UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4938
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DANIEL EUGENE FROST, a/k/a Jackson,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(8:09-cr-00887-HFF-4)
Submitted: June 2, 2011 Decided: September 20, 2011
Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David B. Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, A. Lance Crick,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Eugene Frost pled guilty, pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), to one count of conspiracy to possess with
the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district court
sentenced Frost to 200 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Frost
asserts that the district court erred in accepting his guilty
plea because the factual basis offered by the Government at the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing was insufficient to support the
plea. We affirm.
The district court is required to satisfy itself that
there is a factual basis for a defendant’s guilty plea prior to
entering judgment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). “The rule is
intended to ensure that the [district] court make[s] clear
exactly what a defendant admits to, and whether those admissions
are factually sufficient to constitute the alleged crime.”
United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Frost did not move
to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of an insufficient
factual basis, we review his challenge for plain error, United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-26, 532 (4th Cir. 2002),
which exists when a clear or obvious error by the district court
affects a defendant’s substantial rights, United States v.
Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009).
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We conclude that Frost fails to show error by the
district court. A defendant’s guilt on a charge of conspiracy
to possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine is established by showing that: (1) two or more
persons agreed to possess with the intent to distribute 500
grams or more of methamphetamine; (2) the defendant knew of the
conspiracy; and (3) the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily
became a part of” the conspiracy. United States v. Yearwood,
518 F.3d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Frost concedes that the factual basis established that
he knew of the conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute methamphetamine, but contends that the evidence was
insufficient to prove he was a member of the conspiracy. He
argues that the factual basis established a mere buyer-seller
relationship between himself and others. Although evidence
showing that a defendant is a buyer or seller in a drug
transaction, standing alone, is insufficient to prove the
defendant’s participation in a conspiracy, see United States v.
Mills, 995 F.2d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 1993), evidence of a
buyer-seller relationship is relevant to “the issue of whether a
conspiratorial relationship exists,” Yearwood, 518 F.3d at 226
(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[e]vidence of a
buy-sell transaction coupled with a substantial quantity of
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drugs . . . support[s] a reasonable inference that the parties
[are] co-conspirators.” United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310,
317 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis
omitted). Likewise, continued relationships and repeated drug
transactions between parties are indicative of a conspiracy,
particularly when the transactions involve substantial amounts
of drugs. Id.
In this case, the Government’s recitation of the
facts, to which Frost agreed, established that he made multiple
exchanges and purchases of “pound quantities” of methamphetamine
at the residence of a co-conspirator, pursuant to the
coordinated efforts of another co-conspirator, and that on the
day of his arrest, Frost possessed pound quantities of the drug
and transported it to the residence for such an exchange. This
evidence is sufficient to establish Frost’s participation in the
conspiracy. Accordingly, we discern no plain error in the
district court’s acceptance of Frost’s guilty plea.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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