HABIBI v. Holder

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAWID HABIBI, 
Petitioner, No. 06-72111
v.
 Agency No.
A045-696-373
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney
General, OPINION
Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 5, 2010*
Pasadena, California

Filed September 14, 2011

Before: Raymond C. Fisher and Jay S. Bybee,
Circuit Judges, and Lyle E. Strom, Senior District Judge.**

Opinion by Judge Bybee

*The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, Senior United States District Judge for
the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.

17559
 HABIBI v. HOLDER 17561

COUNSEL

Alex Lareybi, San Diego, California, for the petitioner.

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron,
Assistant Director; Anthony W. Norwood, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department
of Justice, Washington D.C., for the respondent.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

How many days are in a year? The answer is more compli-
cated than it may first appear. According to the Royal Obser-
vatory in Greenwich, the astronomically correct answer is
approximately 365.24237 days. See Leap Years and Leap Sec-
onds, Royal Observatory, http://www.nmm.ac.uk/explore/
17562 HABIBI v. HOLDER
astronomy-and-time/time-facts/leap-years (last visited June 4,
2011). Since it would be impractical for our calendars to add
0.24237 days at the end of each year, we make up the differ-
ence by adding an extra day, February 29, every fourth year,
which is known as “leap year.” Id. This would solve the prob-
lem entirely if a natural year were actually 365.25 days. How-
ever, because the actual figure is slightly less at 365.24237
days, adding a full day every four years ends up overcompen-
sating. Id. To correct this, the Gregorian calendar approxi-
mates the natural year at 365.2425 days. See Leap Years,
Naval Oceanography Portal, http://www.usno.navy.mil/
USNO/astronomical-applications/astronomical-information-
center/leap-years (last visited June 4, 2011). As a result, we
omit leap year every 100 years, in years ending in “00,”
except once every 400 years. Id. Therefore, while the years
1600 and 2000 were leap years, the years 1700, 1800, and
1900 were not. Id.

Despite its precision, the astronomical definition of a year
does not help us answer the question of how long “one year”
is for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). That subsection
provides that an alien who commits “a crime of violence . . .
for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year” has
committed an “aggravated felony.” The immigration conse-
quences of having committed an “aggravated felony” are
substantial—for instance, if a removable alien is a lawful per-
manent resident (“LPR”), he becomes ineligible to apply for
cancellation of removal. Id. § 1229b(a)(3). Disregarding the
intricacies of astronomy, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) defines “one year” as 365 days, regardless of leap
years, for purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(F). Because taking the
intricacies of astronomy into account would needlessly com-
plicate this area of the law, we adopt the BIA’s definition.

I

On November 3, 1999, petitioner Jawid Habibi (“Habibi”),
an LPR, was convicted of Battery of a Current or Former Sig-
 HABIBI v. HOLDER 17563
nificant Other, a misdemeanor under California Penal Code
§ 243(e)(1). Habibi received a 365-day suspended sentence to
be served through the year 2000, which was a leap year. The
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) subsequently
served Habibi with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging
that his California conviction made him removable under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien convicted of a crime of
domestic violence.

Habibi requested cancellation of removal. An immigration
judge (“IJ”) concluded after a hearing that Habibi was not eli-
gible for cancellation of removal because his domestic vio-
lence conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under
§ 1101(a)(43)(F). Habibi argued that because “aggravated fel-
ony” is defined as a “crime of violence . . . for which the term
of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), and because his 365-day sentence was com-
pleted during a leap year, which was 366 days long, his Cali-
fornia conviction did not qualify as an “aggravated felony.”
The IJ rejected this argument, noting that “it is well settled
that . . . 365 days . . . would be the equivalent of a legal year.”

The BIA affirmed and adopted the IJ’s decision. In address-
ing Habibi’s argument that serving his 365-day sentence in a
leap year made him eligible for cancellation of removal, the
BIA noted that in Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999 (9th Cir.
2001), overruled on other grounds, Delgado v. Holder, ___
F.3d ___, No. 03-74442, 2011 WL 3633695 (9th Cir. Aug.
19, 2011) (en banc), “the Ninth Circuit approved of the
Board’s interpretation of one year as commonly meaning 365
days for purposes of finding that an alien’s sentence to 365
days rendered his conviction an aggravated felony.” The BIA
further observed that adopting Habibi’s position would lead
“to an inconsistent and absurd result, subjecting aliens to a
different set of rules depending on whether or not they were
sentenced in a leap year.”

Habibi timely petitioned for review. We review the BIA’s
conclusions of law de novo. See, e.g., Chavez-Perez v. Ash-
17564 HABIBI v. HOLDER
croft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 2004); Rosales-Rosales
v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 2003).

II

[1] Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3), an LPR convicted of an
“aggravated felony” is ineligible for cancellation of removal.
“Aggravated felony” is defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)
as including a “crime of violence . . . for which the term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year.”

It is undisputed that Habibi’s California domestic violence
conviction is a “crime of violence.” He contends, however,
that because he completed his 365-day sentence during a leap
year, his offense does not qualify as a crime “for which the
term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” as required by 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

[2] Habibi’s argument is controlled by our decision in Mat-
suk. In that case, the government sought removal of an alien
who had several state convictions for assault, each of which
carried a sentence of 365 days. Matsuk argued that these con-
victions were not for crimes “for which the term of imprison-
ment [is] at least one year” because a “natural or lunar” year
is actually composed of 365 days plus some hours. 247 F.3d
at 1000-02. The BIA countered that “a calendar year was a
more appropriate measure and . . . that a calendar year is com-
monly thought of as 365 days.” Id. at 1002. We held that the
BIA’s interpretation of one year as equaling 365 days was
rational and entitled to deference.1 Id. (“Because the BIA’s
interpretation is entirely rational—and certainly not demon-
1
Although Matsuk did not cite Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), it appears to have reviewed the BIA’s deci-
sion under a framework of Chevron deference. Matsuk was decided before
our decision in Marmolejo-Campos held that unpublished BIA orders
were not entitled to Chevron deference, but only entitled to Skidmore def-
erence.
 HABIBI v. HOLDER 17565
strably irrational or clearly contrary to the plain and sensible
meaning of the statute—the BIA’s interpretation should not
be disturbed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
United States v. Gonzalez-Tamariz, 310 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2002).

Although Habibi’s leap-year sentence presents an interest-
ing twist, we see no need to revisit Matsuk. Although the
BIA’s definition, contained in an unpublished order, is not
entitled to Chevron deference, see Marmolejo-Campos v.
Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“We
have not accorded Chevron deference to the [BIA]’s unpub-
lished decisions . . . because they do not bind future parties.”);
Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012-14 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“Because unpublished decisions lack precedential
value, this court . . . ha[s] declined to give them deferential
treatment under Chevron.”) (quotation marks and citation
omitted), it is entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d
at 909 (“[W]e have applied Skidmore when reviewing [the
BIA’s] unpublished orders.”). Under Skidmore we defer to the
BIA’s interpretation based on “the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”
323 U.S. at 140.

[3] In the context of § 1101(a)(43), the BIA correctly con-
cluded that the phrase “term of imprisonment [of] at least one
year” means a sentence of at least 365 days, regardless of
whether any part of the sentence was served during a leap
year. Adopting Habibi’s position that “one year” should mean
366 days when the sentence was served in a leap year would
lead to unjust and absurd results. It would mean that an alien’s
status as an aggravated felon—and his eligibility for removal
or cancellation thereof—would turn on a fortuity, the particu-
lar day in a particular calendar year in which he began serving
his sentence. If, for example, Habibi had started serving his
17566 HABIBI v. HOLDER
365-day sentence on February 15, 2000, then, according to
Habibi, he would be eligible for cancellation of removal,
because his sentence would have encompassed February 29,
2000. If, on the other hand, his sentence had started a month
later, on March 15, 2000, then he would not be eligible for
cancellation of removal, since 2001 was not a leap year, and
his sentence would not have included a February 29. There is
no indication that Congress intended for the definition of “ag-
gravated felony” to shift depending on what day an alien hap-
pened to start serving his sentence. Indeed, the statute uses the
phrase “term of imprisonment,” which suggests an inquiry
into the absolute value of the term, rather than an inquiry into
when the term began and when it ended. The BIA’s position
—which effectively classifies as aggravated felons all aliens
sentenced to at least a 365-day prison term—is the most logi-
cal reading of the statute and results in consistent outcomes.

Habibi nonetheless points to our decision in Lagandaon v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 2004), that held, for pur-
poses of a different provision of the Immigration and Natural-
ization Act (“INA”), that “a year, other than a leap year, is
365 days.” In that case, an alien petitioned for cancellation of
removal on grounds set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). To be
eligible for cancellation of removal under that particular pro-
vision, the petitioner had to have “been physically present in
the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10
years.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). For purposes of calculating
whether a petitioner had met the ten-year physical presence
requirement, we held that one year equals 365 days, except in
leap years, when it equals 366 days. Lagandaon, 383 F.3d at
985.

Lagandaon is inapplicable to Habibi’s case. Not only were
we interpreting a different statutory provision in Lagandaon,2
but the language there concerned how to calculate “a ‘year’
. . . in terms of dates.” Looking to Black’s Law Dictionary,
2
Lagandaon did not refer to our prior opinion in Matsuk.
 HABIBI v. HOLDER 17567
we observed that a year is defined as “ ‘[t]welve calendar
months beginning January 1 and ending December 31,’ or as
‘[t]welve calendar months beginning at any point.’ ” Id. at
991 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1609 (7th ed. 1999)).
The method we adopted in Lagandaon is useful for calculat-
ing terms of years from a particular starting date. See id.
(quoting Bailey v. Faux, 704 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (D. Utah
1989) (“[A] calendar method of calculating a one year period
from any given date results in termination of that period in the
next calendar year on the date one day prior to the starting
date.”)); see also Bosch v. Town Pump, Inc., 102 P.3d 32, 33-
34 (Mont. 2004). But “twelve calendar months” is not the
only measure of a “year.” The definition we quoted from
Black’s was the first definition; the second is “[a] consecutive
365-day period beginning at any point.” Black’s Law Dictio-
nary 1754 (9th ed. 2009).3

Lagandaon’s focus on calendar years was reasonable in the
context in which we decided it. We held in Lagandaon that
if an alien arrived in the United States on February 1, 2010,
he might become eligible for cancellation of removal on Janu-
ary 31, 2020. See 383 F.3d at 993. If we had held in Lagan-
daon that one year was 365 days regardless of leap years, we
would have needlessly complicated the calculation by requir-
ing aliens, the BIA, and us to calculate the number of leap
years within the applicable ten year period. For example, if
the alien had arrived on February 1, 2010, 3,650 days (365
days/year times 10 years) would elapse by January 29, 2020.
On the other hand, if the alien had arrived on February 1,
2012, the applicable date would be January 28, 2022. Alter-
natively, if the alien had arrived on February 1, 2097, the date
3
Before Professor Garner began his massive effort to rewrite Black’s,
the entry for “year” noted that “year” could be “astronomical, ecclesiasti-
cal, or regnal,” and that “[w]hen the period of a ‘year’ is named, a calen-
dar year is generally intended, but the subject-matter or context of statute
or contract in which the term is found or to which it relates may alter its
meaning.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1790 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
17568 HABIBI v. HOLDER
after which 3,650 days would elapse would be January 30,
2107. This awkward discrepancy exists because within any
given ten-year period, there will be anywhere between one
and three leap years.4 Defining a year to be 365 days except
in leap years therefore made sense for purposes of the provi-
sion at issue in Lagandaon because we were describing a
“continuous period of not less than 10 years.”

On the other hand, § 1101(a)(43)(F) is not about calculating
calendar periods, but about defining how many days a sen-
tence must be to be a sentence of “at least one year.” Further,
as discussed above, importing the definition of a year from
Lagandaon when reading § 1101(a)(43)(F) would cause the
definition of “aggravated felony” to shift depending on
whether the alien managed to serve some part of his sentence
during a leap year, and when during the leap year he served
his sentence. Lagandaon’s definition of a year made sense for
purposes of § 1229b(b)(1), but it makes little sense for pur-
poses of § 1101(a)(43)(F).

[4] We therefore hold that the BIA was correct to conclude
that, for purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(F), a sentence of 365 days
qualifies as a “term of imprisonment [of] at least one year,”
even when the sentence was served in whole or in part during
a leap year.

III

[5] Habibi next argues that because his underlying domes-
tic violence conviction is classified as a misdemeanor under
California law, it does not qualify as an “aggravated felony”
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). He concedes that our pre-
cedents hold that whether a state classifies an offense as a
4
For instance, between 1999 and 2009, there were three leap years:
2000, 2004, and 2008. Between 2001 and 2011, there were two leap years:
2004 and 2008. Between 2097 and 2107, there will only be one leap year:
2104.
 HABIBI v. HOLDER 17569
“misdemeanor” is irrelevant to determining whether it is an
“aggravated felony” for purposes of federal law. See United
States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (“[I]t is irrelevant whether the state labels the
underlying crime ‘misdemeanor’ or ‘felony.’ . . . . The rele-
vant question is whether the crime meets the definition of an
‘aggravated felony’ under federal sentencing law.”), super-
seded on other grounds by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.4 (2002).
He nonetheless argues that because the Third Circuit held oth-
erwise in Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 135-37 (3d Cir.
2001), the differing application of the law in different circuits
violates his equal protection rights. No court has ever held
that the mere existence of a circuit split on an issue of statu-
tory interpretation violates due process or equal protection,
and we decline Habibi’s invitation to do so here.

IV

[6] In proceedings before the IJ, Habibi also sought a con-
tinuance to permit him to apply for asylum and adjustment of
status. The IJ denied the motion because this would require
Habibi to apply for an INA § 212(h) waiver, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(h), and LPRs convicted of aggravated felonies are not
eligible for § 212(h) waivers. Habibi argues that his equal
protection rights are violated by the fact that, as an LPR, he
is statutorily ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver, although a non-
LPR alien might be eligible.

We have previously held that Congress has a rational basis
for excluding LPRs from eligibility for § 212(h) waivers. In
Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2002), we
observed that because “LPRs enjoy substantial rights and
privileges not shared by other aliens, . . . it is arguably proper
to hold them to a higher standard and level of responsibility.”
Id. at 957-58 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Accordingly, we held that Congress does not violate equal
protection by denying LPRs the opportunity to apply for a
17570 HABIBI v. HOLDER
§ 212(h) waiver. Because Taniguchi is controlling, we must
reject Habibi’s equal protection argument.

V

All of Habibi’s arguments for cancellation of removal have
been addressed by our precedents. None have been resolved
in his favor. Accordingly, we must deny Habibi’s petition for
review.

PETITION DENIED.