UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4228
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WALTER FRANKLIN GRIFFITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:10-cr-00114-WO-1)
Submitted: September 13, 2011 Decided: September 29, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Graham Tod Green, Assistant United States
Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Walter Franklin Griffith pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to the possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2) (2006). The district court sentenced Griffith to 108
months’ incarceration followed by a three-year term of
supervised release. On appeal, Griffith’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which
he states that he could identify no meritorious issues for
appeal, but questions whether Griffith’s sentence was
reasonable. *
This court reviews a sentence under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). The first step in this review requires us to
inspect for procedural reasonableness by ensuring that the
district court committed no significant procedural errors, such
as improperly calculating the Guidelines range, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or
insufficiently explaining the selected sentence. United
States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 2010). We
then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
*
Griffith was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but has declined to do so. The Government
has elected not to file a brief.
2
imposed, taking into account the totality of the circumstances.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume that a sentence within a
properly calculated Guidelines range is reasonable. United
States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
Here, Griffith raised no objection to the findings or
calculations made in the presentence report, which established
an applicable sentencing range of 100 to 120 months, and which
the court explicitly adopted. At sentencing, the court heard
the testimony of two witnesses called by Griffith, considered
counsel’s argument requesting a sentence “near the low end of
the guideline range,” and permitted Griffith an opportunity to
speak on his own behalf. After explaining that its ruling was
predicated on the nature and circumstances of Griffith’s
offense, his history and characteristics, and the need to
protect society from further criminal conduct, the court
sentenced Griffith to a term of incarceration that fell in the
bottom half of the uncontested Guidelines range.
As we have stressed, a sentencing court “need not
robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection,” but must
only “provide [this court] an assurance that the sentencing
court considered the § 3553(a) factors with regard to the
particular defendant.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
657 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our
review of the record persuades us that the sentencing court did
3
so here. Accordingly, we readily conclude that Griffith’s
sentence is procedurally reasonable. We further conclude that
Griffith has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness
accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case, including the guilty plea hearing, and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the
district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel
inform Griffith, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Griffith requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Griffith. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4