FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDWIN VERNON LOCKETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 09-16609
v.
D.C. No.
KEITH ERICSON; CITY OF MOUNT 2:07-cv-00301-
SHASTA POLICE DEPARTMENT; GEB-CMK
ROBERT D. GIBSON; CHRIS LYNCH;
OPINION
DAVE MICKELSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, District Judge, Presiding
Argued November 5, 2010
Submitted August 25, 2011
San Francisco, California
Filed August 31, 2011
Before: John T. Noonan, Richard A. Paez, and
Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Paez
16563
16566 LOCKETT v. ERICSON
COUNSEL
Tania Beth Rose, San Francisco, California, for plaintiff-
appellant Edwin Lockett.
William Ayres, Redding, California, for defendants-appellees
City of Mt. Shasta Police Department, Robert Gibson, and
Chris Lynch.
Kamala Harris, Attorney General of California, Alberto Gon-
zalez, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento,
California, for defendant-appellee Keith Ericson.
OPINION
PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
In 2005, officers entered Plaintiff-Appellant Edwin
Lockett’s (“Lockett”) home without a warrant and obtained
evidence that he had driven under the influence of alcohol
earlier in the night. The ensuing state prosecution concluded
when Lockett pled nolo contendere to a violation of Califor-
nia Vehicle Code section 23103.5(a). Believing the officers
violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his
home in 2005, Lockett filed a federal complaint against the
officers and the Mount Shasta Police Department pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Lockett’s
§ 1983 complaint, concluding that the case was barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and that the district
LOCKETT v. ERICSON 16567
court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Lockett
appealed the dismissal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and, for the reasons set forth below, we reverse
the district court’s dismissal and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.
Factual and Procedural Background
On February 16, 2005, Lockett attempted to drive home
after his birthday party. Lockett did not quite make it: his car
slid off the road close to his house and he was unable to get
it back on the road. A woman saw Lockett trying to move his
car and she asked if he needed help. Lockett declined the
woman’s help and told her he was alright. Lockett then left
his car and walked the remaining short distance to his house.
The Yreka California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) received a
call reporting that a car was off the road; the caller said that
she had spoken to the driver, that she thought he was drunk,
and that he told her that he was not hurt and did not need
assistance. When the witness was interviewed again later, she
clarified that when she saw the car it was already off the side
of the road. CHP Officers Keith Ericson and S.J. Dickson, and
Mt. Shasta Police Officers Robert Gibson and Chris Lynch
went to the site where Lockett had left his car. These officers
found that the car was locked but the right front window was
down and there were several valuable items visible inside.
The Mt. Shasta Police Department Dispatch told the officers
that the car’s registered address was a residence approxi-
mately one block from where the car was left. Officers Eric-
son, Lynch, and Gibson (“Officers”) proceeded to the
registered address.
At the residence, the Officers found the front door ajar by
approximately two inches, and a glass storm door that was
closed but unlocked. The Officers recall that they knocked on
the storm door for five minutes, identified themselves, and
called out for a response. No one inside the residence
16568 LOCKETT v. ERICSON
responded, but the Officers heard several coughs and saw
moving shadows inside. Officer Ericson called CHP Dispatch
and requested assistance from Sergeant Mickelson, who
arrived at the residence a short time later.
After discussing the circumstances, Officers Ericson and
Mickelson decided to enter the residence: they continued to
announce themselves and requested a response from the occu-
pant as they entered. Officer Mickelson found Lockett in bed
and began to question him. Lockett said that he did not
require medical attention and that he did not answer the door
because he was asleep. Officer Ericson said that Lockett could
not have been asleep for very long because he had just
crashed his car nearby; Lockett responded “I didn’t crash, I
just got stuck.” The Officers asked Lockett to remove the
blankets covering him, which revealed that he was fully
dressed and also revealed a strong smell of alcohol. The Offi-
cers further observed that Lockett’s eyes were red and watery.
Officer Ericson asked Lockett if he owned the car at issue and
he said yes. Officer Ericson also asked whether Lockett had
drunk any alcohol since returning home and he responded no.
Officer Ericson then requested that Lockett perform field
sobriety tests, which Lockett did not successfully complete.
At this time, Officer Ericson arrested Lockett for driving
while under the influence of alcohol and took him to the Mt.
Shasta Area CHP office where he underwent a breathalyser
test. The result of the breathalyser was .17/.17.
The county prosecutor filed a misdemeanor complaint
against Lockett on March 9, 2005, alleging one count of driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of Cal-
ifornia Vehicle Code section 23152(a), and one count of
driving at .08 (or above) blood alcohol level in violation of
California Vehicle Code section 23152(b). In the ensuing
state court proceeding, Lockett filed a motion to suppress
under California Penal Code section 1538.5, arguing that the
evidence supporting the State’s case against him was seized
LOCKETT v. ERICSON 16569
without a warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that
the Officers were “reasonable in [their] suspicion of exigent
circumstances regarding the well being of [Lockett]” and
acted “properly in [their] role as a community caretaker in
entering [Lockett’s] residence to determine the need for assis-
tance.” The court further found that “[o]nce inside the resi-
dence . . . the officer[s] made plain sight observations which
gave rise to probable cause to arrest [Lockett] for driving
under the influence.”
After the trial court denied the motion to suppress as noted
above, Lockett entered a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser
violation of California Vehicle Code section 23103.5(a), com-
monly known as a “wet reckless.” Lockett waived his right to
appeal any section 1538.5 suppression issues, his sentence
was suspended, and he was placed on probation for three
years. The Superior Court entered the Order of Informal Pro-
bation against Lockett on June 23, 2008.
Lockett filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on February
15, 2007. The court granted Lockett’s request to stay the pro-
ceedings pending the resolution of his related state prosecu-
tion. The court lifted the stay on August 26, 2008, in response
to Lockett’s report that the state prosecution against him had
concluded upon his nolo contendere plea. At a case manage-
ment conference on October 22, 2008, the district court
directed the parties to brief the issue of whether Lockett’s
claim was barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994).
On May 11, 2009, the assigned Magistrate Judge filed his
findings and recommendations. The Magistrate Judge con-
cluded that the Heck bar applied to Lockett’s civil rights claim
and that the district court therefore lacked subject matter juris-
diction. The Magistrate Judge explained that Lockett
16570 LOCKETT v. ERICSON
argued in his motion to suppress that there were no
exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless
entry into his home. More to the point, [Lockett]
argues that there was no valid reason whatsoever to
enter the house. The facts outlined in [Lockett’s]
§ 1983 complaint do not indicate that the warrantless
search could even arguably have nonetheless been
proper due to some independent source or because of
inevitable discovery. Further, because there was no
trial and [Lockett] waived his right to appeal the
conviction, the issue of harmless error could never
arise.
The Magistrate Judge also rejected Lockett’s argument that
his claim fell within an exception to the Heck bar discussed
in footnote 7 of that opinion: “[b]ecause the search could not
have been otherwise rendered valid (due to, for example, an
independent source, inevitable discovery, or harmless error),
success on the § 1983 claim could have no other effect than
to render the search and subsequent conviction invalid.”
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that
Lockett’s claim be dismissed.
The district court adopted in full the Magistrate Judge’s
findings and recommendations, and it dismissed the case on
June 29, 2009. Lockett now appeals the district court’s dis-
missal. After oral argument, we vacated submission of this
case and ordered supplemental briefing from the parties.
We review de novo a district court order dismissing a case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Snow-Erlin v. United
States, 470 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 2006).
Discussion
I. The Heck Bar
[1] Lockett argues that the district court dismissed his
§ 1983 claim based upon an incorrect application of the
LOCKETT v. ERICSON 16571
Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). We agree. In Heck, the Court held that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconsti-
tutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The Court explained
that a “district court must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the convic-
tion or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. The
Court clarified, however, that if a “plaintiff’s action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any out-
standing criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action
should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other
bar to the suit.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
[2] In Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2001), we
reviewed a district court’s application of the Supreme Court’s
Heck bar. We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. Id. at 820. We did so, however, only
because the plaintiffs had failed to allege a constitutional
violation—we held that the district court’s dismissal of the
claim pursuant to Heck was in error. Id. at 823. In Ove, the
§ 1983 claims arose “from blood tests taken after [the three]
plaintiffs’ arrests for suspicion of driving under the influence
of alcohol.” Id. at 820. In the subsequent criminal proceed-
ings, the three Ove plaintiffs filed suppression motions under
California Penal Code section 1538.5. Id. One plaintiff’s
16572 LOCKETT v. ERICSON
motion was granted and the case was dismissed; the second
plaintiff’s motion was never ruled on and he pled nolo con-
tendere to a violation of California Vehicle Code section
23152(a); the third plaintiff’s motion was denied and he pled
guilty to a violation of California Vehicle Code section
23152(a). Id. The convictions of the latter two plaintiffs were
not “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at
486-87. Applying the principles the Supreme Court set forth
in Heck and its progeny, however, we held that Heck did not
bar the convicted plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. We explained that
the plaintiffs’
lawsuit concerns the way in which their blood was
drawn. But blood evidence was not introduced
against them. No evidence was introduced against
them. They pleaded guilty or nolo contendere,
respectively. Their convictions derive from their
pleas, not from verdicts obtained with supposedly
illegal evidence. The validity of their convictions
does not in any way depend upon the legality of the
blood draws.
Ove, 264 F.3d at 823 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
[3] Our holding in Ove is dispositive in Lockett’s case.
Lockett pled nolo contendere after the superior court denied
his California Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression motion.
He was not tried, and no evidence was introduced against
him. Therefore, like the convicted plaintiffs in Ove, Lockett’s
conviction “derive[s] from [his] plea[ ], not from [a] verdict[ ]
obtained with supposedly illegal evidence.” Id. “The validity
of” Lockett’s conviction “does not in any way depend upon
the legality” of the search of his home. Id. We therefore hold
that Heck does not bar Lockett’s § 1983 claim.
LOCKETT v. ERICSON 16573
II. Plea Agreement Waiver
[4] Defendants argue that even if Heck does not bar
Lockett’s law suit, the case is barred because, in his plea
agreement, Lockett waived his right to appeal any California
Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression issues. The superior
court clerk’s minutes reflect Lockett’s appellate waiver in two
places. One handwritten note reads: “Def waives his right to
appeal any 1538.5 issues.” Another handwritten note reads:
“Def waives any appeal rights in regards to 1538.5 issues.”
[5] “[P]lea agreements are contractual in nature, and, as is
typical in contract cases, if the terms are clear and unambigu-
ous, we will not look further.” United States v. Lightfoot, 626
F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted). The terms
of Lockett’s plea agreement appear clear and unambiguous:
he “waive[d] any appeal rights in regards to 1538.5 issues.”
(emphasis added). The term “appeal rights” in a criminal plea
agreement does not encompass “civil litigation rights.” More-
over, “we steadfastly apply the rule that any lack of clarity in
a plea agreement should be construed against the government
as drafter.” United States v. Cope, 527 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even if the
terms of Lockett’s appellate waiver were ambiguous, we
would construe that ambiguity against the government and
conclude that the waiver in the plea agreement does not affect
Lockett’s ability to pursue this separate civil law suit.
III. Collateral Estoppel
[6] Defendants also argue that collateral estoppel requires
dismissal of Lockett’s case because the superior court already
rejected the same Fourth Amendment claim Lockett asserts
here. “State law governs the application of collateral estoppel
or issue preclusion to a state court judgment in a federal civil
rights action.” Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267,
1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
96 (1980); Takahashi v. Bd. of Trustees, 783 F.2d 848, 850
16574 LOCKETT v. ERICSON
(9th Cir. 1986)). In Leader v. State, 226 Cal. Rptr. 207, 209
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986), the court explained that prior “convic-
tions can be used for purposes of collateral estoppel in [a]
subsequent civil action.” Leader recognized the basic require-
ments for collateral estoppel: the doctrine prohibits relitiga-
tion of an issue decided at a previous trial if (1) “the issue
necessarily decided at a previous trial is identical to the one
which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial
resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and if (3) the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in
privity with a party at the prior trial.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
[7] In addition to these basic principles, Leader explained
that California law contains an important nuance with respect
to using misdemeanor convictions for collateral estoppel in
subsequent civil trials. “When the crime is of the nature of a
traffic offense, the accused may plead guilty merely because
the defense is more trouble than the resulting penalty, and
thus such a conviction would not allow for application of the
doctrine.” Id. at 212. Indeed, the California Vehicle Code
compels this result. Section 40834, titled “Effect of convic-
tion,” states that “[a] judgment of conviction for any violation
of this code . . . shall not be res judicata or constitute a collat-
eral estoppel of any issue determined therein in any subse-
quent civil action.” Cal. Veh. Code § 40834; see also Leader,
226 Cal. Rptr. at 212 n.2.
[8] Here, Lockett pled nolo contendere to a violation of
California Vehicle Code section 23103.5(a). As a result, the
plain language of section 40834 disallows “any issue deter-
mined” in Lockett’s wet reckless conviction to “constitute a
collateral estoppel” in this “subsequent civil action.” Cal.
Veh. Code § 40834 (emphasis added). Defendants argue that
section 40834 does not apply in this case. They contend that
“the statute has no effect here because the issue preclusion
flows not from the judgment of conviction per se but rather
from the earlier suppression ruling . . . and/or the waiver of
LOCKETT v. ERICSON 16575
the right to appeal.” Defendants rely on the beginning of sec-
tion 40834—“[a] judgment of conviction”—and wholly
ignore the end of the statute—“any issue determined therein.”
We are not persuaded by Defendants’ truncated reading of the
statute. The all-inclusive “any issue determined therein”
clause plainly applies to the superior court’s suppression rul-
ing in the criminal proceeding against Lockett. Thus, we con-
clude that there is no collateral estoppel bar to Lockett’s
Fourth Amendment claim in this civil action.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that neither the Heck
bar, nor Lockett’s Cal. Penal Code section 1538.5 appellate
waiver, nor collateral estoppel operates to bar Lockett’s
§ 1983 Fourth Amendment claim.
REVERSED; REMANDED.