ALD-284 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-2996
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IN RE: TRENELL J. COLEMAN,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-6330)
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
September 8, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 4, 2011 )
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Trenell Coleman is serving a 444-month sentence imposed by the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. See United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d
316, 318 (3d Cir. 2009). On August 25, 2010, the District Court denied Coleman‟s
motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and later it denied his motion for
reconsideration. Coleman appealed, and we denied Coleman‟s request for a certificate of
appealability. See CA No. 11-1756 (3d Cir. June 15, 2011). Coleman‟s petition for
panel and en banc rehearing was denied on August 19, 2011.
After we denied him a certificate of appealability but before we denied him
rehearing, Coleman filed the instant mandamus petition. With that petition, Coleman
“prays that this court issues a writ of mandamus and direct[s] the [District Court] to
expedite full disposition of all four of petitioner‟s claims in his original section 2255
motion.” According to Coleman, the District Court failed “to rule on [his] fourth claim.”
Coleman made this same argument about his fourth § 2255 claim in support of
both his request for a certificate of appealability and his petition for rehearing. Clearly,
then, Coleman recognizes the existence of alternative “adequate means . . . to attain the
relief he desires,” Hollingsworth v. Perry, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 705, 710 (2010) (per
curiam) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted), a fact that precludes him from
demonstrating the appropriateness of mandamus relief. It is well-settled that the writ is
not to be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court
for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004); see also In re Catawba Indian Tribe of South
Carolina, 973 F.2d 1133, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992) (“The very power of the writ of mandamus
demands that its availability be limited to narrow circumstances lest it quickly become a
shortcut by which disappointed litigants might circumvent the requirements of appellate
procedure mandated by Congress”).
Furthermore, Coleman‟s right to the relief he desires is not— as it must be before
a mandamus petition can be granted—“clear and indisputable.” Hollingsworth, 130 S.
Ct. at 710. In fact, his contention that the District Court failed to adjudicate all four
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claims raised in his § 2255 motion is baseless. Cf. United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d
585, 594 (3d Cir. 1992) (“The right to a writ is „clear and indisputable‟ when the
petitioner can show „a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion‟”)
(citation omitted). In denying Coleman‟s § 2255 motion, the District Court reasoned as
follows:
The first, second, and fourth of Petitioner‟s claims [of trial
counsel ineffectiveness] fail because Petitioner cannot show
prejudice. All three of those claims basically argue that
Petitioner‟s attorney should have done a better job arguing
that the application of § 924(c) should not have resulted in a
32-year consecutive sentence. However, the Third Circuit
has now affirmed the imposition of that sentence on two
separate occasions.
***
Petitioner‟s third claim . . . should fail because that claim is
vague and conclusory . . . Since Petitioner has not stated any
facts that support his claim that his attorney should have
called additional witnesses, he has not made the showing
required to avoid summary dismissal.
Coleman v. United States, D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-6330, dkt # 12, pgs. 4, 5 (D.N.J. Aug. 25,
2010).
Accordingly, the mandamus petition will be denied.
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