Rossum v. Patrick

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KRISTIN ROSSUM,  No. 09-55666
Petitioner-Appellant,
D.C. No.
v.
DEBORAH L. PATRICK, Warden;  3:07-cv-01590-JLS-
JMA
EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., Attorney
ORDER AND
General for the State of California,
OPINION
Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
April 6, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed September 13, 2011

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson and Stephen Reinhardt,
Circuit Judges, and Nancy Gertner, District Judge.*

Per Curiam Opinion;
Dissent by Judge Gertner

*The Honorable Nancy Gertner, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for Massachusetts, Boston, sitting by designation. Judge Gertner
submitted her dissent for filing prior to her September 1, 2011 resignation
from the court.

17393
17394 ROSSUM v. PATRICK

COUNSEL

William J. Genego, Nasatir, Hirsch, Podberesky & Genego,
Santa Monica, California, for the petitioner-appellant.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kevin Vienna, Supervising Dep-
uty Attorney General, Kyle Niki Shaffer, Deputy Attorney
General, San Diego, California, for the respondent-appellee.

ORDER

Respondents’ petition for panel rehearing is hereby granted.
The opinion filed on September 23, 2010, and published at
622 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2010), is withdrawn and replaced by
the attached opinion.
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17395
No new petitions for panel rehearing shall be accepted in
this case.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

We conclude that this case is now controlled by the
Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Harrington v. Rich-
ter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011). Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s denial of Kristin Rossum’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.

AFFIRMED.

GERTNER, District Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. While I appreciate the extent to
which the Supreme Court’s decisions in Harrington v. Rich-
ter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), and Cullen v. Pin-
holster, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) require that we
rehear this case and reconsider the panel’s original decision,
I nevertheless find that our original conclusions — reversing
and remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing on both
prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) —
were entirely appropriate. The substantive finding of a Strick-
land violation in this case fits squarely within the rule of
Richter; the relief ordered—an evidentiary hearing—fits
within the requirements of Pinholster.

Kristin Rossum (“Rossum”) was convicted of murdering
her husband, Gregory de Villers (“de Villers”). The prosecu-
tion’s theory was that Rossum poisoned him using fentanyl,
a powerful synthetic opiate. Her conviction was upheld on
17396 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
direct review at all levels. After the final denial of relief, Ros-
sum, represented by new counsel, filed a habeas petition
before the California Supreme Court, raising the same issues
as the instant petition, presenting the same expert declaration
and seeking the same relief, an evidentiary hearing. It was
summarily denied. The federal district court, adopting the rec-
ommendations of the magistrate judge, followed suit, reject-
ing Rossum’s petition.

In Rossum v. Patrick, 622 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2010) (with-
drawn), we reversed. Since the state habeas decision was a
summary denial, we reviewed the decision de novo. Based on
the four corners of the state trial and habeas record, we found
that Rossum had made a strong showing that her lawyer’s per-
formance was deficient under the first prong of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and that the state court’s
contrary determination was unreasonable. We remanded for
an evidentiary hearing, focused on the question of whether
Rossum was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.
Respondent moved for a rehearing initially on the scope of the
remand, but subsequently, based on Richter and Pinholster.

The case against Rossum hinged in large measure on toxi-
cological and medical evidence which was equivocal. The
fentanyl levels in de Villers’s autopsy samples were extraordi-
narily, even unnaturally, high. And while these elevated levels
suggested that death was immediate, they were at odds with
medical evidence which indicated that de Villers lingered for
several hours before he died. There was also a plausible alter-
native theory of death, accidental overdose of cold medicines
and oxycodone. A conceded lapse in the chain of custody of
de Villers’s autopsy specimens raised the not insubstantial
chance of contamination, that is, that the fentanyl was added
to the samples after de Villers’s death. Both Rossum and her
lover worked at the San Diego County Office of the Medical
Examiner (OME), which ordinarily would have performed the
toxicological analysis. While the OME was sufficiently con-
cerned about the possibility of a conflict of interest to send the
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17397
samples to another lab for testing, they were stored in an
unsecured refrigerator at the OME for thirty-six hours. In
addition to opportunity, there was motive to contaminate
because of the various personal relationships among the
OME’s employees.

Under the circumstances, the failure of Rossum’s attorneys
to have de Villers’s autopsy samples tested for fentanyl
metabolites, a test that would have resolved whether de Vil-
lers had in fact ingested fentanyl or whether fentanyl found in
the samples was a product of laboratory contamination subse-
quent to his death, could have been critical. Rather than inves-
tigating this possibility, Rossum’s counsel conceded that the
cause of death was fentanyl; the defense theory was suicide-
by-fentanyl, which was implausible in the light of the toxico-
logical evidence. If testing indicated that the fentanyl found
in the samples had never been in de Villers’s body, the prose-
cution’s theory that fentanyl was the cause of death would
have been proven wrong.

The panel remanded the case to the district court to hold an
evidentiary hearing. Rossum, 622 F. 3d at 1275-76. The state
trial record was inadequate to decide the Strickland question
precisely because trial counsel failed to develop the evidence
outlined in Rossum’s state Supreme Court habeas petition.
And the state habeas record was likewise inadequate because
it only provided the one sided conclusions of petitioner’s fen-
tanyl expert in affidavit form. Without a hearing it was neces-
sarily untested by cross examination or the evidence of a
competing expert.

Indeed, the respondent’s initial Petition for Rehearing of
the panel decision underscored the importance of holding an
evidentiary in a case such as the one at bar. Respondents rea-
sonably wanted to make certain that they would be permitted
to call witnesses to counter the petitioner’s expert’s declara-
tion, and to cross examine the declarant. In addition, they
sought to present evidence challenging counsel’s alleged defi-
17398 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
cient performance (Strickland’s first prong) as well as show
that petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged inef-
fectiveness (Strickland’s second prong).

Neither Richter nor Pinholster should change the panel’s
original conclusions. To be sure, Richter mandates deference
even to the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of the
habeas petition. And deference means that we are to hypothe-
size the arguments that “could have been made to support the
state court’s decision,” and then determine if “fair minded
jurists could disagree” as to whether these arguments were
unreasonable under federal law. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. In
addition, where the right at issue is ineffective assistance of
counsel, habeas review is “doubly” deferential. Id. at 788. But
even applying these standards, I conclude that no “fair minded
jurist could disagree” that the arguments that could have been
made in support of the state decision—particularly the deci-
sion to deny a hearing on these facts—were unreasonable
under Strickland. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785-86.

Richter is wholly distinguishable by the substantial evi-
dence in that case of the petitioner’s guilt, as well as the plau-
sible reasons for not pursuing the forensic testing on which
the Strickland violation was premised. In contrast, in the case
at bar, if the fentanyl metabolite test demonstrated the absence
of metabolites in the autopsy samples, the government’s the-
ory of murder would have been demonstrably erroneous. On
this record, I can conceive of no plausible reason for counsel
to have not conducted the test.

And, while Pinholster narrowed the circumstances under
which a federal court can order an evidentiary hearing, I
believe that the instant case falls within those narrow circum-
stances. In Pinholster, the Court was concerned about a fed-
eral ruling based on facts no state court had had an
opportunity to evaluate. The Pinholster majority did not
address the situation here (although it was raised in the
concurrence)—where the untested facts in the state habeas
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17399
record made out a strong showing of a Strickland violation,
and the state’s contrary determination was unreasonable.
Under such circumstances, the critical question is whether
those facts are true, precisely what an evidentiary hearing
seeks to uncover and which the state court unreasonably
denied.

It cannot be that a federal court is obliged to repeat the state
court’s error. Without a hearing both sides are disadvantaged.
It would be unfair to the government to assume the truthful-
ness of the expert’s untested declaration and order habeas
relief. And, it would be equally unfair to Rossum to conclude
that she is entitled to no relief in federal court in the face of
a strong showing of a constitutional violation which the state
court precluded her from developing. Nothing in Pinholster
requires that result.

Accordingly, I would remand for an evidentiary hearing.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

I recite the facts in detail because they underscore the cir-
cumstantial nature of the case and the centrality of the foren-
sic testing issue. Rossum and de Villers married in 1999. In
2000, Rossum was hired as a toxicologist at the OME.
Around the time of her hiring, the OME appointed Michael
Robertson to the position of Forensic Laboratory Manager.
Robertson, a new hire, replaced Russ Lowe, a longtime
employee who had been serving as acting laboratory manager.

Rossum and Robertson—who, like Rossum, was married at
the time—began having an affair. Lowe and OME toxicolo-
gist Catherine Hamm testified that some of Rossum’s
coworkers resented her for it, believing that she might receive
special treatment from Robertson, who was her supervisor.
17400 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
On Thursday, November 2, 2000, de Villers confronted
Rossum about his suspicion that she was using drugs (she had
abused methamphetamines in college), and worse, that she
was having an affair with Robertson. He threatened that if she
did not resign, he would reveal both her drug use and her
affair.

Rossum testified that when de Villers awoke on the morn-
ing of Monday, November 6, he seemed “out of it.” At 7:42
a.m., she left a message at his workplace stating that he was
ill and probably would not come to work that day. Rossum
went to work soon thereafter; coworkers saw her crying in
Robertson’s office. That afternoon, she went back and forth
from her work to her apartment. At midday, according to Ros-
sum, she ate lunch with her husband. When she asked him
why he had been so “out of it” that morning, he told her that
he had taken some of her oxycodone and clonazepam, which
she had obtained years earlier when she was trying to end her
methamphetamine addiction. According to Rossum, de Villers
went back to bed after lunch, and she returned to work.

Rossum left work at 2:30 p.m. and stayed with Robertson
until about 5:00 p.m., when she went back to her apartment,
leaving again at 6:30 p.m. to run errands. Upon her return at
about 8:00 p.m., de Villers appeared to be sleeping. After a
bath and shower, she found that de Villers was not breathing.

Rossum called 911 at 9:22 p.m. The operator instructed her
to move de Villers’s body to the floor and attempt CPR.
When paramedics arrived, they found his body on the floor
with red rose petals strewn around him.1 Rossum initially told
the paramedics that he had not taken any drugs as far as she
knew, but later told them that he may have taken oxycodone.
1
The parties disputed the source of the rose at trial. See Rossum, 622
F.3d at 1266 n.2.
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17401
De Villers was pronounced dead at 10:19 p.m. While at the
hospital, Rossum told a nurse that de Villers may have over-
dosed on oxycodone.

Dr. Brian Blackbourne, the San Diego County Medical
Examiner, who performed de Villers’s autopsy, determined
that de Villers had been dead for at least an hour before the
paramedics arrived. He concluded that de Villers had devel-
oped early bronchopneumonia, a condition that results when
secretions that are normally removed by the breathing process
accumulate in the lungs because the person is “unconscious or
not breathing very deeply.” He also noted that de Villers had
a substantial amount of urine in his bladder, an amount which
would have been “very uncomfortable” to a conscious person.
The combination of the two—the bronchopneumonia in de
Villers’s lungs and the amount of urine in his bladder—led
Dr. Blackbourne to conclude that de Villers had been not
breathing properly for approximately six to twelve hours prior
to his death.

Lloyd Amborn, the OME’s operations administrator,
decided to send the autopsy samples to an outside laboratory
to avoid any potential conflict of interest; this was the first
time that he ordered an outside lab to conduct such tests. The
specimens were placed in a cardboard box, with each con-
tainer marked as a sample taken from de Villers’s body. They
were supposed to be transported to the sheriff’s office for
transfer to the outside lab, but, since the individual who was
to receive the samples was not immediately available, the box
was taken to the OME. It remained in an OME refrigerator for
approximately thirty-six hours until it was taken to the sher-
iff’s crime lab on the morning of Thursday, November 9,
2000.

While the autopsy specimens were at the OME, anyone
with a key to the building had access to them. The containers
were not sealed; their tops could be pulled off and then
replaced. Indeed, on Wednesday, November 8, 2000, Robert-
17402 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
son commented to one of the toxicologists at the OME that he
had looked at a sample of de Villers’s stomach contents.

That same day, November 8, Russ Lowe—the veteran
OME employee who served as acting laboratory manager
before Robertson supplanted him—called the police to report
Rossum’s and Robertson’s affair. Lowe’s call was a turning
point in the investigation, focusing the police’s attention on
the possibility of foul play.

Toxicology tests showed that de Villers’s autopsy speci-
mens contained extraordinarily high concentrations of fenta-
nyl, as well as a smaller amount of clonazepam and a trace
level of oxycodone. Dr. Blackbourne characterized the con-
centration of clonazepam found in de Villers’s blood as a high
therapeutic level, but not at the level of an overdose and “not
fatal.” He conceded, however, that sometimes postmortem
testing reveals a lower concentration of a drug than had previ-
ously been present in the body. The jury also heard testimony
that oxycodone, which is an opiate, and clonazepam, a ben-
zodiazepine, can have a “synergistic” effect on each other,
meaning that each drug is made more powerful when taken
with the other.

The discovery of fentanyl in de Villers’s samples was
unexpected; the OME did not ordinarily test for it; Pacific
Toxicology, the outside laboratory to which the samples were
first sent, did so regularly. After receiving the test results, Dr.
Blackbourne concluded that de Villers died of acute fentanyl
intoxication.

Prior to Rossum’s trial, de Villers’s samples were also sent
to two other laboratories for testing: the Alberta Office of the
Chief Medical Examiner in Canada and Associated Patholo-
gist Laboratories in Las Vegas, Nevada. As the following
chart demonstrates, the concentration levels of fentanyl mea-
sured by the different laboratories varied:
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17403

Alberta Office of Pacific Associated
the Chief Medical Toxicology Pathologist
Examiner Laboratories Laboratories
201 ng/mL, 286.5 ng/mL,
Stomach Contents 128 ng/mL
210 ng/mL 329.7 ng/mL
Urine — 189 ng/mL 236 ng/mL
Blood — 57.3 ng/mL 32.8 ng/mL
Peripheral Blood — 11.2 ng/mL —
Antemortem
— 35.8 ng/mL —
Blood
Right Proximal
Forearm Ulnar — 21.3 g —
Aspect Tissue
Key: “g” is grams; “ng” is nanograms; “mL” is milliliters; “—” indicates that
there are no results in the record

The prosecution called Dr. Theodore Stanley as an expert
witness on fentanyl. Dr. Stanley testified that fentanyl is a
potent and generally fast-acting pain reliever with a serious
side effect; it can cause a person to stop breathing. Fentanyl
begins to affect respiration at a concentration level in the
blood of 2 ng/mL. At a concentration of 4 ng/mL, about half
of “opioid naive” individuals—people without significant
experience taking opiates—would be breathing very slowly or
not at all. At 57.3 ng/mL, the extraordinarily high concentra-
tion found in de Villers’s blood by Pacific Toxicology, no
opioid naive individual would be conscious or breathing.2

Dr. Stanley testified that the speed with which fentanyl
takes effect depends on the manner in which it is adminis-
tered: the peak effect occurs about sixteen hours after admin-
istration of a transdermal patch, twenty to thirty minutes after
oral consumption, fifteen to twenty minutes after intramuscu-
2
No evidence was presented at trial that de Villers was inured to the
effects of fentanyl through the regular abuse of opiates.
17404 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
lar injection, and five minutes after intravenous injection. He
explained that fentanyl is not normally administered orally
because when the drug is taken in this way, the liver destroys
about 65 percent of it, leaving only about 35 percent to enter
the bloodstream.

None of the three physicians who testified at Rossum’s trial
—Dr. Blackbourne, Dr. Stanley, or the defense expert on fen-
tanyl, Dr. Mark Wallace—could provide a definitive opinion
as to how the fentanyl was introduced into de Villers’s body.
Dr. Stanley, however, testified that the differing concentration
levels in de Villers’s system, along with the evidence indicat-
ing that de Villers had been unconscious and breathing shal-
lowly for hours before his death, suggested that fentanyl
likely had been administered to de Villers on multiple occa-
sions.

After de Villers’s death, the OME audited its impounded
drugs and drug standards.3 It discovered that fifteen fentanyl
patches and ten milligrams of fentanyl standard were missing.
Rossum had logged in the fentanyl standard and had worked
on each of the three cases in which the missing fentanyl
patches had been impounded. The OME also determined that
quantities of methamphetamine, clonazepam, and oxycontin
(a time-released form of oxycodone) were missing.

II. Rossum’s Trial and Post-Trial Proceedings

Rossum was prosecuted for de Villers’s murder. Cal. Penal
Code §§ 187, 190.2(a)(19). The prosecution’s theory was that
Rossum poisoned de Villers with fentanyl, possibly after the
clonazepam she gave him failed to kill him. The defense con-
ceded that fentanyl caused de Villers’s death but contended
that de Villers committed suicide because he was despondent
over his marital problems.
3
The OME impounds drugs discovered at the scene of an individual’s
death and maintains an inventory of “drug standards”—quantities of par-
ticular drugs used as reference material during testing procedures.
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17405
The jury found Rossum guilty; the court sentenced her to
prison for life without parole. All reviews failed.

On December 15, 2006, Rossum, represented by new coun-
sel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court.4 The petition asserted for the first time the
claim at issue in this proceeding—that Rossum’s trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by not having de Villers’s
autopsy samples tested for fentanyl metabolites despite the
fact that if metabolites were not found in the sample, the
results would have ruled out fentanyl as the cause of de Vil-
lers’s death and disproven the prosecution’s theory. Rossum
offered a declaration from Dr. Steven H. Richeimer, a physi-
cian with substantial experience in anesthesiology, and
requested an evidentiary hearing. Dr. Richeimer’s declaration
underscored the anomalous nature of the evidence in the light
of fentanyl’s properties as “a very rapidly acting drug.” On
the one hand, “[i]f very high doses [were] rapidly adminis-
tered” to de Villers, then he likely would have died “within
minutes,” “not in a manner consistent with the 6-12 hours of
impaired breathing and consciousness described by Dr. Black-
bourne.” On the other hand, if de Villers absorbed fentanyl
“gradually, perhaps through the stomach,” then he likely
would not have survived “long enough for [his] blood levels
to reach the extremely high levels” measured by the toxicol-
ogy labs.

According to Dr. Richeimer, contamination of the samples
drawn from de Villers’s body would have explained the seem-
ing “inconsistency between the rapid action of fentanyl, the
extraordinarily high concentration levels, and the lengthy
period of impaired breathing and reduced consciousness” that
de Villers suffered. Indeed, Dr. Richeimer opines:
4
In California, the state supreme court, intermediate courts of appeal
and superior courts all have original habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Cal.
Const. art. VI, § 10.
17406 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
[C]ontamination of the specimens would explain the
high blood levels better than ingestion or other
administration of fentanyl to the decedent. . . . [I]n
attempting to determine if the cause of death was
from fentanyl, it would be necessary to rule out the
possibility that the samples were contaminated.

Richeimer Decl. at 3.

Dr. Richeimer further noted that a toxicology lab could
conclusively resolve the contamination issue by testing his
samples for metabolites of fentanyl. If de Villers’s specimens
contain metabolites of fentanyl, then fentanyl must have been
present in his body at the time the specimens were taken. If
no metabolites are present, then the specimens must have
been contaminated after his death.

The California Supreme Court summarily denied Rossum’s
habeas petition in a one-sentence order on August 8, 2007.
Two days later, Rossum filed a federal habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court adopted the recommenda-
tion of the magistrate judge and denied Rossum’s petition. It
also denied Rossum’s motion, made under Rule 6 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases, for leave to test de Villers’s
autopsy specimens for metabolites of fentanyl.

DISCUSSION

I. Governing Legal Standards

Review of the instant petition is framed by Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), and upon rehearing, by the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions in Richter and Pinholster.

A. Richter

Under AEDPA, the district court could not grant Rossum’s
habeas relief unless the California Supreme Court’s decision
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17407
denying her state habeas petition “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Reynoso, 462
F.3d at 1109. Under Richter, even if the state court’s decision
is unaccompanied by an explanation, § 2254(d) still requires
that federal court to hypothesize what arguments could have
supported the state court’s decision and then ask if “fair-
minded jurists could disagree that those arguments . . . are
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of the
Supreme Court. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-86.

Richter also emphasized the interplay between AEDPA’s
deferential review and the deference accorded trial counsel in
an ineffective assistance claim. Under Strickland, Rossum
must prove that (1) her counsel’s performance was deficient,
and (2) she suffered prejudice as a result. 466 U.S. at 687. To
be deficient, an attorney’s conduct must fall below an “objec-
tive standard of reasonableness” established by “prevailing
professional norms.” Id. at 687-88. To demonstrate prejudice,
Rossum must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different.” Id. at 694. Under AEDPA, we
may not merely reverse the state court finding that there are
no Strickland violations, but we must conclude that that deter-
mination is itself unreasonable. Id. at 788. Strickland presup-
poses that there is a “wide range” of reasonable professional
assistance which meets the constitutional standard. Richter at
787. As such, the application of AEDPA’s standards to inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims is “doubly” deferential.
Id. at 788. In effect, trial counsel is given a wide berth under
Strickland as in addition are state courts under AEDPA.

I will first address the arguments that could have been
made to support the California Supreme Court’s decision, and
then consider whether their acceptance by that Court repre-
sents an unreasonable application of Strickland. In consider-
ing the latter, I evaluate not only whether the state court was
17408 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
unreasonable in its ultimate conclusion that there was no
Strickland violation, but also in its conclusion that Rossum
had not made an adequate showing for an evidentiary hearing
in state court. Then I will consider what remedy is appropri-
ate.

B. The Merits of Rossum’s Strickland Claim

Rossum argued that a competent attorney would not have
conceded that fentanyl caused de Villers’s death without first
having his autopsy specimens tested for metabolites of fenta-
nyl. The California Supreme Court, in considering Rossum’s
habeas petition, asked itself “whether, assuming the petition-
er’s factual allegations [were] true, the petitioner would be
entitled to relief.” People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474
(1995). The court’s summary denial of Rossum’s petition
without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidenti-
ary hearing reflected its determination that “the claims made
in the petition [did] not state a prima facie case entitling the
petitioner to relief.” In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 770 (1993).
The question is whether, under § 2254(d)(1), given the facts
alleged by Rossum before the state court, the court’s summary
rejection of her claims was, in light of the entire state court
record, an unreasonable application of federal law. See Pin-
holster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403 n.12.

Clearly, the state’s decision was an unreasonable applica-
tion of federal law. There were “tantalizing indications” in the
state court record that de Villers’s autopsy specimens might
have been contaminated: The medical and toxicological evi-
dence raised serious questions as to whether fentanyl could
have caused de Villers’s death, an alternative cause of death
was plausible, and there was a lapse in the chain of custody
of de Villers’s autopsy specimens. Stankewitz v. Woodford,
365 F.3d 706, 719-20 (9th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, given the
significance of the test to this case, counsel could not show
any strategic reason for his failure to have the samples tested.
Proving that there were no metabolites would render the pros-
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17409
ecution’s theory untenable. Proving that there were metabo-
lites would be wholly consistent with the theory the defense
adopted in the absence of such proof and to the facts to which
it stipulated. Thus there could be no possible harm to Rossum
as a result of the performance of the metabolite test.5 Accord-
ingly, any state court determination to the contrary, particu-
larly without an evidentiary hearing, would have constituted
an unreasonable application of Strickland.

Five arguments could have been made in support of the
California Supreme Court’s decision. First, Rossum’s coun-
sel’s decision not to challenge the evidence that fentanyl
caused the victim’s death was a reasonable exercise of trial
strategy in light of the overwhelming evidence of fentanyl
poisoning. Second, defense counsel’s failure to pursue a con-
tamination theory was not unreasonable because the contami-
nation theory was too speculative. Third, it was reasonable for
defense counsel to concede the cause of death and decline to
pursue a contamination theory because those arguments
would have been contradicted by Rossum’s testimony that she
believed her husband had died as a result of his voluntary
ingestion of fentanyl and other drugs. Fourth, the facts of
Richter closely track the case at bar and, as the Supreme
Court found, do not warrant relief. Finally, even if counsel’s
performance were deficient, Rossum cannot show prejudice.

1. Overwhelming Evidence

The evidence of fentanyl poisoning as the cause of death
was not overwhelming, and thus this explanation for defense
counsel’s conduct could not have served as a reasonable basis
for the California Supreme Court’s decision that Rossum had
not established that her counsel’s performance was constitu-
5
Only if the defense intended to offer the results into evidence at trial,
which they would do if they were negative, would there be a duty to dis-
close. See Cal. Penal Code § 1054.3(a) (West 2002); see also Rossum, 622
F.3d at 1274.
17410 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
tionally deficient. The fentanyl concentration levels measured
by the three toxicology labs were widely disparate, and
extraordinarily high, suggesting that something might have
been amiss with de Villers’s autopsy specimens. Dr. Stanley
conceded that in his decades of experience, he had never seen
fentanyl concentrations as high as those measured in de Vil-
lers’s stomach. Given fentanyl’s potency, a competent attor-
ney would have wondered how the concentration of fentanyl
in de Villers’s blood, urine, and stomach contents could have
reached these levels before the drug killed him.6

The record also raises question as to how de Villers could
have lingered for six to twelve hours before finally succumb-
ing. Dr. Richeimer’s declaration reflected that if Rossum
administered a single, large dose of fentanyl to de Villers, he
would have died within a matter of minutes. If de Villers
absorbed fentanyl gradually, his breathing would have
stopped; he would have perished long before the concentra-
tion of fentanyl in his blood reached the stratospheric levels
measured by the toxicology labs.7 The inconsistency between
fentanyl’s potency and its relatively rapid onset, on the one
hand, and de Villers prolonged period of unconsciousness and
his extraordinarily high toxicology results, on the other,
would have prompted a competent attorney to investigate the
possibility that de Villers’s death was caused by something
else.

There was an alternative explanation of de Villers’s death,
although one that was not fully developed once the high fenta-
6
There is some evidence suggesting that fentanyl has a unique property:
unlike most drugs, concentrations of fentanyl may increase after death, but
not enough to explain the extraordinarily high levels found in the samples.
See Rossum, 622 F. 3d at 1270 n.7.
7
Dr. Stanley did testify that de Villers’s blood levels potentially could
have been obtained through the application of multiple transdermal
patches. But his opinion on this issue was very tentative. He admitted that
he was “not sure” that such levels could be achieved because he had never
placed that many patches on a patient.
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17411
nyl levels were found. Toxicologists also found clonazepam
and oxycodone in de Villers’s autopsy specimens. True, the
concentration of clonazepam was in the high therapeutic
range, not fatal, and only a trace amount of oxycodone was
found. But Dr. Stanley testified to the synergistic effect of
clonazepam and oxycodone, each multiplying the effect of the
other when they are taken in combination. Thus, a concentra-
tion of clonazepam near the top of the therapeutic range could
potentially have turned lethal when its effect was com-
pounded by the presence of oxycodone. In addition, Dr.
Blackbourne conceded that the concentration of clonazepam
in de Villers’s body might have fallen after his death due to
postmortem redistribution.

2. Contamination

The possibility of contamination was not too speculative,
and therefore could not reasonably justify the California
Supreme Court’s rejection of Rossum’s petition. The samples
were stored at the OME lab for thirty-six hours before they
were transferred to the sheriff’s office. Anyone with a key to
the OME had access to them. (Indeed, Robertson claimed to
have opened at least one of the samples while they were
housed at the OME.) Since the OME also stores fentanyl at
its lab, contamination—whether intentional or unintentional—
could have occurred.

The samples could have been contaminated by a coworker
upset by the preferential treatment Rossum seemed to receive
from Robertson. Alternatively, an OME employee seeking to
dethrone Robertson from his position as laboratory manager
could have contaminated the specimens to cast suspicion on
both him and Rossum.8
8
Robertson appears to have had a special interest and expertise in fenta-
nyl. Russ Lowe testified that he discovered approximately thirty-seven
articles on fentanyl while cleaning out Robertson’s office after his depar-
ture from the OME. If Robertson’s interest in fentanyl was widely known,
then contaminating de Villers’s samples with fentanyl might have seemed
like an effective way of implicating Robertson in de Villers’s death.
17412 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
Respondent further claims that because toxicology labs
rarely test for fentanyl, if one of Rossum’s coworkers was try-
ing to frame her or Robertson, he would not have used fenta-
nyl. The trial record suggests otherwise. OME employees
could well have known that de Villers’s specimens would be
sent to an outside lab, and that the first lab selected to analyze
de Villers’s samples, Pacific Toxicology, did test for fentanyl.
Moreover, the argument ignores the manner in which toxicol-
ogy testing is ordinarily done. Dr. Blackbourne testified that
if a toxicology lab’s initial testing fails to disclose a cause of
death, further tests are often conducted to determine if less
common substances—like fentanyl—are present.

In any event, contamination could have been definitively
determined through testing for the presence of metabolites of
fentanyl, according to Dr. Richeimer’s declaration.9 Although
the Respondent notes that the absence of fentanyl metabolites
would not have exonerated Rossum because she could have
killed de Villers with another drug, it is highly unlikely that
9
Respondent argued at the District Court that “Petitioner presents no
evidence that the autopsy specimens were not already tested for the pres-
ence of metabolites,” and quoted directly from Dr. Richeimer’s declara-
tion, “testing for these metabolites is commonly done by many
laboratories.” Answer to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 15. At oral argu-
ment, however, Respondent instead claimed that a competent attorney
would not have realized that de Villers’s samples could be tested for con-
tamination by analyzing them for the presence of fentanyl metabolites.
Respondent directed our attention to the cross-examination of toxicologist
Michael Henson. Rossum’s attorney asked Henson, “Do you have any
way of knowing or testing to determine if any [of de Villers’s] samples . . .
has been tampered with or spiked by anybody?” Henson answered, “No.”
ER 305. An answer given by a single prosecution witness during cross-
examination cannot, however, be dispositive, particularly given Rossum’s
allegation in her state habeas petition that her trial counsel “could have
determined the viability of a contamination defense by having the speci-
mens confidentially tested.” State Habeas Petition at 4, see also id. at 30.
In any case, defense attorneys are obligated to pursue lines of investigation
that hold out the promise of proving their clients’ innocence prior to decid-
ing on a trial strategy. See Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070-71 (9th
Cir. 1999).
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17413
a jury would have convicted her if the defense were able to
conclusively contradict the prosecution’s only theory, that
fentanyl was the cause of death. In any event, if fentanyl
metabolites were found, the defense would have suffered no
harm; it could proceed just as readily as before with its unsuc-
cessful suicide-by-fentanyl theory.

3. Suicide Defense

The state court may have relied on Respondent’s argument
that Rossum’s attorneys could reasonably have decided not to
pursue a contamination theory so as not to contradict Ros-
sum’s trial testimony. However, this could not have been the
basis for counsel’s decision not to pursue a contamination the-
ory in the first instance. They had an obligation to investigate
such a theory before the trial, when there was no testimony to
contradict. In any event, this argument gives undue promi-
nence to a single question and answer made during Rossum’s
cross-examination:

Q. So it is your testimony, then, that Greg de Villers
voluntarily took fentanyl, clonazepam, and oxyco-
done, correct?

A. As far as his death, yes.

Trial Tr. vol. 21, 2569.

Rossum’s answer was nothing more than a restatement of
her defense. She insisted that she did not have firsthand
knowledge of how her husband died because de Villers, not
she, administered whatever drugs caused his demise. She sim-
ply believed he had committed suicide by voluntarily taking
the drugs that had been found in his system.

While there were significant holes in the prosecution’s the-
ory that Rossum murdered de Villers with fentanyl, the
defense’s suicide-by-fentanyl theory was even more implausi-
17414 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
ble. The medical and toxicological evidence suggested that de
Villers could only have died from an overdose of fentanyl if
he was administered the drug on multiple occasions through-
out the day. If de Villers self-administered a large, single dose
of fentanyl, then he would have died too rapidly for the bron-
chopneumonia to develop in his lungs and for the large quan-
tity of urine to collect in his bladder. But de Villers could not
have voluntarily taken multiple doses of fentanyl over the
course of the day because in the last hours of his life, he was
too comatose even to breathe properly, much less self-
administer fentanyl. In any event, administering the test for
metabolites could have only proven the prosecution’s case
wrong; it could in no way have harmed the defendant’s case.10

4. Comparison with Richter

Respondent also attempts to draw factual parallels to Rich-
ter, where the Supreme Court found that it was reasonable for
the state court to deny an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim based on counsel’s failure to conduct forensic testing.
In contrast to Rossum’s case, however, the failure to do foren-
sic testing was not unreasonable in Richter because testing
might have undermined the only plausible defense available
to Richter, that the victim was killed in the cross fire of the
co-defendant’s shooting battle, and not at Richter’s hands.
131 S.Ct. at 789-90. Furthermore, the Court found “sufficient
conventional circumstantial evidence pointing to Richter’s
guilt.” Richter at 792.

Rossum’s case, in contrast, is about forensic testing that
would have been dispositive on the cause of death. The state’s
case against Rossum pivoted entirely on the fentanyl finding.
And unlike Richter, counsel’s performance with regard to this
test could not reflect competent legal strategy—at least on the
record before the state court. By confidentially testing for fen-
tanyl metabolites, counsel would have given up nothing.
10
See supra note 6.
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17415
Notably, Richter acknowledges that there will be criminal
cases where the “only reasonable and available defense strat-
egy requires consultation with experts or introduction of
expert evidence, whether pretrial, at trial, or both.” 131 S. Ct.
at 788. Indeed, the Third Circuit recently applied this princi-
ple in Showers v. Beard, 635 F. 3d 625 (3d. Cir. 2011), a post-
Richter case, involving yet another murder case in which a
woman was accused of killing her husband with liquid mor-
phine, Roxanol. The government claimed the defendant
administered the drug; the defense claimed that her husband
committed suicide. At issue was whether the bitter taste of
Roxanol could be masked. At an evidentiary hearing in the
state court—this state court granted an evidentiary hearing—
new experts testified that the taste could not be masked, and
one of the experts who had testified at trial indicated he had
informed the defense that he did not know one way or the
other. What is significant in Showers is i) that the Court dis-
tinguished wholly circumstantial cases and in particular, cases
involving forensic issues from others, and ii) the state record
is far more complete precisely because it granted an evidenti-
ary hearing. The terms on which the Court distinguished Rich-
ter apply precisely to the case at bar:

The facts in Richter were radically different from the
facts and circumstances here. The dissenting judge in
the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that “[t]he
defining issue in this matter is whether the victim,
who according to the Commonwealth’s theory
unknowingly ingested a toxic substance, Roxanol
(liquid morphine), would have or could have done so
without any evidence that the drug’s acute bitterness
was masked so as to conceal its presence.” Showers
II, 782 A.2d at 1023 (Tamilia, J., dissenting). The
properties of Roxanol and the autopsy results were
known well before the trial. If Roxanol could not be
masked by another substance, the only plausible
explanation for the manner of death would have been
willing, selfadministration. The Commonwealth’s
17416 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
evidence in the case against Showers, other than
expert testimony regarding the properties of liquid
morphine, was wholly circumstantial, making scien-
tific evidence all the more important. See Duncan v.
Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is
especially important for counsel to seek the advice of
an expert when he has no knowledge or expertise
about the field.”). Dr. Doyle provided Showers’
counsel with the names of three experts but counsel
failed to consult even one of the three experts that
Dr. Doyle had already suggested would have sup-
ported the defense’s suicide theory.

635 F. 3d at 631 (Italics supplied.)

Like Showers, it was critical for counsel to address the
forensic evidence and its substantial limitations in order to
provide an effective assistance of counsel. And through that
lens, I conclude that no fairminded jurist would disagree,
based on the record before the state court, that it was unrea-
sonable for defense counsel to pursue a suicide-by-fentanyl
theory, with all its defects, without first having de Villers’s
specimens tested for metabolites.

5. Prejudice

The state court may have found that even if Dr.
Richeimer’s declarations were true, and Rossum’s counsel
was ineffective, she could not demonstrate prejudice under
Strickland’s second prong. However, no fairminded jurist
could find such a determination to be reasonable on this
record. Rossum alleged in her state habeas petition that testing
the samples would reveal that they contained no fentanyl
metabolites. State Habeas Petition at 4. As noted, if the
defense had tested de Villers’s autopsy specimens and found
no fentanyl metabolites, it could have refuted the prosecu-
tion’s theory of murder by fentanyl overdose. And, given the
evidence, the prosecution would have had a difficult time con-
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17417
vincing the jury that Rossum committed the murder with dif-
ferent drugs. Indeed, if jurors learned that de Villers’s autopsy
samples had been contaminated, either intentionally or by
accident, they would in all likelihood have viewed the prose-
cution’s evidence as falling short of that needed to meet the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

Accordingly, I find that based on the state trial record and
the evidence and factual allegations presented in Rossum’s
state habeas petition, including the Richeimer declaration, the
state court’s summary rejection of her ineffective assistance
of counsel claim was an unreasonable application of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland. An evidentiary hear-
ing is necessary—as the Respondent suggested in the rehear-
ing petition—to permit the state an opportunity to question
Dr. Richeimer regarding the contents of his declaration. I also
find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to provide the
petitioner with the opportunity to prove prejudice by testing
de Villers’s autopsy samples to determine whether they con-
tain fentanyl metabolites, an opportunity of which the state
deprived Rossum by denying her a habeas hearing.

I turn now to the question of whether the Supreme Court’s
decision in Pinholster precludes such a hearing.

C. Pinholster

In Pinholster, the Court found that review under
§ 2254(d)(l) is “limited to the record that was before the state
court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 131 S. Ct. at
1398. The Pinholster majority was concerned that AEDPA’s
scheme, a scheme intended to leave primary responsibility for
evaluating state convictions with state courts, would be under-
mined were a petitioner permitted to overcome an “adverse
state-court decision with new evidence introduced in a federal
habeas court and reviewed by that court in the first instance
effectively, de novo.” 131 S. Ct. at 1399. Thus, Respondent
argues that, on the authority of Pinholster, this court may not
17418 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
order an evidentiary hearing. It asserts that if the state court
trial and habeas record is not adequate to obtain habeas relief,
Rossum’s claim must fail. Pinholster, however, is distinguish-
able as a matter of fact, law, and logic.

Pinholster was convicted of murder; at the penalty phase,
the jury unanimously voted for death. His first state habeas
petition, prepared by new counsel, alleged inter alia, ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. He claimed
that his trial counsel failed to present mitigating evidence,
including evidence of his mental disorders. He offered various
corroborative records, as well as factual declarations from
family members, prior counsel and a psychiatrist. The Califor-
nia Court denied the claim. Pinholster then filed a federal
habeas petition, reiterating his previous allegations, but
adding new claims and significantly, new facts. The federal
court held the petition in abeyance, to allow Pinholster to
return to state court. The state court again denied the petition.
Returning to federal court, Pinholster amended his petition,
now on all fours with the second state petition, and asked for
an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, new medical experts
testified for both sides, experts not presented to the state court
at any time.11 The district court granted habeas relief, and this
Court, sitting en banc, affirmed. Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d
651 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Supreme Court reversed. In part II of the majority
opinion, the Court held “that review under § 2254(d)(1)” must
be limited to the facts presented to the state court; in part III,
the Court concluded that, based on the state record, the state
court’s decision was not unreasonable. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct.
at 1398-99.

Rossum has satisfied the requirements of Pinholster. She
11
Indeed, the government claims that the evidence presented at the hear-
ing was so different from that presented in state court as to amount to
unadjudicated claims.
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17419
has demonstrated that the state court’s rejection of her petition
was unreasonable, and has done so on the basis of the record
that was before the state court. Pinholster requires no more.
I would now order an evidentiary hearing not to allow peti-
tioner to “overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1)” using evi-
dence not presented to the state court, see id. at 1400; rather,
I would order the evidentiary hearing to determine whether,
now that petitioner has demonstrated that the state court’s
summary decision, including its refusal to afford her a hear-
ing, was unreasonable, a federal court may grant the relief that
she requests. Pinholster did not hold that AEPDA bars a fed-
eral habeas court from ever holding an evidentiary hearing.
Indeed, it recognized that “Section 2254(e)(2) [which governs
evidentiary hearings] continues to have force where
§ 2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief.” Id. at 1401.
In this case, because § 2254(d)(1) does not bar relief—
Rossum has demonstrated on the basis of the state court
record that the state court’s decision was an unreasonable
application of federal law—an evidentiary hearing is not pre-
cluded by Pinholster.

In his concurrence, Justice Breyer explained the effect of
Pinholster’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

An offender who believes he is entitled to habeas
relief must first present a claim (including his evi-
dence) to the state courts. If the state courts reject the
claim, then a federal habeas court may review that
rejection on the basis of materials considered by the
state court. If the federal habeas court finds that the
state court decision fails [§ 2254](d)’s test . . . then
a[ ] [§ 2254](e) hearing may be needed.”

Id. at 1412 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In order to provide support for the majority’s contention
that its construction did not render § 2254(e) obsolete, Justice
Breyer offered examples of situations in which a federal court
17420 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
could properly hold an evidentiary hearing despite Pinholster.
One such example applies precisely to the instant case:

“[I]f the state-court rejection assumed the habeas
petitioner’s facts (deciding that, even if those facts
were true, federal law was not violated), then (after
finding the state court wrong on a (d) ground) an (e)
hearing might be needed to determine whether the
facts alleged were indeed true.”

Id.

In the case at bar, I have reviewed the state court’s rejection
of petitioner’s claims based on the record before it. The state
court assumed the truth of petitioner’s factual claims, but held
that even if those facts were true, she had not established a
viable Strickland claim. This determination was an unreason-
able application of Strickland, and as such, Rossum has thus
satisfied § 2254(d)(1)’s requirements. To the extent that the
conclusions in the panel’s original opinion were tentative it
was precisely because the state habeas record was one sided
—Rossum offered the declaration—and no evidentiary hear-
ing had been ordered. Surely no court could make a definitive
determination as to the petition itself without giving the state
an opportunity to prove that the facts in Dr. Richeimer’s dec-
laration were not true or not complete.12 This is the very situa-
tion that Justice Breyer identified—a hearing to see whether
the facts as alleged before the state court, which were suffi-
cient to make out a Strickland violation, were true. A hearing
is particularly important where, as here, the state court deci-
sion at issue is not the ultimate determination—was Rossum
12
The evidentiary hearing in this case surely could be far more narrow
than the hearing at issue in Pinholster. Indeed, some of the concerns of the
majority in Pinholster may be addressed more in considering the scope of
an evidentiary hearing rather than the fact of it, i.e. making certain that the
federal hearing does not go so far afield as to amount to the adjudication
of entirely new claims.
 ROSSUM v. PATRICK 17421
denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel?—but the prior question—did the state court unrea-
sonably fail to order a hearing on the facts as alleged?

My reading of Pinholster is bolstered by the lack of any
discussion of the body of law governing discovery in federal
court habeas proceedings. Pinholster does not mention Rule
6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, or its own pre-
cedent in Bracy v. Gramley, “[w]here specific allegations
before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner
may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate
that he is . . . entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to
provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an ade-
quate inquiry.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).13 By not purporting
to change or overrule these standards, the Court did not intend
to preclude hearings in all cases. See also Conway v. Houk,
No. 2:07-cv-947, 2011 WL 2119373, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May
26, 2011).

And, my view of Pinholster is supported by post-Pinholster
case law. See Skipwith v. McNeil, No. 09-60361-CIV, 2011
WL 1598829, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2011) (concluding
on the basis of the state court record that the state court’s
decision involved an unreasonable factual determination
based on the record and that the district court could conduct
an evidentiary hearing and consider new evidence in deter-
mining whether the claim was meritorious); Hearn v. Ryan, et
al., No. CV 08-448-PHX-MHM, 2011 WL 1526912, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 21, 2011) (holding that where a federal court finds,
based solely on the state court record, that the state court’s
decision was unreasonable, then the federal court could hold
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the claim war-
rants habeas relief).
13
Bracy is quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969), which
was decided prior to adoption of Rule 6. Bracy explicitly states that “Ha-
beas Corpus Rule 6 is meant to be consistent with Harris,” and cites to the
Advisory Committee’s Notes on Habeas Corpus Rule 6.
17422 ROSSUM v. PATRICK
II. Remedy

I would thus remand for the district court to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing on both prongs of Strickland. Rossum is not
barred from obtaining an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2) because she did not “fail[ ] to develop the factual
basis of [her] claim” before the California state courts, to the
extent those courts permitted her to do so. The state court
denied her an evidentiary hearing which would have deter-
mined the metabolite question. Indeed, § 2254(e)(2) permits
a hearing where Rossum (1) alleges facts that, if proven,
would entitle her to relief, and (2) shows that she did not
receive a full and fair hearing in state court. See Karis v. Cal-
deron, 283 F.3d 1117, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669-70 (9th Cir.
2005). Moreover, under Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002 (9th
Cir. 1997), in conducting this evidentiary hearing the district
judge is obligated to allow discovery, including testing de Vil-
lers’s specimens for metabolites of fentanyl. See Rossum, 622
F.3d at 1276.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Rossum is enti-
tled to an evidentiary hearing on her claim that her trial coun-
sel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland, both as to
the first prong, whether her counsel’s performance fell below
the standard of reasonably competent counsel, and the second
prong, whether Rossum was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient
performance. Accordingly, I would REVERSE the district
court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.