FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 3 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-10616
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:10-cr-01002-GMS
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JESUS ALBERTO GONZALEZ-MEZA,
a.k.a. Jesus Beltran, a.k.a. Jesus Gonzalez-
Meza, a.k.a. Jesus A Mesa-Gonzalez,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 27, 2011 **
Before: HAWKINS, SILVERMAN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Jesus Alberto Gonzalez-Meza appeals from the 49-month sentence imposed
following his guilty-plea conviction for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Gonzalez-Meza contends that the district court erred by relying upon
improper factors at sentencing. The record reflects that the district court properly
considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities. See United States v. Carty, 520
F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Gonzalez-Meza’s
contention that the district court improperly considered his apparent favorable
prosecutorial treatment during a prior criminal immigration case is without merit.
Gonzalez-Meza further contends that the district court procedurally erred by
failing to adequately explain the sentence, and that the sentence is substantively
unreasonable. The record reflects that the district court sufficiently explained the
sentence imposed. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. Moreover, and in light of the
totality of the circumstances, the sentence below the Guidelines range is
substantively reasonable. See id. at 993; see also United States v. Orozco-Acosta,
607 F.3d 1156, 1167 (9th Cir. 2010) (staleness of a prior conviction did not render
sentence substantively unreasonable where the case presented “other aggravating
sentencing considerations”).
Finally, as Gonzalez-Meza concedes, his contention that his sentence
violates the Sixth Amendment because the fact of his prior conviction was not
2 10-10616
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is foreclosed. See Almendarez-Torres
v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
AFFIRMED.
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