CLD-276 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-2872
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MAURICIO MATERON,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN DAVID EBBERT, Allenwood FCI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 11-0648)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 25, 2011
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 28, 2011)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Mauricio Materon appeals the District Court‟s order denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons discussed
below, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6.
Materon is a federal prisoner. On October 12, 2010, Officer Morales observed
Materon speaking on a cellular phone in his cell. Officer Morales confiscated the phone,
and Materon was charged with possession, manufacture, or introduction of a hazardous
tool in violation of Code 108, 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 3. After a hearing, the Unit
Disciplinary Committee found Materon guilty of the Code 108 offense. The Discipline
Hearing Officer (DHO) noted that Materon did not dispute that he had possessed a cell
phone, and held that this constituted a violation of Code 108. More specifically, the
DHO concluded that cell phones qualify as “hazardous tools” because they have “been
used to arrange rendezvous for escapes” and “to arrange contraband introductions.” This
interpretation, the DHO, stressed, was consistent with a memorandum issued by Warden
Donna Zickefoose. Materon was sentenced to 30 days of disciplinary segregation,
disallowance of 40 days of good conduct time, forfeiture of 540 days of non-vested good
conduct time, and loss of various privileges.
In April 2011, Materon filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the
District Court. Materon claimed that the DHO had violated his due process rights by
finding him guilty of the Code 108 offense. According to Materon, cell phones did not
qualify as “hazardous tools” under 108; rather, his conduct was punishable under only
Code 305, which prescribes less-severe penalties than Code 108. The District Court
denied Materon‟s petition, and Materon filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.1
1
Challenges by federal prisoners to the loss of good time credits are properly brought under §
2241, see Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009), and a certificate of appealability
2
Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits. See Vega,
493 F.3d at 317 n.4. When a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good
time credits, the prisoner is entitled to “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary
charges; (2) an opportunity . . . to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his
defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the
reasons for the disciplinary action.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). In
addition, the disciplinary decision must be supported by “some evidence” — that is, “any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary
board.” Id. at 455-56.
Materon presents a single argument — that Code 305, not Code 108, covers his
offense. Code 108 prohibits “[p]ossession, manufacture, or introduction of a hazardous
tool (Tools most likely to be used in an escape or escape attempt or to serve as weapons
capable of doing serious bodily harm to others; or those hazardous to institutional
security or personal safety; e.g., hack-saw blade).” 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 3. Code
305, meanwhile, prohibits “[p]ossession of anything not authorized for retention or
receipt by the inmate, and not issued to him through regular channels.” Id.
We agree with the District Court that Materon‟s argument lacks merit. The DHO
determined, in accordance with a memorandum issued by the warden, that cell phones
were “hazardous tools” because they could be used to facilitate escape or to engage in
is not required to appeal the denial of a federal prisoner‟s § 2241 petition, see Burkey v.
Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s legal conclusions and
apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact. Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310,
314 (3d Cir. 2007).
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other illegal activities, and thus represent “a threat to the security and orderly running of
the institution.” Therefore, the DHO concluded, Materon‟s conduct was punishable
under Code 108. This interpretation is consistent with the language of Code 108, and we
thus discern no error in the DHO‟s analysis. See Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378,
389 (3d Cir. 2001) (“An agency‟s interpretation of its own regulation is
„controlling . . . unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.‟”
(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order denying
Materon‟s § 2241 petition. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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