United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________
IGT,
Plaintiff-Cross Appellant,
v.
BALLY GAMING INTERNATIONAL, INC., BALLY
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
AND BALLY GAMING, INC. (DOING BUSINESS AS
BALLY TECHNOLOGIES),
Defendants-Appellants.
__________________________
2010-1364, -1365
__________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware in case no. 06-CV-0282, Judge Sue L.
Robinson.
___________________________
Decided: October 6, 2011
___________________________
DEANNE E. MAYNARD, Morrison & Foerster LLP, of
Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-cross appellant.
With her on the brief were ALEXANDER J. HADJIS, BRIAN
R. MATSUI and MARC A. HEARRON. Of counsel on the brief
was DAVID P. ENZMINGER, O’Melveny & Meyers, LLP, of
Los Angeles, California.
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 2
EDWARD J. DEFRANCO, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, of New York, New York, argued for defen-
dants-appellants. With him on the brief were ALEXANDER
RUDIS; and CHARLES K. VERHOEVEN, of Los Angeles,
California. Of counsel was JACK B. BLUMENFELD, Morris,
Nicols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, of Wilmington, Delaware.
__________________________
Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
Bally Gaming International, Inc., Bally Technologies,
Inc., and Bally Gaming, Inc. (Bally collectively) appeal the
district court’s grant of summary judgment of infringe-
ment of certain claims of U.S. reissue patent nos.
RE37,885 (’885 patent) and RE38,812 (’812 patent) owned
by IGT. IGT cross appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment of noninfringement of certain claims
of the two patents-in-suit. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The patents-in-suit share a common specification and
are reissues of U.S. patent nos. 5,752,882 and 5,836,817.
The specifications describe a networked system of gaming
machines shown in figure 1:
3 IGT v. BALLY GAMING
The patents describe a system for controlling networked
gaming devices 12-16 and 22-26. The gaming devices
shown here are a type “having a pull handle for initiating
a game, e.g., slot machines.” ’885 patent col.7 ll.17-18.
The gaming devices are connected to floor controllers 18
and 28. The floor controllers monitor the activity on the
gaming devices and may issue certain commands to
reconfigure the gaming devices. Id. col.7 ll.25-31. The
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 4
floor controllers interface with file servers 32-36. The file
servers store data and generate usage reports related to
the gaming devices.
Using this architecture, the patents-in-suit describe
and claim methods for rewarding players over and above
the normal device payouts. Id. col.3 ll.11-18. The floor
controller configures a gaming device to pay out extra
money if certain conditions are met. Id. col.6 ll.59-62.
For example, the gaming devices may be configured to
payout a bonus when a player bets a certain amount of
money. Id. col.3 ll.10-15. These bonuses and promotions
may be used to encourage players to use gaming devices
during typically slow periods such as late nights during
the week.
The ’885 patent claims at issue generally contain
three steps: 1) tracking activity of a group of gaming
devices, 2) issuing a command to the gaming devices
when a predetermined event occurs, and 3) paying in
accordance with that command. The ’812 patent claims at
issue generally contain four steps: 1) issuing an initial
command establishing the criteria to cause a bonus to be
paid upon the occurrence of a predetermined event, 2)
storing the command at a controller for a gaming device,
3) transmitting a pay command to the gaming device upon
the occurrence of the predetermined event, and 4) paying
at the gaming device responsive to the command. The
primary difference between the claims of the two patents
is the requirement in the ’812 patent claims to initially
send the command to the gaming device establishing the
criteria for a payout.
IGT accused Bally of infringing these claims when it
offers two promotions—Power Rewards and Power Win-
ners. The configuration for both promotions generally
includes a host computer that communicates with a
5 IGT v. BALLY GAMING
controller. The controller, in turn, manages a number of
gaming devices. Power Rewards incentivizes players by
rewarding them based on their game play at a particular
machine. It is commonly known as a “Play X, Get Y”
promotion. For example, it could be a play $100, get $10
promotion that rewards a player each time the player
reaches $100 in bets on a particular machine. Power
Rewards allows a casino operator to define the limits of
the promotion including the participating machines and
the times. When a player comes to the machine, the
player inserts an identification card. In response to the
card insertion, the host computer sends a “transaction
#151” to the controller associated with the gaming device.
Transaction #151 includes the “Play X, Get Y” amount
that applies. The controller monitors the play and, when
the Play X amount is reached, the controller causes the
gaming device to display a “Promo” key. The player
activates the Promo key to place money in an account.
More than one player may win a Power Reward during
the promotion.
The other accused promotion is Power Winners.
Rather than rewarding players for specific amounts spent,
Power Winners randomly selects a single player for a
bonus. Power Winners applies to a set of devices selected
by the casino operator. During the time period set aside
for promotion, the system periodically decides whether to
award a bonus. To decide whether to award a bonus, the
system splits the allotted time into 125 segments. At the
end of each segment, the system generates a random
number that determines if that time segment should
produce a winner (the exact mechanism for this is not
relevant to the appeal). If not, then the promotion con-
tinues. If there is to be a winner, the system then ran-
domly selects a winner from the qualified players playing
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 6
on the machines. Power Winners only has a single bonus
for each promotional time period.
The method of payout for Power Winners is important
to this appeal. There are two pay methods. In the first
method, ACSC, the system pays out using a transaction
#151 message. It is set to Play $0, Get Y. Thus, the
winner immediately can access the “Promo” key. In the
second method, SDS/CMP, the user is simply notified that
he or she has won the promotion and it is paid out
through the casino’s accounting system.
The district court construed a number of claim terms
and turned to the question of infringement on summary
judgment. The district court determined that, as a matter
of law, the Power Rewards promotion infringes claims 10,
33, and 46 of the ’885 patent and claims 21 and 44 of the
’812 patent. IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l Inc., 610 F. Supp.
2d 288, 305-06 (D. Del. 2009). Regarding the ’885 patent
claims, the district court determined that the transaction
#151 message is a “command” or “message” under the
claims. Id. at 301. As noted above, the ’812 patent claims
require that the system issue a command establishing the
criteria for a bonus and subsequently, the occurrence of a
predetermined event to pay the bonus. The district court
determined that the transaction #151 message is the
“command” and the “predetermined event” is the player’s
fulfillment of the “Play X” requirement. Id. at 303.
The district court determined that Power Winners in
its ACSC embodiment infringes claims 10 and 46 of the
’885 patent. Id. at 310. The court held that the prede-
termined event is the random selection that a given time
period should produce a winner. Id. at 308-09. The court
further held that the “command” is the transaction #151
message set to Play $0, Get Y that causes the gaming
device to pay out. Id. at 308. Finally, the court granted
7 IGT v. BALLY GAMING
summary judgment of noninfringement by the SDS/CMP
embodiment because the only possible “command” does
not cause payment, but merely notifies a winner. Id.
Bally appeals arguing that the district court erred in
a number of its claim constructions and in its grant of
summary judgment of infringement. IGT cross appeals
arguing that the district court erred in certain other claim
term constructions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment de novo. ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys. Inc., 558
F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is
appropriate when, drawing all justifiable inferences in the
nonmovant’s favor, there exists no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
I. Claim Construction
We review claim construction de novo. Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc). The words of a claim are generally given their
ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a
person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the con-
text of the specification and prosecution history. See
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc).
Independent claim 10 of the ’885 patent includes
many of the claim terms in dispute:
A method of operating gaming devices intercon-
nected by a host computer having a user-operated
input device comprising:
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 8
associating each gaming device with a unique ad-
dress code;
preselecting less than all of the gaming devices in-
terconnected by the host computer . . .;
using the network to track activity of the prese-
lected gaming devices;
issuing a command over the network to one of said
preselected gaming devices responsive to a prede-
termined event; and
paying at said one gaming device in accordance
with the command.
(emphases added). We address the disputed claim terms
in turn.
A. “one”
Claim 10 of the ’885 patent requires “issuing a com-
mand over the network to one of said preselected gaming
devices” and “paying at said one gaming device in accor-
dance with the command.” Bally argues that we should
construe “one” to require that the command be sent to one
and only one machine during a promotional period. It
argues that there can be only one command sent to only
one machine. Similarly it argues that payment can be
made at only one gaming device. Bally contends that
because Power Rewards pays at more than one gaming
device, it cannot be held to infringe. Bally argues that we
have held that the meaning of “one” is “one and only one”
citing WMS Gaming, Inc. v. International Game Tech-
nologies, 184 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Bally
argues that, like WMS Gaming, the claims here rely on
the “one” language for antecedent basis with the require-
ment of “paying at said one gaming device.” Bally argues
that this shows that the command (and thus any bonus)
9 IGT v. BALLY GAMING
must only be awarded to a single player at a single device.
Bally also points to the fact that other claims use the
terms “each” gaming device (claim 1 of the ’885 patent) or
“at least one” gaming device (claim 33 of the ’885 patent).
It argues that this shows that when IGT claimed “one”
gaming device in claim 10 of the ’885 patent, it meant one
and only one device could receive a payout.
Bally also argues that the three different types of
claims (“one,” “at least one,” and “each”) correspond to
types of promotions expressly disclosed in the specifica-
tion. For example, according to Bally, the disclosed
“mystery bonus” may occur after a specific number of
coins are played, and thus could be paid on “each” device.
Appellant’s Br. 27 (citing ’885 patent col.36 ll.42-44). It
argues that this shows that the applicants specifically
claimed different embodiments and intended the word
“one” to mean only one.
IGT contends that the claims do not limit the system
to pay out at a single one of the preselected devices. It
argues that the claims only require that a single com-
mand pay out at a single machine. In other words, as
long as one command goes to one machine and causes that
machine to pay out, that command meets the claim limi-
tation regardless of how many other commands are sent.
IGT also notes that Bally ignores claim 21 of the ’812
patent that states the command is sent to “only one”
gaming device. It argues that this shows that the appli-
cants knew how to claim a “one and only one” embodi-
ment and that the word “one” should not be so limiting.
Finally, IGT argues that the three examples from the
specification cited by Bally each pay out at one or more
gaming devices, so none of them support Bally’s conclu-
sion that this claim term must mean “one and only one.”
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 10
We agree with IGT. The meaning of the word “one” in
this claim is clear from the words that surround it—
“issuing a command over the network to one of said prese-
lected gaming devices” and “paying at said one gaming
device in accordance with the command.” Certainly the
use of “one” in this claim is limiting in that a command
will go to one of the preselected gaming devices. The
command will cause one device to pay. Hence “one”
modifies devices that will receive a particular command,
not the number of commands that might be issued. The
second use of “one” further supports this construction –
“one” gaming device will pay in accordance with the
command. These claim limitations are directed to a
command which will go to one device and cause that same
device to pay in response to a predetermined event. A
single command must be issued to a single gaming device.
The claim, however, does not limit the number of com-
mands that could be issued to discrete gaming devices.
Nothing in this limitation requires issuing only one
command to only one machine. Bally would have us
rewrite the claim to say “issuing only one command . . . to
only one of said preselected gaming devices.” We refuse to
adopt this strained construction.
In addition to the claim language, a number of the
promotions described in the preferred embodiments
involve multiple commands sent to different devices.
There is no justification for holding as Bally requests that
only one machine may receive a command and that only
one machine may pay a bonus during a promotional
period. The use of one in these claims clearly modifies the
number of machines responsive to a particular command,
but nothing in this claim prevents multiple commands to
be issued to multiple machines. Likewise the use of “one”
in the pay command modifies the number of devices that
will pay in accordance with the command, but does not
11 IGT v. BALLY GAMING
prevent the issuance of other pay commands to other
machines during the promotional period. WMS Gaming
does not demand a different result. In WMS Gaming, the
claim required “selecting one of said . . . numbers” clearly
limiting the number selected to one. 184 F.3d at 1350.
Here, the claim requires “issuing a command . . . to one of
said preselected gaming devices,” not issuing one com-
mand, which would more closely track the language in
WMS Gaming. We caution that claim language must be
construed in the context of the claim in which it appears.
Extracting a single word from a claim divorced from the
surrounding limitations can lead construction astray. 1
Claim language must be construed in the claim in which
it appears.
In light of this construction, the district court cor-
rectly granted summary judgment of infringement by
Bally’s Power Rewards. The fact that Power Rewards
pays a bonus at more than one gaming device does not
render it noninfringing.
B. “transmitting a pay command . . . upon the
occurrence of the predetermined event”
This claim term appears in claims 21 and 44 of the
’812 patent. The district court construed this term to
mean:
Transmitting an instruction related to payment
from the controller to the gaming device in re-
sponse or reply to the occurrence of one or more
conditions chosen in advance. A ‘pay command,’
1 We recognize that in a different district court
case, the court construed “one” as one and only one com-
mand. Mikohn Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc., No. CV-S-97-
1383-EJW (LRL) (D. Nev.). As counsel for both sides
acknowledged, such a construction was merely persuasive
authority and did not bind the district court in this case.
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 12
an instruction related to payment, need not cause
payment to be effected ‘automatically.’
J.A. 5-6. Bally argues that this term requires that the
predetermined event causes the payment and does not
cover a gaming device where a pay command is transmit-
ted following some intervening step associated with the
player. Bally argues that Power Rewards does not in-
fringe because when the predetermined event occurs (Play
X), the gaming device does not pay, it displays a Promo
key, which the user then presses in order to cause the
payment.
We agree with the district court that this claim term
simply means that the system must transmit a pay com-
mand when the predetermined event has occurred. The
limitation does not mandate a particular method of pay-
ment as Bally suggests. Nothing in the plain language of
the claims precludes an intervening step by the user to
accept payment. Thus, we hold that the district court did
not err in its claim construction. Again we see no error in
the district court’s summary judgment with regard to
Bally’s Power Rewards.
C. “predetermined event”
The district court construed this term to mean “the
occurrence of one or more conditions chosen in advance.”
J.A. 5. During summary judgment, the district court
explained that the predetermined event may be random
in its occurrence, as long as the condition itself is chosen
in advance.
Bally argues that the district court erred because the
“predetermined event” cannot be a random event. In-
stead, Bally claims that it must be something that will
occur either at a given time or after a known occurrence
(such as a number of slot lever pulls or an amount bet).
13 IGT v. BALLY GAMING
Bally argues that the event must be “determined in
advance of its occurrence.” It argues that the specification
only gives examples of predetermined events that are
non-random.
IGT responds that the district court correctly gave the
term its plain and ordinary meaning—a condition that
must be chosen in advance. It relies on the plain lan-
guage of the claim, “issuing a command over the net-
work . . . responsive to a predetermined event.” It argues
that this simply means the claim requires a system to
monitor network activity and, when a certain condition is
met, issue a command. It argues that it is irrelevant
whether this is a finite condition (such as the passing of
time), or a random condition. It also points to the specifi-
cation that expressly states that certain bonuses are paid
“when certain conditions are met.” Appellee’s Br. 44
(citing ’885 patent col.3 ll.13-15).
Again, the district court correctly construed this term.
The claims and the specification only require that some
condition be met in order for the system to issue the
claimed command. The district court properly held that
the predetermined event must be a condition chosen in
advance, but there is nothing in the claims or the specifi-
cation that requires the predetermined event to be finite
or non-random. If the condition determined in advance is
an entirely random occurrence, it is no less an event.
Bally is incorrect that this construction reads “predeter-
mined” out of the claim. If the “predetermined event” is
not “chosen in advance,” the claim limitation is not met.
Although the specification does include examples of non-
random conditions, this is not sufficient to redefine the
term predetermined event to have anything other than its
plain and ordinary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Bruns-
wick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding
that to act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 14
“clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term”
other than its plain and ordinary meaning). Thus, the
term “predetermined” retains its plain meaning. Because
the predetermined event can include random events (so
long as they are predetermined), the district court did not
err in concluding that summary judgment was appropri-
ate with regard to Power Winners. Transaction #151, the
command at issue in the Power Winners promotion, is
sent in response to a predetermined event (the random
selection of the winner). As a result, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment of infringement.
D. “predefined event”
Claims 33 and 46 of the ’885 patent use the term
“predefined” in place of “predetermined.” The district
court determined that the two terms have essentially the
same meaning, construing “predefined event” to mean “an
occurrence based on a criterion or criteria defined in
advance.” J.A. 4-5. Bally argues that the term “prede-
fined event” is insolubly ambiguous and that the claims
should be invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. It argues
this because, during prosecution, the applicants indicated
that “predefined” is broader than “predetermined.” J.A.
1179. It argues that if a predetermined event can be any
random event, then predefined event cannot possibly be
broader and thus, the claim term must be indefinite.
IGT responds that the term is amenable to construc-
tion based on the plain meaning. Further, IGT quotes
Bally’s expert who stated that the two terms (predeter-
mined and predefined) mean the same thing. Appellee’s
Br. 49 (citing J.A. 1289).
Indefiniteness is a question of law that we review de
novo. Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cable-
vision of Westchester, Inc., 336 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
15 IGT v. BALLY GAMING
2003). A claim is definite if “one skilled in the art would
understand the bounds of the claim when read in light of
the specification.” Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). A claim is
only indefinite if it is “not amenable to construction or [is]
insolubly ambiguous.” Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS
Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
We agree that the term “predefined” has a plain and
ordinary meaning and is not insolubly ambiguous. We
agree with the district court, the term “predefined” means
“defined in advance.”
It is true that, during prosecution, the applicants
stated that the term “predefined” has a broader scope
than “predetermined,” and that now IGT argues that
“predetermined” can be almost any event, random or
finite. This does not render “predefined” indefinite. First,
the plain language of the claim must control, and the
term “predefined” has a well-known definition. Second,
the applicant’s claim that predefined is even broader than
predetermined does not raise to the level of a disclaimer
nor does it have sufficient clarity to give the word prede-
fined a meaning other than its plain and ordinary mean-
ing. The patentee did not act as its own lexicographer
with regard to “predefined” to cause a departure from the
plain and ordinary meaning this term should be given.
As an alternative to its indefiniteness argument,
Bally argues that a “predefined event” cannot be random
for the same reasons as “predetermined event.” Appel-
lant’s Br. 48 n.5. For the same reasons stated above
regarding “predetermined event,” we hold that the district
court correctly construed this term.
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 16
E. “paying”
The final limitation of each asserted claim requires
“paying” at the gaming device in accordance with a com-
mand or message. The district court held that this pay-
ment “need not be effected ‘automatically’ or without any
withdrawal steps . . . .” J.A. 6.
Restating the arguments it made with regard to the
“transmitting a pay command . . . upon the occurrence of
the predetermined event” language, Bally argues that we
should construe this claim term to exclude any player
interaction in the process of accepting payment. For the
same reasons discussed in section I.B, we hold that the
district court was correct and that the term “paying”
encompasses making payment available for a player to
accept.
F. “command” or “message” – IGT Cross Appeal
The district court construed the term “command” to
mean:
A reconfiguration command. A reconfiguration
command is a command that rearranges the pre-
vious configuration of the gaming device so that
the gaming device pays out extra money it would
not have paid in its previous configuration.
J.A. 2. As the district court explained, “[t]here are virtu-
ally no commands described in the patents that are not
related to reconfiguration.” Id. Based on this construc-
tion, the district court determined that Power Winners in
its SDS/CMP embodiment does not meet this limitation
because it merely informs winners of their jackpot win-
nings; it does not cause the gaming device to pay out.
IGT, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
17 IGT v. BALLY GAMING
IGT argues that this construction improperly reads
limitations from the specification into the claims. It
contends that we should adopt the broader definition: “an
instruction communicated to or by a computer.” Accord-
ing to IGT, the district court imported the word “recon-
figuration” into a claim where the patentee did not
include it.
Bally argues that the district court’s construction of
command is correct and supported by the specification
and prosecution history, and that the district court was
correct that Power Winners SDS/CMP does not infringe.
Bally argues that the district court should have also held
that Power Winners ACSC did not infringe because its
command, transaction # 151, is not a reconfiguration
command.
This is not an instance of reading a limitation from
the specification into the claim, but rather of interpreting
the claim language. Claim 10, for example, states: “pay-
ing at said one gaming device in accordance with the
command.” This language is clear – the payment must
occur at the gaming device and be caused by the com-
mand. This does not preclude intervening steps, such as
customer acceptance. When the word command is viewed
in the limitations in which it appears it is clear that the
claimed command must issue responsive to a predeter-
mined event and must cause a payment at the gaming
device which would not otherwise have occurred. Only a
command which meets these express criteria is a com-
mand pursuant to this claim. This same analysis applies
to the term “message” as it appears in some claims. For
example, claim 33 of the ’885 patent requires sending a
message and “paying . . . in accordance with the message.”
Thus, as with “command,” the claims require that the
“message” causes the machine to pay out a bonus it would
not have paid in its previous configuration.
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 18
The specification strongly supports this construction.
For example, the only commands associated with pay-
ment in the 59 page ’885 patent are all reconfigure com-
mands. The abstract discusses only reconfiguration
commands; the summary of the invention discusses only
reconfiguration commands; the detailed description of the
invention and system overview discusses only reconfigu-
ration commands. The specification discusses how “each
promotion involves sending a reconfiguration command.”
’885 patent col. 20 ll.7-8 (emphasis added). It further
explains that “the preferred embodiment of the system
supports many different reconfiguration commands.” Id.
at col. 23 ll.24-25. Table 1 lists different examples of
reconfiguration commands which can be used and Table 2
lists reconfiguration data structures. In every example in
the specification, the command which is responsive to the
predetermined event reconfigures the system to pay. The
only command discussed anywhere in the specification in
conjunction with payment is a reconfiguration command.
We hold that the claim language “paying at said one
gaming device in accordance with the command” means
that the command causes an extra payment to the user at
the gaming device that the gaming device would not have
paid out. Though we have modified slightly the district
court’s construction, the modification has no impact on
the summary judgment determinations on appeal. In
light of our construction and the undisputed facts, the
district court’s grant of summary judgment of nonin-
fringement of claims 10, 33, and 46 of the ‘885 patent by
Power Winners SDS/CMP is affirmed. There are no facts
in dispute. The command, DM33, does not cause “paying
at said one gaming device.” As the district court ex-
plained, “there is no indication of record that DM33 does
anything other than inform a player of his bonus win-
nings.” DM33 notifies the player that it has won a bonus
19 IGT v. BALLY GAMING
and payment is later made by the casino’s accounting
system, not at the gaming device. Therefore the district
court is correct that a message that simply informs the
winning player that he has won is not a “command” or
“message” as required by the claims.
Bally argues that the district court erred in its grant
of summary judgment of infringement of Power Winners
ACSC which it argues does not have a command which
reconfigures the gaming device. Bally argues that the
transaction #151 message in the Power Winners promo-
tion does not reconfigure the gaming device, it simply tells
the gaming device to pay out a particular amount. Again
the facts are not in dispute. The transaction #151 mes-
sage in Power Winners is set to Play $0, Get Y so that the
machine immediately pays out the bonus to the winning
player.
The district court noted that “[i]n the context of Power
Winners, transaction #151 provides a jackpot that was not
available under the machine’s normal pay table.” J.A. 32.
There is no dispute that transaction #151 causes an extra
payment to the user at the gaming device that the gaming
device would not have paid out, therefore it is a command
in the context of the claims.
II. Infringement
The parties’ infringement arguments each depend en-
tirely on their respective claim constructions. There are
no factual issues on appeal. We affirm the grant of sum-
mary judgment of infringement of claims 10, 33, and 46 of
the ’885 patent and claims 21 and 44 of the ’812 patent by
the Power Rewards product and claims 10 and 46 of the
’885 patent by the Power Winners product in its ACSC
embodiment. We also affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment of noninfringement by Power Winners
in its SDS/CMP embodiment.
IGT v. BALLY GAMING 20
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.