Raghavendra v. The Trustees of Columbia University

10-825-cv (L)
Raghavendra v. The Trustees of Columbia University, et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 8th day of September, two thousand eleven.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 ROGER J. MINER,
9 ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 RAJAGOPALA SAMPATH RAGHAVENDRA,
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 10-825-CV (L);
17 10-833-cv (CON);
18 10-887-cv (CON
19 THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
20 et al.,
21 Defendants-Appellees,
22
23 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, et
24 al.,
25 Defendants.*
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*
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend
the official caption as set forth above.
 1
2 FOR APPELLANT: ROBERT G. LEINO, New York, New York.
3
4 FOR APPELLEES: EDWARD A. BRILL (Susan D. Friedfel, on
5 the brief), Proskauer Rose LLP, New York,
6 New York.
7
8 Appeal from an order of the United States District
9 Court for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.).
10
11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
12 AND DECREED that the order of the district court be AFFIRMED
13 IN PART and VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
14
15 Rajagopala Raghavendra appeals from an order of the
16 United States District Court for the Southern District of
17 New York (Crotty, J.), denying his motion to set aside his
18 settlement agreement with his former employer, Columbia
19 University, and ruling that plaintiff’s counsel was entitled
20 to recover a contingency fee as specified in his retainer
21 agreement. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
22 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
23 presented for review.
24
25 We review de novo the district court’s legal
26 conclusions with respect to the settlement agreement; we
27 review its factual conclusions “under the clearly erroneous
28 standard of review.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432
29 F.3d 437, 443 (2d Cir. 2005). A district court “may
30 exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear fee disputes
31 between litigants and their attorneys when the dispute
32 relates to the main action.” Alderman v. Pan Am World
33 Airways, 169 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
34 marks omitted). This Court reviews a district court’s
35 decision to award fees under an abuse of discretion
36 standard. Id.
37
38 The district court properly held that the settlement
39 agreement was binding, enforceable, and disposed of all of
40 plaintiff’s claims against the defendants. See Powell v.
41 Omnicom, 497 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating
42 “settlement remains binding even if a party has a change of
43 heart” after he agreed to the terms of the settlement).
44 Plaintiff’s claims of fraud and duress are not substantiated
45 by the record.
46

2
 1 The district court’s exercise of supplemental
2 jurisdiction over the fee dispute was proper. See Achtman
3 v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 336 (2d
4 Cir. 2006) (observing that district courts have “power to
5 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a fee dispute” and
6 that “the lower court’s familiarity with the subject matter
7 of the [underlying] suit len[ds] support to the exercise of
8 jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)). However,
9 we vacate and remand in part, for the district court to make
10 further factual findings that bear upon the award of fees
11 including, inter alia, the timing of the commencement of
12 counsel’s representation and the pendency of other cases,
13 litigated pro se, that are folded into the settlement.
14
15 Payment of the settlement amount will abide the
16 determination of the fee dispute in light of the district
17 court’s findings.
18
19 Having considered all of Raghavendra’s properly
20 presented arguments, we hereby AFFIRM IN PART the order of
21 the district court, because we find that the settlement
22 agreement was binding and disposed of all of plaintiff’s
23 claims, and VACATE the award of attorneys fees and REMAND
24 for further factual findings consistent with this order.
25
26
27 FOR THE COURT:
28 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
29

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