10-4448-cv
Klos v. Commissioner of Social Security
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,
on the 27th day of September, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Patricia Klos,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 10-4448-cv
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Patricia Klos, pro se, Flushing, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Varuni Nelson, Kathleen A. Mahoney, Scott R.
Landau, Seth D. Eichenholtz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York, Brooklyn, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Ross, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia Klos, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment
granting the motion of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for judgment on
the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thereby
upholding the Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability benefits under the Social
Security Act. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review district court orders granting motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c) de novo. Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2003). When
reviewing determinations made by the Commissioner, we conduct a plenary review of the
administrative record. See Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Schaal
v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 500-501 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the focus of review is the
administrative ruling, not the district court’s decision). Moreover, we may set aside the
Commissioner’s decision only if the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence,
or if the decision was based on legal error. See Burgess, 537 F.3d at 127. “Substantial evidence
means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 127. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Here, after having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of
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these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment. The evidence in the record concerning
Klos’s conditions, along with her own testimony, provides substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s determination that she was not disabled under the Act during the relevant time period
(March 17, 2000-December 31, 2005).
In addition, the new evidence that Klos submitted to the district court did not warrant
remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Tirado v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 595, 597
(2d Cir. 1988). As the district court correctly determined, much of the new evidence was
cumulative, and, in any event, it was not material to Klos’s disability claim for the reasons set
forth in the district court’s opinion and order. Although medical evidence that postdates an
ALJ’s decision is not per se irrelevant, see Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2004),
the letters from Drs. Marin and Kamel here did not indicate that Klos’s condition was more
serious than previously thought.
We have considered all of Klos’s remaining arguments and find them to be unavailing.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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