FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 15, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
GLORY JOHNSON-STANTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 10-4221
v. (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-00046-DAK)
(D. Utah)
MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
In this employment discrimination case, Glory Johnson-Stanton appeals
pro se from the district court’s order granting Management and Training
Corporation’s (MTC’s) motion for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
B ACKGROUND
Ms. Johnson-Stanton worked for MTC for twenty-eight years, until “her
GED/ESL Senior Instruction position was eliminated effective May 31, 2007[,] as
part of a reduction in force action.” R. at 17. She retained counsel and sued
MTC in April 2009, alleging that she had been terminated in violation of Title VII
because of her “race (African American) and national origin (African American).”
Id.
MTC sought summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Johnson-Stanton’s claims
were either time-barred or failed on the merits. After obtaining two extensions of
time to file an opposition, Ms. Johnson-Stanton’s attorney joined with MTC in a
“Stipulation to Submit MTC’s Motion for Summary Judgment for Decision
Without Opposition from Plaintiff.” Id. at 474. Specifically, the stipulation
provided that Ms. Johnson-Stanton had “chosen not to oppose MTC’s Motion or
to oppose the entry of any of the relief sought in MTC’s Motion based on the
record supporting MTC’s Motion.” Id. at 475.
The district court granted MTC summary judgment, and
Ms. Johnson-Stanton appealed pro se.
D ISCUSSION
“We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment.”
Fredericks v. Jonsson, 609 F.3d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 2010). “Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” McCarty v. Gilchrist,
646 F.3d 1281, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2011).
Ms. Johnson-Stanton does not assert that summary judgment is unsupported
by the facts or law. Instead, she argues that her attorney was “incompeten[t]” and
failed “to properly represent [her] in the case against MTC.” Aplt. Br. at 7, 8.
She states that she terminated her attorney after he and MTC filed the stipulation,
and that after the district court entered summary judgment, she notified the court
“concerning the behavior of [her] attorney,” but was told to contact the Utah State
Bar. Id. at 7.
Ms. Johnson-Stanton presents a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
“The general rule in civil cases is that the ineffective assistance of counsel is not
a basis for appeal or retrial.” Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1119
(10th Cir. 2006); cf. id. at 1120 (recognizing that “the only context in which
courts have recognized a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in
civil litigation is in immigration cases”). “If a client’s chosen counsel performs
below professionally acceptable standards, with adverse effects on the client’s
case, the client’s remedy is not reversal, but rather a legal malpractice lawsuit
against the deficient attorney.” Id. at 1119. 1
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We express no opinion on the representation of Ms. Johnson-Stanton’s
counsel.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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