Jackson v. Danberg

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______

No. 11-9002
______

ROBERT W. JACKSON, III

v.

CARL C. DANBERG, Commissioner,
Delaware Department of Correction;
THOMAS L. CARROLL,
Warden Delaware Correctional Center;
PAUL HOWARD,
Bureau Chief Delaware Bureau of Prisons;
OTHER UNKNOWN STATE ACTORS
RESPONSIBLE FOR AND PARTICIPATING IN
THE CARRYING OUT OF PLAINTIFF'S EXECUTION

Robert W. Jackson, III, individually and
on behalf of the Certified Class,

Appellant
______

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No. 1-06-cv-00300)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
 ______

Argued July 28, 2011
Before: AMBRO, FISHER and
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 7, 2011 )

Helen A. Marino, Esq.
Maria K. Pulzetti, Esq.
Michael Wiseman, Esq. (Argued)
Defender Association of Philadelphia
Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit
The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West
Independence Square West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellant

Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esq.
Marc P. Niedzielski, Esq.
Gregory E. Smith, Esq.
Paul R. Wallace, Esq (Argued)
Morgan Zurn, Esq.
State of Delaware
Department of Justice
820 North French Street
Carvel Office Building, 6th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Appellees

2
 ______

OPINION OF THE COURT
______

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

A class of inmates sentenced to death by the State of
Delaware and named plaintiff Robert W. Jackson, III
(collectively referred to in this opinion as “Plaintiffs”), appeal
from the District Court’s denial of their motion to reopen and
their motion for a stay of Jackson’s execution. After careful
review, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion, and, accordingly, we affirm.

I.

A. Facts

This is our second encounter with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
challenge related to Delaware’s lethal injection protocol.
Much of the background factual information in this case is the
same as we recounted in Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210
(3d Cir. 2010) (“Jackson I”), and so we only will briefly
outline that background material before setting forth in more
detail those facts essential to the resolution of this appeal.

Delaware law provides that:

[p]unishment of death shall, in all cases, be
inflicted by intravenous injection of a substance
or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to

3
 cause death and until such person sentenced to
death is dead, and such execution procedure
shall be determined and supervised by the
Commissioner of the Department of Correction.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (2006 Supp.). The
statute does not mandate the use of any particular drug or
series of drugs.

On August 29, 2008, the Delaware Department of
Correction (“DDOC”) instituted a new lethal injection
protocol (“2008 Protocol”). The protocol calls for the
sequential intravenous (“IV”) injection of three chemicals
into an inmate’s bloodstream. The first chemical is sodium
thiopental, which renders an inmate unconscious. The second
chemical is pancuronium bromide, a muscle relaxant that acts
as a paralytic agent. The third and final chemical is
potassium chloride, which induces cardiac arrest and causes
the inmate’s death. The 2008 Protocol also calls for the IV
team, consisting of two people who may have at least one
year of professional experience, 1 to examine the inmate to
ensure he is unconscious before the pancuronium bromide is
administered. The consciousness check requires the warden
to call the inmate’s name out loud to observe any reaction
from the inmate. At the same time, a member of the IV team
assesses the inmate’s consciousness by touching the inmate,
shaking his shoulder, and brushing his eyelashes. If the

1
Those specialists include a certified medical assistant,
a phlebotomist, an emergency medical technician, a
paramedic, and a military corpsman.

4
inmate is not unconscious, the protocol requires the execution
team to repeat the administration of the first chemical and
subsequent consciousness checks until the inmate is deemed
unconscious.

Delaware amended its protocol on May 5, 2011. The
amended protocol, which is before us today, includes only
one significant difference. Due to a nationwide shortage of
sodium thiopental, Delaware, along with a number of other
states, revised its protocol to allow for the use of an
alternative barbiturate, pentobarbital, as the first chemical to
be administered.

B. Procedural History

Jackson, a Delaware state inmate convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to death by the State of
Delaware, commenced this action on May 8, 2006. He filed a
section 1983 action 2 alleging that the State of Delaware’s

2
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured[.]

5
then-existing method of lethal injection created an
unconstitutional risk of pain and suffering, cognizable under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. 3 The District Court certified a class under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b) consisting of all Delaware death row inmates
and appointed class counsel. See Jackson v. Danberg, 240
F.R.D. 145 (D. Del. 2007).

During the course of litigation in the District Court,
Defendants amended their lethal injection protocol twice.
Ultimately, the 2008 Protocol was enacted in an effort to
incorporate the safeguards described by the Supreme Court in
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), which upheld Kentucky’s
lethal injection protocol against a challenge under the Eighth
Amendment. Upon adoption of the 2008 Protocol and at the
direction of the District Court, Defendants moved for
summary judgment. They argued that the 2008 Protocol fully
complied with the mandate of Baze and that the lethal
injection protocol, including the use of sodium thiopental, did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The District
Court acknowledged that the DDOC had failed to follow its
own procedures in certain executions but held that Plaintiffs
3
Jackson named the following defendants in his
complaint: Stanley W. Taylor, Jr., Commissioner, Delaware
Department of Correction; Thomas L. Carroll, Warden,
Delaware Correctional Center; Paul Howard, Bureau Chief,
Delaware Bureau of Prisons; and other unknown Delaware
officials (collectively, “Defendants”). In February 2007, the
District Court substituted Taylor with his successor, Carl C.
Danberg.

6
had not shown a “substantial risk of an inadequate dose of
sodium thiopental.” Jackson v. Danberg, 601 F. Supp. 2d
589, 599 (D. Del. 2009). The District Court granted summary
judgment to Defendants and stayed executions pending
appeal. Id.

Plaintiffs appealed, and Defendants cross-appealed the
stay of executions. We affirmed the grant of summary
judgment, applying Baze to our analysis. Jackson I, 594 F.3d
210. We held that to prevail on a claim that a risk of future
harm runs afoul of the Constitution, an inmate must
demonstrate that “the conditions presenting the risk must be
‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless
suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’”
Id. at 216 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 50). We noted that “the
proper administration of sodium thiopental is an
indispensable link in the lethal injection chain for Eighth
Amendment purposes, as it ensures that an inmate will not
suffer under the effects of the second two drugs.” Id. at 225.
In other words, although “[r]easonable people of good faith
disagree on the morality and efficacy of capital punishment,”
Delaware’s 2008 Protocol is not unconstitutional under
existing Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 230 (quoting Baze,
553 U.S. at 61). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on
October 12, 2010. Jackson v. Danberg, 131 S. Ct. 458
(2010).

Shortly after Delaware changed its protocol to include
pentobarbital as an alternative to sodium thiopental in May
2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6) and (d) and a motion to stay Jackson’s execution
with the District Court. Plaintiffs argued that the substitution

7
of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental is a factual change that
undermines the foundations of the prior ruling, constituting an
exceptional circumstance under Rule 60(b)(6) and a
circumstance calling for an independent action to prevent a
miscarriage of justice under Rule 60(d). They relied on an
expert report written by David B. Waisel, M.D., in support of
their motion. Defendants, in turn, relied on an expert report
by Dr. Mark Dershwitz, an anesthesiologist with a Ph.D. in
pharmacology. The District Court denied both of Plaintiffs’
motions. It found that a stay was not warranted because
Plaintiffs had “not carried their burden to prove that they are
likely to succeed on the merits of their Eighth Amendment
claim.” Jackson v. Danberg, 2011 WL 3205453, at *3 (D.
Del. July 27, 2011). The District Court also denied Plaintiffs’
motion to reopen under both Rules 60(b)(6) and 60(d),
concluding that “the record at bar is insufficient to reopen the
judgment entered by [it] in 2009.” Id. at *4. Plaintiffs timely
appealed the judgment of the District Court and filed an
independent motion for a stay.

We denied the motion to stay on July 28, 2011, and
affirmed the judgment of the District Court with an opinion to
follow.4 Following our decision, the Supreme Court denied

4
The panel issued its order around 7:00 p.m. on
July 28, 2011, approximately five hours before the scheduled
time of execution.

8
certiorari, and Robert Jackson was executed just after
midnight on July 29, 2011, by lethal injection. 5

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) to consider the appeal by Plaintiffs from the
District Court’s denial of injunctive relief and under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 to consider the appeal by Plaintiffs from the
District Court’s denial of relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
and (d). We review a district court’s denial of a stay for
abuse of discretion, which may be found where its conclusion
includes the commission of a serious error of law or a mistake
in considering the facts. Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ.,
910 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990). We also review a
district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) and (d) motion to
reopen for abuse of discretion. Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333,
341 (3d Cir. 1999).

III.

A. Stay

“[A] stay of execution is an equitable remedy” that “is
not available as a matter of right, and equity must be sensitive
to the State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal
judgments without undue interference from the federal

5
We write on this issue as this appeal was filed on
behalf of a class, and it impacts appellants other than Jackson.

9
courts.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). The
standard for issuance of a stay is like that for issuance of a
preliminary injunction, and requires consideration of four
factors:

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Republic of
Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir.
1991). In assessing these factors, we underscore that
“inmates seeking time to challenge the manner in which the
State plans to execute them must satisfy all of the
requirements for a stay, including a showing of a significant
possibility of success on the merits.” Hill, 547 U.S. at 584.

Plaintiffs argue that because pentobarbital is not
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for
use as an anesthetic, its performance in the three-drug
protocol, namely its manner and timing of inducing
unconsciousness, is unknown and unpredictable and therefore
violative of the Eighth Amendment. In support of their
argument that pentobarbital renders the lethal injection
protocol unconstitutional, Plaintiffs proffer the following
evidence: (1) the opinion of Dr. David Waisel, an
anesthesiologist at Harvard Law School, who, among other
things, has reviewed eyewitness accounts and has concluded

10
that Alabama prisoner Eddie Powell and Georgia prisoner
Roy Blankenship were inadequately anesthetized by
pentobarbital and suffered greatly from their executions;
(2) the fact that pentobarbital is not approved by the FDA for
use as an anesthetic; and (3) the fact that pentobarbital is less
lipid-soluble than sodium thiopental and therefore does not
cross the blood-brain barrier as quickly.

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the DDOC’s substitution of
pentobarbital for sodium thiopental is governed by the
Supreme Court’s splintered decision in Baze. In Baze, the
Supreme Court recognized “that subjecting individuals to a
risk of future harm − not simply actually inflicting pain − can
qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.” 553 U.S. at 49.
However, to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment,
“the conditions presenting the risk must be ‘sure or very
likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,’ and
give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’” Id. at 50
(quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 34-35). “Simply because an
execution method may result in pain, either by accident or as
an inescapable consequence of death, does not establish the
sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that qualifies as
cruel and unusual.” Id. Rather, a stay of execution may only
be granted where “the condemned prisoner establishes that
the State’s lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated
risk of severe pain . . . [and] that the risk is substantial when
compared to the known and available alternatives.” Id. at 61.

The District Court, applying the Baze principles,
concluded that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the
substitution of pentobarbital resulted in a constitutionally
unacceptable risk of pain and suffering. It noted that

11
Delaware’s protocol calls for the administration of five grams
of pentobarbital, which on its own is a lethal dose according
to Dr. Dershwitz. Moreover, the Delaware protocol calls for
a consciousness check after two minutes have lapsed,
followed by the administration of a second dose of
pentobarbital if the inmate is still conscious after two
minutes. Based upon these factual findings and procedural
safeguards, the District Court concluded that Plaintiffs had
not presented “affirmative evidence . . . that the
administration of pentobarbital as the first drug in Delaware’s
three-drug protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe
pain, as required by the Supreme Court.” Jackson, 2011 WL
3205453, at *3. In other words, the District Court concluded
that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits and accordingly denied the stay.

After conducting our own searching review of the
record, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a stay. The
District Court’s factual findings are supported by the
testimony of Defendants’ expert, Dr. Dershwitz. The purpose
of the anesthetic in Delaware’s lethal injection protocol is to
render the inmate unconscious before administration of the

12
second and third drugs, and there is no affirmative evidence
that pentobarbital fails to do this. 6

6
Jackson urges us to consider Georgia’s execution of
Roy Blankenship and Alabama’s execution of Eddie Powell
as affirmative evidence that pentobarbital fails to properly
anesthetize inmates. Dr. Waisel, who formulated his opinion
based on witnesses’ accounts of the execution and some
movement by the inmates during the initial three minutes at
the start of the execution process, expressed concern that
Blankenship and Powell were insufficiently anesthetized.
Witnesses described these executions in contradictory ways.
For example:

To some, Blankenship was just looking up and
watching what was occurring, looked at his left
arm (which had an IV saline drip) and then 30
to 60 seconds later looked toward his right arm
where the administration of the pentobarbital
was starting. To others, Blankenship appeared
to grimace, or have a startled face, or jerked his
arm twice, or had his mouth open and tried to
mouth something.

DeYoung, 2011 WL 2899704, at *5. Under Georgia’s
protocol, the execution could not proceed until a
consciousness check was performed. The District Court was
not persuaded by this equivocal evidence of consciousness in
the face of strict procedural safeguards, and we see no abuse
of discretion in its conclusion.

13
 Indeed each court to consider this issue has uniformly
held that the use of pentobarbital in lieu of sodium thiopental
is constitutional. 7 See, e.g., DeYoung v. Owens, --- F.3d ---,
2011 WL 2899704, at *3 (11th Cir. July 20, 2011); Powell v.
Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam);
Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 2010). For
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit approved a protocol virtually identical to Delaware’s
after allowing an Oklahoma death-sentenced inmate to
conduct discovery, submit an expert report, and hold an
evidentiary hearing. Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1338-40. In Pavatt,
the district court considered evidence that: (1) the first step of
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol mandates the
intravenous administration of five grams of pentobarbital;
(2) the protocol requires the attending physician to ensure that
the inmate is sufficiently unconscious prior to the
administration of the paralytic agent; (3) the administration of
a sufficient dose of pentobarbital will render an individual
unconscious; (4) the defendant’s expert witness, Dr.
Dershwitz, testified that the five-gram dosage will ensure that
the inmate does not feel the effects of the paralytic agent; and
(5) Dr. Dershwitz responded to Dr. Waisel’s testimony by
pointing out that the use of pentobarbital to induce a
barbiturate coma takes the patient to a state of
unconsciousness beyond a normal clinical level of anesthesia.

7
While these cases are not controlling, it is noteworthy
that the expert reports before the District Court here were
written by the same experts utilized in the other courts of
appeals cases.

14
Id. at 1339. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district
court denied the motion for a stay, concluding that the
prisoner failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits of his Eighth Amendment challenge.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying a stay. Specifically,
the Tenth Circuit observed that Dr. Dershwitz had
“substantially more clinical experience with the use of
pentobarbital than Dr. Waisel.” Id. at 1340. The court also
noted the importance of the consciousness check to its
analysis, and held that the inmate “failed to establish a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth
Amendment challenge to the . . . revised protocol.” Id.; see
also DeYoung, 2011 WL 2899704, at *6 (“DeYoung has
wholly failed to show that pentobarbital, once fully
administered and allowed to act, is ineffective as an
anesthetic.”); 8 Powell, 641 F.3d at 1257-58 (approving the
substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental). We
agree with the Tenth Circuit’s approach and likewise
conclude that Plaintiffs cannot establish that pentobarbital is
8
Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Eleventh Circuit’s denial
of DeYoung’s claims was based entirely on Georgia’s two-
year statute of limitations is only partially correct. DeYoung,
2011 WL 2899704, at *3. The court engaged in a thorough
analysis of the merits of DeYoung’s claims and held in the
alternative that “even if [DeYoung’s claims] were timely,
they fail as a matter of law . . . because [he] has not
established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of
his claims.” Id.

15
“sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless
suffering.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at
34-35).

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court
misapplied the legal rubric of Baze by failing to engage in an
additional inquiry with respect to their execution challenge: a
comparative risk analysis. According to Plaintiffs, the
District Court was required to consider the comparative risks
of “known and available alternatives” to Delaware’s
pentobarbital three-drug protocol. Specifically, they argue
the District Court should have considered the comparative
risk of (1) a known anesthetic drug with a proven track
record, for use as the first drug in the three-drug protocol, or
(2) a single-drug execution protocol. 9

Plaintiffs’ argument misstates the law. “[A]
condemned prisoner cannot successfully challenge a State’s
method of execution merely by showing a slightly or
marginally safer alternative.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 51. Rather,

9
With respect to the second option, Dr. Dershwitz
testified that a five-gram dose of a barbiturate such as sodium
thiopental or pentobarbital would cause death in all people,
and that death would occur as quickly as five minutes from
the injection. Ohio has used a one-drug protocol since
November 2009, and Washington adopted a one-drug
protocol on March 2, 2010, but permits condemned inmates
to select the method. See Death Penalty Information Ctr.,
Authorized Methods,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods-execution.

16
an inmate must first show that a state’s current protocol
creates a “demonstrated risk of severe pain.” Id. at 61.
Moreover, Delaware is not “compelled to change its lethal
injection protocol simply because another state has elected to
do so.” Jackson I, 594 F.3d at 228. We recognize that the
one-drug protocol is gaining support as an alternative to the
three-drug lethal injection protocol, and we commend those
states steadily striving to develop more humane alternatives
to existing methods of execution. However, federal courts are
not “boards of inquiry charged with determining ‘best
practices’ for executions.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 51.

“Pentobarbital is a barbiturate commonly used to
euthanize terminally ill patients who seek death with dignity
in states such as Oregon and Washington.” Beaty v. Brewer,
--- F.3d. ---, 2011 WL 2040916, at *4 (9th Cir. 2011)
(denying rehearing en banc because inmate had no likelihood
of success on Eighth Amendment claim based on
pentobarbital). It has been used successfully for executions in
at least four other states, and there is no evidence that it fails

17
to render an inmate unconscious.10 Id. The District Court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the use of pentobarbital
did not create “a demonstrated risk of severe pain, as required
by the Supreme Court.” Jackson, 2011 WL 3205453, at *3.
Thus, we affirm the District Court’s denial of the stay. 11

B. 60(b)(6) and 60(d)

10
Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants’ use of
pentobarbital is violative of the Eighth Amendment because it
evinces Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the potential
pain and suffering he will undergo. We have previously held
that Baze did not import the “deliberate indifference”
standard to lethal injection challenges. See Jackson I, 594
F.3d at 223 n.16. Instead, the Baze Court held that “there
must be a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively
intolerable risk of harm’ that prevents prison officials from
pleading that they were ‘subjectively blameless for purposes
of the Eighth Amendment.’” Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846, & n.9 (1994)).
Even if this language did graft the deliberate indifference
standard onto lethal injection challenges, because we
conclude that there was no “substantial risk of serious harm,”
we also conclude that there could have been no deliberate
indifference to that alleged risk.
11
Because we conclude that Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, we need
not address the other factors required for a stay of an
execution.

18
 Rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment is only granted in
extraordinary circumstances. See Martinez-McBean v. Govt.
of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1977). 12 It is
available where the party seeking relief demonstrates that
“extreme” and “unexpected” hardship will result absent such
relief. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119
(1932). Similarly, Rule 60(d) permits a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment in order
to “prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v.
Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998).

Plaintiffs claim that the addition of pentobarbital as an
available alternative to sodium thiopental is such a
circumstance. In making this argument, Plaintiffs urge that
the use of sodium thiopental was central to our decision in
Jackson I, and that the substitution of an alternative
barbiturate undermines the very foundation of our decision.

In Jackson I, we held that Delaware’s three-drug
protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment, and stated
that “the proper administration of sodium thiopental is an
indispensable link in the lethal injection chain for Eighth
Amendment purposes, as it ensures that an inmate will not
suffer under the effects of the second two drugs.” 594 F.3d at
225. However, the import of both Baze and Jackson I is that
use of an effective anesthetic as the first drug in a three-drug

12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) provides, in pertinent part:
“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for . . . any . . . reason that justifies relief.”

19
protocol is required to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. In
other words, “[t]he proper administration of the first drug
[must] ensure[] that the prisoner does not experience any pain
associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by the
second and third drugs.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 44.

We cannot say that the District Court’s finding that
pentobarbital is an effective anesthetic for purposes of the
three-drug lethal injection is clearly erroneous, particularly
based on its demonstrated uses and the testimony of Dr.
Dershwitz. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to
reopen, and we agree that “the substitution of pentobarbital
for sodium thiopental does not constitute a factual change
which undermines the foundation of [the] prior ruling,”
necessitating independent action under either Rule 60(b)(6) or
60(d). Jackson, 2011 WL 3205453, at *4. 13

IV.

13
We also conclude that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to grant an evidentiary
hearing on the matter. Having presided over the entire case
and being intimately familiar with the record to date as well
as the submissions regarding pentobarbital, the District Court
was well-situated to rule on the motion to reopen and the
motion for the stay, and additional discovery would not
further illuminate the issue at bar. See United States v. Hines,
628 F.3d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2010) (setting forth the standard of
review).

20
 For all of these reasons, we conclude that Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of their claims, and that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a stay of Jackson’s execution
and Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen. Accordingly, we will
affirm.

21