UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5202
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RODERICK LEMAR GREEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:10-cr-00369-RBH-1)
Submitted: September 29, 2011 Decided: October 4, 2011
Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant United States Attorney,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roderick L. Green pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to bank robbery and use of a firearm during a
crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 2113(a), (d)
(2006), and was sentenced to a total term of 121 months of
imprisonment. On appeal, Green’s attorney has filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 when it accepted Green’s guilty plea and whether the
sentence imposed was reasonable. Although informed of his right
to file a supplemental pro se brief, Green has not done so. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We conclude, based on our review of the transcript of
Green’s guilty plea hearing, that the district court fully
complied with Rule 11 in accepting Green’s guilty plea. The
court ensured that Green understood the charges against him and
the potential sentence he faced, that he entered his plea
knowingly and voluntarily, and that the plea was supported by an
independent factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 116, 119–20 (4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we affirm
Green’s conviction.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
2
38, 51 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id.
First, this court must assess whether the district court
properly calculated the Guidelines range, considered the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. Id. at 49–50; see United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). We also must consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
In this case, the district court correctly calculated and
considered the advisory Guidelines range and heard argument from
counsel and allocution from Green. The court considered
relevant § 3553(a) factors and explained that the within-
Guidelines sentence was warranted in light of the nature and
circumstances of the offense. Further, Green offers no grounds
to rebut the presumption on appeal that his within-Guidelines
sentence of 121 months imprisonment is substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in sentencing Green.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Green, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Green requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Green. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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