10-1996-ag
Huang v. Holder
BIA
Schoppert, IJ
A088 527 724
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 29th day of August, two thousand eleven.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12
13 YI MEI HUANG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 10-1996-ag
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, N.Y.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
26 General; Greg D. Mack, Senior
27 Litigation Counsel; Micheline
28 Hershey, Attorney, Office of
29 Immigration Litigation, United
30 States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Yi Mei Huang, a native and citizen of the People’s
6 Republic of China, seeks review of an April 28, 2010, order
7 of the BIA affirming the August 13, 2008, decision of
8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Douglas B. Schoppert, which denied
9 Huang’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
10 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
11 Yi Mei Huang, No. A088 527 724 (B.I.A. Apr. 28, 2010), aff’g
12 No. A088 527 724 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 13, 2008). We
13 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
14 and procedural history in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we review both
16 the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
17 completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.
18 2008) (per curiam). The applicable standards of review are
19 well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also
20 Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008). For
21 asylum applications, such as Huang’s, governed by the REAL
22 ID Act, the agency may, considering the totality of the
2
1 circumstances, base a credibility finding on an applicant’s
2 demeanor, the plausibility of her account, or
3 inconsistencies in her statements, without regard to whether
4 they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
5 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
6 Contrary to Huang’s position, substantial evidence
7 supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
8 The IJ reasonably relied on a number of bases in finding
9 Huang not credible, including Huang’s demeanor. The Court
10 grants “particular deference” in applying the substantial
11 evidence standard to credibility findings based on demeanor.
12 Dong Gao v. B.I.A., 482 F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2007).
13 Such deference is appropriate given that the IJ’s ability to
14 observe the witness places him in the best position to
15 evaluate credibility. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of
16 Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, the IJ
17 noted that “it was [his] impression particularly when
18 testifying on direct examination that [Huang] was testifying
19 not about real life, lived experiences, but from a script.”
20 He further observed, “on cross-examination, [Huang]
21 frequently asked that questions be repeated and her demeanor
22 suggested to me that she was seeking to buy time to
23 formulate an answer to the questions.” We defer to the IJ’s
3
1 findings here. Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167
2 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
3 The IJ also reasonably based his decision on
4 implausibilities in Huang’s testimony. In making a finding
5 that an applicant’s claim is implausible, an IJ is not
6 required to “explain in precise detail what made each
7 identified act implausible.” Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509
8 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Rather, if “the
9 reasons for [the IJ’s] incredulity are evident,” the
10 implausibility finding is supported by substantial evidence.
11 Id. While “bald” speculation is an impermissible basis for
12 an adverse credibility finding, “[t]he speculation that
13 inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made
14 available to the factfinder by record facts, or even a
15 single fact, viewed in the light of common sense and
16 ordinary experience.” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168-
17 69 (2d Cir. 2007). Here, the IJ reasonably found it
18 implausible, given her alleged devout Christian beliefs and
19 participation in church activities, that Huang did not
20 baptize her baby who was born in the United States and did
21 not have a Christian wedding ceremony. Huang’s explanations
22 for these seeming implausibilities were not so compelling
23 that a reasonable fact-finder must credit them. See Majidi
4
1 v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005). Thus, as
2 the IJ’s finding is based on Huang’s own contradictory
3 testimony, and is therefore “tethered to record evidence,”
4 Wensheng Yan, 509 F.3d at 67, the finding is supported by
5 substantial evidence.
6 The agency also relied on an inconsistency in reaching
7 its adverse credibility determination. As the IJ noted,
8 Huang testified that she worked at a plant in China from
9 September 2004 to January 2006, when she was fired after
10 being detained for her participation in underground church
11 activities. However, Huang had submitted a household
12 registration booklet from 2005 that indicated that she was a
13 student at that time. The IJ reasonably found that this
14 inconsistency undermined Huang’s credibility. Huang offered
15 explanations; however, “a petitioner must do more than offer
16 a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to
17 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
18 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi,
19 430 F.3d at 80 (emphasis in original) (internal citations
20 omitted). Therefore, the agency was not required to credit
21 Huang’s explanation for this discrepancy. See id. at 80-81.
22 Finally, Huang claims that the IJ erred in discounting
23 her unauthenticated documents from China. However, this
5
1 claim is unavailing, as the weight afforded to the
2 applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely
3 within the discretion of the IJ. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.
4 Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006).
5 Because Huang’s claims were all based on the same
6 factual predicate, the agency’s adverse credibility
7 determination was a proper basis for the denial of asylum,
8 withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v.
9 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang v.
10 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005).
11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
12 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
13 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
14 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
15 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
16 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
17 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
18 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
19 FOR THE COURT:
20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
21
6