UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5052
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRELL E. ROBERSON,
Defendant - Appellant,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Party-in-Interest.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:10-cr-00060-CMH-1)
Submitted: September 1, 2011 Decided: September 14, 2011
Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Todd M. Richman,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael E. Rich, Assistant
United States Attorney, Michael J. Frank, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Terrell E. Roberson appeals his convictions for
carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006); using and
carrying a firearm during a violent crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006); and transporting stolen
vehicles, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2006). Roberson
challenges the district court’s admission of testimony and
refusal to give his proffered jury instructions. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
Roberson argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to strike a witness’s
testimony on the ground that the witness was inherently
incredible in light of her prior false statements to the grand
jury. Because it is not the function of the district court to
sit as a gatekeeper and to shield the jury from evidence of
questionable veracity, the district court properly submitted the
issue of the witness’s credibility to the jury. See United
States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 283 (4th Cir. 2007). Thus, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Roberson’s motion to strike. See United States v. Cole,
631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating standard of review).
Next, Roberson asserts that the district court abused
its discretion when it refused to give his proffered jury
instructions. We “review[] jury instructions in their entirety
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and as part of the whole trial . . . [to] determine . . .
whether the [district] court adequately instructed the jury on
the elements of the offense and the accused’s defenses.” United
States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Both the decision whether to give a
jury instruction and the content of that instruction are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Passaro,
577 F.3d 207, 221 (4th Cir. 2009). The denial of a requested
jury instruction is reversible error only if the proposed
instruction “(1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered
by the court’s charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point
in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested
instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to
conduct his defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
With these standards in mind, we have reviewed both
the proffered jury instructions and the district court’s charge
to the jury in the context of the entire trial. We conclude
that the substance of Roberson’s proffered instructions was
adequately covered by the district court’s charge to the jury.
Finally, our review of the record establishes that the district
court’s refusal to charge the jury with the exact text of
Roberson’s proffered instructions did not impair Roberson’s
ability to meaningfully mount his defense, as he thoroughly
cross-examined the witness who admitted lying before the grand
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jury, called impeachment witnesses, and presented a zealous
closing argument attacking the witness’s credibility.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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