UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4933
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY GENE TRAPPIER,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:09-cr-00340-TLW-1)
Submitted: July 18, 2011 Decided: September 28, 2011
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Russell W. Mace, III, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Jimmie Ewing, A. Bradley Parham, Assistant United
States Attorneys, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Gene Trappier appeals his convictions and 322-
month sentence after he entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count each of possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or
more of heroin and 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011). Trappier
asserts that the judgment should be vacated because: (1) his
guilty plea was unknowing and failed to comply with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 because he was unaware that he qualified as a career
offender; and (2) the district court erred when it denied his
suppression motion. Trappier has also filed a motion to file a
pro se supplemental brief with this Court. We deny Trappier’s
motion and affirm.
We conclude that the district court did not err when
it denied Trappier’s suppression motion. In reviewing the
district court’s denial of Trappier’s motion, we review the
district court’s factual determinations for clear error and any
legal determinations de novo. United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d
586, 589 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010).
Because the district court denied Trappier’s motion, we construe
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the government.”
Id.
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee
requires that arrests and “searches be conducted pursuant to a
warrant issued by an independent judicial officer.” California
v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). There are “a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions[,]”
however. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
For instance, an officer can make a warrantless arrest
if he has probable cause to believe that the person has
committed, or is committing, a felony in his presence. See
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976). Assuming a
warrantless arrest is lawful, police may conduct a full search
of an arrestee’s person and personal items in his possession and
control. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973) (holding that a search incident to arrest requires no
additional justification).
Probable cause “to justify an arrest [without a
warrant] means facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or
one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances
shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S.
3
31, 37 (1979). Moreover, whether police had probable cause is
determined by the “totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
“The substance of all the definitions of probable
cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt . . . and that
the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the
person to be searched or seized[.]” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Moreover, officers may “draw on
their own experience and specialized training to make inferences
from and deductions about the cumulative information available
to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United
States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir.) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
358 (2010).
Trappier asserts that the district court erred when it
denied his suppression motion because: (1) police lacked
probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest and search of his
person on October 8, 2008; and (2) an October 16, 2008 traffic
stop of the vehicle he was driving was unconstitutional because
it was initiated based on an anonymous and uncorroborated tip.
We have reviewed the transcript of Trappier’s suppression
hearing and conclude that the totality of the facts and
circumstances known by the agents on October 8, 2008, provided a
reasonable basis for their belief that Trappier was in
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possession of illegal narcotics; accordingly, Trappier’s
warrantless arrest on that date passes muster under the Fourth
Amendment. Similarly, we conclude that given the agents’
knowledge that Trappier’s driver’s license was suspended, the
agents had probable cause to effect the traffic stop that
resulted in the discovery and seizure of additional narcotics on
October 16, 2008. Accordingly, we discern no error in the
district court’s decision to deny Trappier’s suppression motion.
We also reject Trappier’s assertion that although he
was informed of the statutory mandatory minimum and maximum
sentences he faced during his Rule 11 hearing, his plea was
unknowing and involuntary because the district court did not
inform him he might qualify as a career offender. Although Rule
11 requires a district court to notify a defendant during the
plea colloquy “of all potentially applicable statutory minimum
and maximum sentences[,]” it “does not require courts to inform
defendants of the applicable Guidelines sentencing ranges[.]”
United States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2008).
The district court informed Trappier that the drug
charge to which he was pleading guilty required a statutory
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years and carried a maximum of
life in prison, and that the weapons charge required a minimum
sentence of five years and carried a maximum of life in prison,
and that the sentence on the weapons charge had to run
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consecutively to any sentence imposed on the drug charge.
Trappier indicated that he understood. Accordingly, the
district court complied with Rule 11 and nothing more was
required.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment. We
also deny Trappier’s motion to file a pro se supplemental brief. *
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Trappier’s ineffective assistance claim raised in his pro
se brief is not addressed because counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness does not conclusively appear on the record. See
United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 223, 239 (4th Cir. 2006)
(reiterating that this Court will only address an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal “if the lawyer’s
ineffectiveness conclusively appears from the record”).
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