The authorities are decisive to the effect that a discharge in bankruptcy extinguishes all the debts of the bankrupt provable under the act existing at the date of the filing of his petition in bankruptcy, and any judgment that may be obtained upon any of such debts, if such judgment be entered before the date of the discharge in bankruptcy. (Clark v. Rowling, 3 N. Y., 216;
It may be conceded that there is some difficulty in perceiving why upon principle a judgment rendered before tbe discharge-in bankruptcy upon a debt existing at tbe date of filing tbe petition is less an absolute verity than one rendered after tbe discharge upon tbe like debt, and why it is that that judgment can be canceled upon motion and need not be opened. It seems to be an exception to tbe general rule affirming tbe absolute verity of judgments. That a judgment rendered after a discharge in bankruptcy should not be admitted within tbe exception seems obvious enough. Sucb a judgment may rest upon facts affecting tbe debt, but arising after tbe discharge, as in tbe case of Dusenbury v. Hoyt (53 N. Y., 521), where a new promise to pay tbe discharged debt made after tbe discharge, was held to be good.
These views are in accord with those expressed by tbe learned judge at Special Term, and lead to an affirmance of tbe order denying tbe motion to cancel tbe judgment. But tbe notice of motion asked for sucb other relief as the court shall deem it proper to grant. Tbe order appealed from does not speak of any motion to
We affirm both orders, with costs and disbursements, but without prejudice to a motion to open the judgment and allow the discharge in bankruptcy to be interposed, and without prejudice to such a stay of execution as shall give effect to any order the court may grant upon the hearing of such motion.
Orders affirmed, with ten dollars costs and printing disbursements in each, without prejudice to motion to open judgment, etc.