National Tradesman's Bank v. Wetmore

Bocees, J.:

The plaintiff was simply a creditor-at-large of Abner C. Wet-more, deceased, the late husband of the defendant, to whom, as is alleged, his lands described in the complaint were transferred without consideration and in fraud of the rights of his creditors. Should the title thereto be adjudged to have remained in the husband to the time of his death, still the plaintiff would then have had no lien thereon, either general or specific, for the satisfaction of its claim against him; nor was there then or at any time thereafter, any trust in favor of the plaintiff as respects those claims impressed thereon, legal or equitable, by virtue of any writing creating or *362declaring such trust. This being so, the plaintiff has no standing in court to demand and have the relief sought herein, to wit: to have the transfer of the premises to the defendant adjudged fraudulent and void, and payment of its claims against Abner C. Wet-more, deceased, decreed t-o be made therefrom.

This conclusion is settled by many decisions. (Evans v. Hill, 18 Hun, 464; Adsit v. Sanford, 23 id., 45 ; aff’d Adsit v. Butler, 87 N. Y., 585; Geery v. Geery, 63 id., 252; Estes v. Wilcox, 67 id., 264; Adee v. Bigler, 81 id., 349.) If it be, as is insisted, that the plaintiff makes a case showing that all attempts by other proceedings to obtain satisfaction of its claims would be absolutely unavailing, still that would not change the settled rule of law declared in the above and other cases.

It is conceded, of course, -that in the case of a creditor’s bill there must be judgment and execution, and, under some circumstances, a return of execution unsatisfied in whole or part, in order to give the creditor standing in the court to demand and have the removal of a fraudulent transfer by the debtor of his property. This necessity grows out of a statutory requirement (2 R. S., 173, 174, § 38 ; Code of Civ. Pro., §§ 1871, 1872); but the same rule obtains in all cases where this relief is sought, irrespective of such statutory provision. This was so determined in Adsit v. Butler (supra), where the subject was discussed at length and on authority; and, indeed, this rule was recognized by the Special Term in this case, but it was found that here the plaintiff had exhausted its remedy at law, and therefore had standing in court to have the relief demanded.

In this conclusion of the learned judge, we think he was in error. The plaintiff was a general creditor, without judgment and execution. Before commencing this action it had taken no proceeding to collect its claim and demands. There had been a proceeding in the Probate Court of Connecticut, under the insolvent laws of that State, wherein commissioners in insolvency had been appointed to administer upon the estate of the debtor, Abner C. Wetmore, who was insolvent and had made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors. The plaintiff presented its claims to those commissioners in insolvency, and the latter allowed them and determined their amount; but nothing was realized thereon from that proceeding. Now, this proceeding, in its results, did not amount to a judgment *363in favor of the plaintiff against Abner C. Wetmore for the amount of the claims of the former against the latter. There was no adjudication that the plaintiff recover the amount against Wetmore. It but settled, determined, the amount due the former from the latter, for the purpose of that proceeding, nothing more; and if deemed a judgment, still there was no execution thereon, even if a judgment recovered in another State with execution thereon returned unsatisfied there, would aid the plaintiff’s case. The learned judge was in error, as we think, in holding that the plaintiff had exhausted its remedy at law, wiki in ihe requirements of the decisions above cited. This conclusion necessitates a reversal of the judgment without considering other questions discussed before us on the argument ; and as this objection to the recovery goes to the right of action as made on the complaint, judgment final should be awarded in favor of the defendant, with costs.

Judgment reversed, judgment final ordered for the defendant, with costs.

Learned, P. J"., concurred; Landón,.J,, not sitting.

Judgment reversed,' and final judgment for defendant ordered, with costs.

Decided January 4, 1887.