
Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding
that the district court’s determination at the pleading
stage that the prison had a legitimate penological reason
to deny detainee religious articles of rosary and prayer
booklet was premature); see Alston, 13 F.3d at 1040
(holding dismissal improper where the district court
assumed that the defendants were justified in
restricting the inmate’s religious freedom because he
was in administrative segregation). We do not make
any determination about the ultimate merits of the al-
legations contained in the complaint, nor should our
decision today be read as suggesting an outcome. We
only conclude that Maddox has stated a claim “plausible
on its face” that he was denied a reasonable opportunity
to exercise his religion without adequate penological
justification.

B. Summary Judgment—Dismissal of Counts 1 and 4
The district court allowed Maddox’s complaint to go
forward on Counts 1 and 4, but then granted the defen-
No. 10-1139 21

dants’ motion for summary judgment on both counts
because Maddox failed to properly exhaust his admini-
strative remedies. Maddox concedes that he failed to
grieve his complaint for access to religious materials
(Count 1), Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 2 n.1 (stating that
his “grievance did not address alleged denial of access
to religious literature, and therefore, his claims as to this
issue were properly dismissed on summary judgment”),
so we find that the district court properly dismissed
that count. The district court, however, also dismissed
Maddox’s claim for group worship (Count 4) because
he failed to list the names of the defendants, or if not
known at the time, their description, in the grievance
pursuant to 20 Illinois Administrative Code § 504.810.
We review de novo the question whether the prisoner
has met the exhaustion requirement. See Conyers v.
Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2005). Exhaustion is an
affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the
defendants. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007).
The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . .
until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a)
requires “proper exhaustion”; that is, the inmate must
file a timely grievance utilizing the procedures and rules
of the state’s prison grievance process. See Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 93 (2006); see also Conyers, 416 F.3d
at 584. The “applicable procedural rules” that a prisoner
must properly exhaust are defined not by the PLRA, but
by the prison grievance process itself. Jones, 549 U.S. at
218. We have taken a “strict compliance approach to
22 No. 10-1139

exhaustion.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir.
2006). Thus, “[a] prisoner must properly use the prison’s
grievance process. If he or she fails to do so, the prison
administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and
the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Id.
Grievances are intended to “[allow prisons] to address
complaints about the program it administers before
being subjected to suit, [reduce] litigation to the extent
complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and [improve]
litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation
of a useful record.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 219.
The Illinois Administrative Code requires that the
grievance “contain factual details regarding each aspect
of the offender’s complaint, including what happened,
when, where, and the name of each person who is
the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the com-
plaint.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(b). If names of
individuals are unknown to the offender, he can still
file the grievance, but “must include as much descrip-
tive information about the individual as possible.” Id.
This version of the Code provision became effective in
2003 and was in effect when Maddox filed his grievance.
However, Maddox filed his grievance on a prison form
dated 2001 and the form only asked for a “Brief
Summary of Grievance”; there was no indication on the
form that names had to be provided. That’s because
under the prior version of § 504.810, inmates were not
required to draft their grievances with any specific
degree of factual particularity and were not required
to identify, by name or otherwise, the individuals respon-
sible for the events that gave rise to their respective
No. 10-1139 23

grievances. See 27 Ill. Reg. § 6214 (amending § 504.810).
Prior to 2003, a grievance sufficed simply by “object[ing]
intelligently to some asserted shortcoming.” Cannon v.
Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Strong
v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Illinois has
not established any rule or regulation prescribing the
contents of a grievance or the necessary degree of
factual particularity.”).
The defendants argue that Maddox failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies because he did not name
the defendants or describe them in his grievance; the
defendants do not otherwise contend that Maddox
failed to follow the prison three-step grievance process.
See 20 Ill. Admin. Code §§ 504.800 et seq. (detailing griev-
ance procedure); see also Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284
(7th Cir. 2005) (explaining process). This argument fails
because before this suit, Maddox’s compliance with the
grievance process was never in question. Maddox’s
grievance was rejected on the merits at every
stage of review without any indication from prison offi-
cials that it was procedurally deficient.6 “[A] procedural

6
The defendants contend that Maddox has waived this argu-
ment on appeal by not developing it below. We disagree. First,
Maddox was acting pro se in the district court, and as a pro se
litigant, his submissions should be held to less exacting stan-
dards than those drafted by counsel. See Alvardo v. Litscher, 267
F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). Second, and more importantly,
Maddox did respond to the defendants’ summary judgment
motion by contending that he exhausted available administra-
(continued...)
24 No. 10-1139

shortcoming like failing to follow the prison’s time dead-
lines amounts to a failure to exhaust only if prison ad-
ministrators explicitly relied on that shortcoming.”
Conyers, 416 F.3d at 585. Where prison officials address
an inmate’s grievance on the merits without rejecting it
on procedural grounds, the grievance has served its
function of alerting the state and inviting corrective
action, and defendants cannot rely on the failure to
exhaust defense. See id.; see also Riccardo v. Rausch, 375
F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen a state treats a
filing as timely and resolves it on the merits, the federal
judiciary will not second-guess that action, for the griev-
ance has served its function of alerting the state and
inviting corrective action.”); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395,
398 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that by deciding prisoner’s
grievance without invoking a forfeiture doctrine, the
Administrative Review Board established that the
prisoner exhausted his state remedies).
Maddox’s grievance served its function by providing
prison officials a fair opportunity to address his com-

6
(...continued)
tive remedies and that he received a response to his grievance
at every level denying his request due to budget cuts. During
the summary judgment hearing, Maddox also stated that the
grievance goes to the warden and he even talked to the
warden about his grievance. He stated, “I exhausted my
remedy by filing a grievance.” The defendants had the burden
to prove their affirmative defense of exhaustion and to show
that they were entitled to summary judgment on that basis.
Based on the record submitted and the undisputed facts,
they failed to make that showing.
No. 10-1139 25

plaint. He complained about an administrative deci-
sion—the cancellation of AHI services—and it belies
reason to suggest that prison administrators at Lawrence
were unaware of who was responsible for that decision.
In fact, defendant Love was asked to respond to Maddox’s
grievance and defendant Garnett, as Chief Administra-
tive Officer, was directly involved in denying it. That
Maddox didn’t specifically name the defendants in the
grievance was a mere technical defect that had no effect
on the process and didn’t limit the usefulness of the
exhaustion requirement. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 219 (pro-
viding early notice to those who might later be sued
has not been thought to be one of the leading purposes of
the exhaustion requirement) (citing Johnson v. Johnson,
385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004) (“We are mindful that
the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison
officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to
a particular official that he may be sued; the grievance
is not a summons and complaint that initiates adversarial
litigation.”)).
This conclusion is particularly appropriate in this case
where the form provided by the prison didn’t request
inmates to provide the name of the person subject to
the complaint. See, e.g., Curtis v. Timberlake, 436 F.3d 709,
712 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment in
favor of defendant on exhaustion grounds where
prisoner presented evidence that he followed the
prison’s “accepted practice” with regard to submitting
grievances even though he didn’t follow the letter of the
written grievance procedure). The grievance form pro-
vided to Maddox asked for a brief summary of the griev-
26 No. 10-1139

ance; Maddox provided a brief summary. He was
never informed that his summary was procedurally
deficient, and prison officials (including defendant
Garnett) acted on his grievance by addressing it on the
merits after contacting defendant Love to respond.
Based on these facts, we find that Maddox properly
exhausted his administrative remedies.
We therefore reverse the district court’s entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants on Count 4 and
remand for further consideration. The defendants ad-
dressed the merits of Count 4 in their memorandum in
support of summary judgment and raised the defense of
qualified immunity, but the district court didn’t address
those issues, nor has either party addressed them on
appeal. We therefore remand to the district court to
consider the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits in the first
instance. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hix Wrecker Serv., Inc., ___ F.3d
___, No. 09-3023, 2011 WL 2586284, at *4 (7th Cir. July 1,
2011) (declining to address issue raised on summary
judgment that the district court hadn’t first considered);
see also Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 634
F.3d 906, 916-17 (7th Cir. 2011) (remanding to the
district court the issue of whether the defendants are en-
titled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity).

III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we R EVERSE the dismissal of
Counts 2 and 3 and V ACATE the entry of summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants on Count 4 as to Maddox’s
No. 10-1139 27

§ 1983 claims against the defendants in their individual
capacities and otherwise A FFIRM . The case is R EMANDED
for further proceedings.

8-24-11