United States v. Richardson

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

No. 11-1202
_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ASYA M. RICHARDSON,
Appellant
_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-05-cr-00440-018
District Judge: The Honorable R. Barclay Surrick

Argued July 14, 2011

Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 23, 2011)

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Ellen C. Brotman, Esq. (argued)
Karen M. Ibach, Esq.
Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads LLP
123 South Broad Street
28th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19109
Counsel for Appellant

Michael J. Bresnick, Esq.
Richard A. Lloret, Esq.
Bernadette A. McKeon, Esq. (argued)
Kathy A. Stark, Esq.
Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq.
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee

________________

OPINION
________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Alton Coles was the leader of a Philadelphia drug
distribution ring responsible for selling a staggering amount
of both cocaine and cocaine base (also known as crack) from
1998 to 2005. The defendant in this appeal, Asya
2
Richardson, was Coles‘ fiancée. In the summer of 2005, the
couple used drug money to purchase a new home. Not long
after, a federal grand jury returned a series of indictments
charging Coles and others with various drug trafficking and
firearms offenses. Eventually the grand jury returned a fourth
superseding indictment charging Richardson with money
laundering. The government‘s theory was that, in the course
of purchasing the new home, Richardson had participated in
financial transactions knowing that they were designed to
conceal the criminal origin of the money involved. The case
proceeded to trial, and at the close of the government‘s case,
Richardson moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict. The
court denied the motion and Richardson was convicted.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain Richardson‘s conviction. We will
therefore vacate the conviction and remand for entry of a
judgment of acquittal.

I. Facts

In addition to being a drug dealer, Coles was the CEO
and owner of Take Down Records, a recording label that
produced rap and hip-hop music. He also threw weekly
parties at Palmer‘s, a nightclub located in downtown
Philadelphia. Coles‘ drug activity generated substantial
revenues, but his legitimate businesses were not profitable.
Take Down Records operated at a loss, and the nightclub
parties broke even (though they produced substantial cash
receipts in the form of cover charges).

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 In the summer of 2002, Coles and Richardson met and
began dating. The relationship blossomed into a serious
romance, and by December 2002, the two were engaged. But
within a year of the engagement, the couple was involved in a
domestic dispute causing Richardson to flee their apartment.
She went to court seeking a restraining order, and in support
of her application, submitted an affidavit in which she averred
(among other things) that Coles ―is a big time drug hustler.‖1
Despite their difficulties, Coles and Richardson eventually
reconciled.

1
Richardson says we cannot consider the ―drug hustler‖ affidavit
in reviewing the denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal.
She asserts that the affidavit was not admitted until after the
government rested, and that considering it thus would violate the
rule that a decision on an acquittal motion made at the close of the
government‘s case must be made based on the evidence then
existing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. Richardson is incorrect. Before
Coles‘ and Richardson‘s joint trial, the government indicated its
intent to introduce the affidavit in its case against Richardson. But
it pointed out that if she did not testify (and thus was not available
for cross examination), introducing the affidavit could violate
Coles‘ confrontation rights. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968). To avoid the confrontation problem, the District Court
bifurcated the money-laundering counts, explaining that the jury
would decide Coles‘ case before hearing about the affidavit and
determining Richardson‘s guilt or innocence. So when the
government announced that it was resting, its case against
Richardson remained open for the purpose of introducing the
affidavit.
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 In February 2005, Coles and Richardson decided to
purchase a home together. They picked out a new house
located in Mullica Hill, New Jersey. The purchase price for
the home was $466,190. Coles and Richardson signed a
purchase contract with the homebuilder, and Coles issued two
checks from his personal checking account at Citizens
Bank—one for $10,000 and another for $30,000—as a
deposit towards the home‘s purchase price.

Coles and Richardson applied for a joint mortgage
through the homebuilder‘s lender affiliate, NVR Mortgage
Company. In the application, Coles claimed to earn $100,000
per year as the CEO of Take Down Records, and Richardson
truthfully stated that she made $22,800 annually as a
customer service representative at Bank of America. The
mortgage application was rejected because Coles had poor
credit.

NVR referred the couple to Pine Creek Mortgage
Services, a ―last resort‖ mortgage company. Pine Creek
reviewed Coles‘ credit history and concluded that it would
not be able to secure a joint mortgage for the couple. It
determined, however, that Richardson had good credit and
that it could probably obtain an individual mortgage in her
name. At Pine Creek‘s suggestion, the couple removed
Coles‘ name from the home purchase contract and
Richardson completed an application for a ―stated income‖
mortgage.2 The application vastly overstated Richardson‘s

2
―Stated income‖ means the lender verifies the applicant‘s
employment but not her income. The income listed on the loan
5
income. It indicated that she had three jobs and that she
earned over $110,000 per year. Pine Creek nevertheless
approved the application, and settlement on the house was
scheduled for July 29, 2005.

Besides the $40,000 already paid to the homebuilder,
the couple planned to put an additional $74,000 down on the
home at settlement. In the days leading up to the settlement,
Coles made a number of cash deposits into Take Down
Records‘ business account at Citizens Bank. He later
transferred the funds to his personal checking account to use
towards the down payment.

The day of settlement was marked by a flurry of
banking activity. At 12:08 p.m., a $9,800 cash deposit was
made into Coles‘ and Richardson‘s joint checking account at
PNC Bank. This deposit took place at a PNC branch located
in Philadelphia. At 1:12 p.m., Coles made a $9,140 cash
deposit into Take Down Records‘ business account. The
funds were later transferred to Coles‘ personal checking
account and used towards the down payment. Half an hour
later, at the same bank branch, Coles deposited $9,200 in cash
directly into his personal checking account. At 3:33 p.m.,
Richardson made a $9,200 cash deposit into the couple‘s joint
checking account. This deposit was made at a PNC branch
located in Stratford, New Jersey, which was near the location

application is accepted as accurate unless the underwriters
determine that it is unreasonably high.
6
of the settlement.3 Finally, at 4:00 p.m., Coles made a $6,160
cash deposit into a Wachovia checking account belonging to
his son. This deposit, too, occurred at a branch located in
Stratford.

The couple proceeded to the settlement, where Coles
tendered three checks to cover the $74,000 outstanding on the
$114,000 down payment. The first was an official check for
$49,000 purchased with money from Coles‘ personal
checking account at Citizens Bank. The second was a
$19,000 cashier‘s check purchased with money from the
couple‘s joint checking account at PNC Bank. The third was
an official check for $6,000 bought with money from Coles‘
son‘s checking account at Wachovia. The settlement went
smoothly. Because Coles had been dropped from the home
purchase contract and mortgage, the property was titled in
Richardson‘s name only.

II. Procedural History

On August 3, 2005, shortly after the couple had moved
into the new home, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment charging Coles with a single count of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon. Three superseding
indictments followed charging Coles and others with various

3
We know Richardson made this deposit herself because the
deposit slip evidenced her handwriting. It is not clear whether
Richardson or Coles made the earlier PNC deposit. The bank
could not locate the deposit slip and no other evidence pointed in
either direction.
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drug trafficking and firearms crimes. On March 22, 2006, a
fourth superseding indictment was filed charging Coles and
Richardson with money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i), conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18
U.S.C. § 1956(h), and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Coles
and Richardson proceeded to trial along with four other
defendants. At the close of the government‘s evidence,
Richardson moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The
District Court took the matter under advisement, after which
Richardson presented evidence in her own defense. The jury
found Coles and Richardson guilty on the money-laundering
charges but acquitted them of wire fraud. The jury also
convicted Coles of drug trafficking. After the trial, the
District Court issued a ruling denying Richardson‘s motion
for judgment of acquittal. The Court sentenced Richardson to
24 months in prison. This appeal followed.

III. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
―We exercise plenary review over a district court‘s grant or
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the
sufficiency of the evidence.‖ United States v. Starnes, 583
F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). Because Richardson moved for
judgment of acquittal at the close of the government‘s case-
in-chief, and because the District Court reserved ruling on the
motion, we must confine ourselves to the evidence that
existed at the time the motion was made. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29(b); United States v. Tyson, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL
8
3314942 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Moore, 504 F.3d
1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that Rule 29 entitles the
defendant ―to a snapshot of the evidence at the point that the
court reserves its ruling‖). We can uphold Richardson‘s
convictions only if the government‘s evidence would permit a
reasonable jury to ―find the essential elements of the crime[s]
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Starnes, 583 F.3d at 206. In
determining whether this standard is met, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
mindful that it is the jury‘s province (and not ours) to make
credibility determinations and to assign weight to the
evidence. United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir.
2010).

IV. Analysis

We begin with the provision of the money-laundering
statute under which Richardson was convicted. It provides:

Whoever, knowing that the property involved in
a financial transaction represents the proceeds
of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity . . . knowing that the
transaction is designed in whole or in part . . . to
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . shall
be sentenced to a fine . . . or imprisonment for
not more than twenty years, or both.
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18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Thus the government had the
burden of establishing four elements: ―(1) an actual or
attempted financial transaction; (2) involving the proceeds of
[a] specified unlawful activity; (3) knowledge that the
transaction involves the proceeds of some unlawful activity;
and (4) . . . knowledge that the transaction[ was] designed in
whole or in part to conceal the nature, location, source,
ownership, or control of the proceeds of [a] specified
unlawful activity.‖ United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291,
294–95 (3d Cir. 2001). Richardson‘s sufficiency challenge
focuses on the second and fourth elements.

Richardson attacks the District Court‘s conclusion that
the financial transactions culminating in the purchase of the
home involved the ―proceeds of [a] specified unlawful
activity.‖ Omoruyi, 260 F.3d at 294. She does not dispute
that drug trafficking is a ―specified unlawful activity.‖ It
clearly is. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A). Nor does she
dispute that the transactions involved at least some drug
money. The government demonstrated that Coles‘ legitimate
businesses (Take Down Records and the nightclub parties)
were unprofitable, thereby permitting the jury to infer that at
least some of the money used on the $114,000 down payment
came from Coles‘ other source of income: drug trafficking.
See United States v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231, 249 (4th Cir.
2001) (―‗Evidence that a defendant was engaged in drug
trafficking and had insufficient legitimate income to produce
the money used in a transaction is sufficient to establish that
the money was derived from . . . drug distribution.‘‖) (quoting
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United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1483 (10th Cir.
1996)).

Richardson contends, however, that the government
failed to prove that the transactions involved the ―proceeds‖
of drug distribution. The evidence, Richardson notes,
established only that the transactions involved gross receipts
of drug distribution, and not that they involved profits of drug
distribution. Citing the Supreme Court‘s decision in United
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008), Richardson argues that
the term ―proceeds,‖ as used in the money-laundering statute,
means profits, not gross receipts. For its part, the government
acknowledges that it failed to prove that the transactions
involved profits of drug distribution. But it disagrees with
Richardson‘s reading of Santos, arguing that the statute‘s use
of the term ―proceeds‖ means gross receipts, at least in drug
trafficking cases.

Efrain Santos operated an illegal lottery for over two
decades. He used the gross receipts of the lottery to pay the
winners and his employees (the runners and collectors who
made the scheme possible). Id. at 509. Based on these
payments, Santos was convicted under a provision of the
money-laundering statute that makes it unlawful to use
criminal ―proceeds‖ to promote illegal activity. See 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Concluding that the statute‘s use
of the term ―proceeds‖ means profits, the lower courts
invalidated Santos‘ conviction because the evidence showed
only that the predicate payments involved gross receipts of
the illegal lottery. Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 894
(7th Cir. 2006), aff’g 342 F. Supp. 2d 781 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
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 A splintered Supreme Court affirmed. A four-justice
plurality noted that the term ―proceeds‖ is ambiguous:
dictionary definitions indicate that it can mean either profits
or gross receipts. 553 U.S. at 511. Invoking the rule of lenity
(under which ambiguity in a criminal statute must be
construed in the defendant‘s favor), the plurality opined that
the term ―proceeds,‖ as used in the money-laundering statute,
means profits, not gross receipts. Id. at 514–15. The
plurality also observed that adopting a receipts definition of
―proceeds‖ would create a ―merger problem‖ in certain types
of cases:

If ―proceeds‖ meant ―receipts,‖ nearly every
violation of the illegal-lottery statute would also
be a violation of the money-laundering statute,
because paying a winning bettor is a transaction
involving receipts that the defendant intends to
promote the carrying on of the lottery. Since
few lotteries, if any, will not pay their winners,
the statute criminalizing illegal lotteries . . .
would ―merge‖ with the money-laundering
statute. Congress evidently decided that lottery
operators ordinarily deserve up to 5 years of
imprisonment, [18 U.S.C.] § 1955(a), but as a
result of merger they would face an additional
20 years, § 1956(a)(1). [Indeed, t]he merger
problem is not limited to lottery operators.
[A]ny specified unlawful activity, an episode of
which includes transactions which are not
elements of the offense and in which a
participant passes receipts on to someone else,
12
 would merge with money laundering. . . . The
Government suggests no explanation for why
Congress would have wanted a transaction that
is a normal part of a crime it had duly
considered and appropriately punished
elsewhere in the Criminal Code to radically
increase the sentence for that crime. Interpreting
―proceeds‖ to mean ―profits‖ eliminates the
merger problem. [A] criminal who enters into a
transaction paying the expenses of his illegal
activity cannot possibly violate the money-
laundering statute, because by definition profits
consist of what remains after expenses are paid.

Id. at 515–17.

Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. He
eschewed the plurality‘s conclusion that ―proceeds‖ should
always be construed to mean profits. Id. at 525 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) (―[T]his court need not pick a single
definition of ‗proceeds‘ applicable to every unlawful activity,
no matter how incongruous some applications may be.‖). He
began by observing that ―the legislative history of [the
money-laundering statute] makes it clear that Congress
intended the term ‗proceeds‘ to include gross revenues from
the sale of contraband and the operation of organized crime
syndicates involving such sales.‖ Id. at 525–26 & n.3. At the
same time the legislative ―history sheds no light on how to
identify the proceeds of many other types of specified
unlawful activities,‖ including operating an illegal lottery. Id.
Given the absence of helpful legislative history, Justice
13
Stevens was persuaded to concur in the judgment because
applying a receipts definition in Santos‘ case would have run
headlong into the merger problem that the plurality had
identified. Congress could not have intended ―such a
perverse result.‖ Id. at 526–28 & n.7.

Writing for the four dissenting justices, Justice Alito
argued that ―the term ‗proceeds‘ in the money laundering
statute means gross receipts, not net income.‖ Id. at 546
(Alito, J., dissenting). Although the dissent disagreed with
Justice Stevens‘ approach ―insofar as it holds that the
meaning of the term ‗proceeds‘ varies depending on the
nature of the illegal activity that produces the laundered
funds,‖ it expressly agreed with him that a receipts definition
was appropriate in cases arising from ―‗the sale of contraband
and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving
such sales.‘‖ Id. at 531–32. Finally, the dissent disagreed
that the merger problem called for a profits definition in some
or all money-laundering cases: ―[T]he so-called merger
problem is fundamentally a sentencing problem, and the
proper remedy is a sentencing remedy.‖ Id. at 547.4

4
Congress legislatively overruled Santos in 2009. Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, §
2(f)(1), 123 Stat. 1617, 1618 (2009). As amended the money-
laundering statute defines ―proceeds‖ as ―any property derived
from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some
form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such
activity.‖ Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9)) (emphasis
added). The government acknowledges that the 2009 amendment
does not apply retroactively to this case.
14
 We believe that ―proceeds‖ means gross receipts in the
circumstances of this case. For starters, the merger problem
that impelled a majority of the Supreme Court to throw out
Santos‘ conviction is not present here. Purchasing real
property is neither integral to nor an expense associated with
the crime of drug trafficking. Moreover, five justices agreed
in Santos that ―proceeds‖ means gross receipts in cases
involving the sale of drugs and other contraband. Although
not binding (because four of the justices who expressed this
view did not concur in the Court‘s judgment, see Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)), the collective view
of five justices is, of course, persuasive authority. See
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 298–300, 304
(1996); Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1057 n.8
(11th Cir. 2008). Finally, our sister circuits uniformly agree
that ―proceeds‖ means receipts in the drug trafficking
context—at least where (as here) there is no merger problem.
See Wilson v. Roy, 643 F.3d 433, 437 n.3 (5th Cir. 2011)
(collecting cases); United States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590,
599 (2d Cir. 2011). Cf. United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178,
189–90 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding money-laundering
conviction where transactions clearly involved profits, thus
eliminating need to address profits-versus-receipts issue).

Richardson next argues that even if she knew drug
money was used to purchase the home, there was not
sufficient evidence to meet the fourth element of money
laundering, i.e., that she participated in financial transactions
knowing that they were designed (at least in part) to conceal
the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the
money. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d at 294–94. ―In this context,
15
‗design‘ means purpose or plan, i.e., the intended aim of the‖
transactions. Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 563
(2008). The government need not prove that the defendant
herself had the intent to conceal one of the listed attributes of
the funds. It is enough to prove that the defendant knew
someone else had that purpose. United States v. Carr, 25
F.3d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Campbell,
977 F.2d 854, 857–58 (4th Cir. 1992).

Evidence of a purpose to conceal can come in many
forms, including ―statements by a defendant probative of
intent to conceal; unusual secrecy surrounding the
transaction; structuring the transaction in a way to avoid
attention; depositing illegal profits in the bank account of a
legitimate business; highly irregular features of the
transaction; using third parties to conceal the real owner; a
series of unusual financial moves cumulating in the
transaction; or expert testimony on practices of criminals.‖
United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1475–76
(10th Cir. 1994) (citing cases, including United States v.
Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1989)).

The government argues that Richardson had
knowledge of a design to conceal based on (1) the fact that
Coles made cash deposits into Take Down Records‘ business
account only to then transfer the money to his individual
checking account for personal use; (2) the irregular nature of
the depositing activity that occurred on the day of settlement;
and (3) the facts that Richardson lied about her income on the
mortgage application and that the house was titled in

16
Richardson‘s name even though Coles was the ―de facto‖
owner.

We agree with the government that funneling cash
through an ostensibly legitimate business—a classic example
of money laundering—is ordinarily sufficient to prove a
design to conceal the nature and source of the money. United
States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 318 F.3d 268, 277 (1st Cir. 2003).
But it was Coles, not Richardson, who funneled cash through
the Take Down Records account. The government adduced
no evidence suggesting that Richardson participated in or
knew about the transactions involving the account. This
evidence thus cannot be used to establish knowledge of a
design to conceal on Richardson‘s part.

The government is surely correct that the depositing
activity that occurred on settlement day was highly suspect.
As a money-laundering expert explained at trial, banks are
required to file a currency transaction report when they accept
a cash deposit of $10,000 or more. The report is sent to the
IRS, which compares it against the depositor‘s tax return to
check for discrepancies. The five deposits made on
settlement day took place at four different bank locations, and
each involved under $10,000 in cash—four just barely so.
This is powerful evidence that the deposits were structured to
deflect government attention, and thus to conceal the nature,
source, and ownership of the funds. See United States v.
Tekle, 329 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); Rivera-
Rodriguez, 318 F.3d at 272; Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d at 1478
(design to conceal shown where asset purchase was funded by
17
bank deposits that had been structured to sidestep currency
reporting requirements).

The problem the government faces, however, is that
there is precious little evidence connecting Richardson to the
pattern of suspicious depositing activity. True, the
government established that Richardson made the $9,200
deposit at the PNC branch located in Stratford. But it offered
no evidence from which to infer that Richardson participated
in or was aware of the other deposits that occurred on
settlement day. A single cash deposit of less than $10,000 is
not sufficient to establish knowledge of a design to conceal as
to the transaction as a whole.

Yet we must still consider the evidence that
Richardson lied about her income on the mortgage
application and allowed the house to be titled in her name
even though Coles was the true owner. This evidence,
according to the government, proves that Richardson intended
to hide Coles‘ role as the source of the purchase money. The
circumstances of this case indicate otherwise.

The following facts are undisputed. After deciding to
purchase the home in Mullica Hill, Coles and Richardson
both signed the home purchase contract, and Coles wrote two
checks from his personal bank account to cover an initial
$40,000 deposit. The couple submitted an application for a
joint mortgage, in which Coles claimed to make $100,000 per
year as the CEO of Take Down Records and Richardson
stated truthfully that she earned $22,800 annually as a Bank
of America employee. The application was rejected,
18
however, because of Coles‘ negative credit history.
(Importantly, had the application been approved, the house
would have been jointly titled in Coles‘ and Richardson‘s
names.) They were then referred to a mortgage company of
―last resort,‖ which examined Coles‘ credit history and
concluded that it would not be able to secure a joint mortgage
for the couple. The company determined, however, that
Richardson had good credit and that it could obtain an
individual mortgage for her. It thus advised the couple to
delete Coles‘ name from the home purchase contract and to
apply for a mortgage in Richardson‘s name only. Richardson
went along with the plan and (knowing that she could not
qualify for a mortgage based on her true salary) submitted a
mortgage application that vastly overstated her income. The
mortgage was approved, and the house was titled in
Richardson‘s name because she was the sole mortgagor.

These circumstances show that Richardson lied about
her income and had the property titled in her name, not to
hide Coles‘ involvement (which by then was perfectly
obvious), but to get around Coles‘ bad credit and purchase the
house as planned. Cf. United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970,
979 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466,
1471–73 (10th Cir. 1991). No jury could have reasonably
reached a different conclusion.

Viewed as a whole, the evidence was not sufficient to
establish knowledge of a design to conceal on Richardson‘s
part. For this reason, we must vacate not only Richardson‘s
money-laundering conviction but also her conviction for
conspiracy to commit money laundering. After all, without
19
knowledge of a design to conceal the nature, source, or
ownership of the money, Richardson could not have agreed
to conceal the nature, source, or ownership of the money. See
United States v. Henry, 325 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2003). The
government has not argued otherwise.

V. Conclusion

For these reasons we will vacate the District Court‘s
judgment and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

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