UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4111
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JABARA L. THREAT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:10-cr-00202-HEH-1)
Submitted: August 25, 2011 Decided: September 1, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Amy L. Austin, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United
States Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States
Attorney, Michael A. Jagels, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jabara L. Threat entered a conditional guilty plea to
unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Threat preserved his right to
challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence seized as a result of an investigative stop. On
appeal, Threat argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress because the officers did not have
reasonable articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal
activity. Finding no error, we affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for
clear error and its determination of reasonable suspicion de
novo. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1104 (2010). We accord
particular deference to the district court’s credibility
determinations. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232
(4th Cir. 2008). When the district court has denied a motion to
suppress, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government. United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 364
(4th Cir. 2008).
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may
conduct a brief investigatory stop when there is reasonable
suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal activity is
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afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Whether
there is reasonable suspicion to justify the stop depends on the
totality of the circumstances, including the information known
to the officers and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the
time of the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8
(1989). Reasonable suspicion may exist even if each individual
factor alone is susceptible of innocent explanation. Black, 525
F.3d at 365. The reasonable suspicion determination is a
“commonsensical proposition,” and deference should be accorded
to police officers’ determinations based on their practical
experience. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th
Cir. 2004). Our review of the record, construed in the light
most favorable to the government, leads us to conclude that the
district court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion justified
the stop of Threat is sound. The district court thus properly
denied Threat’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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