FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 13, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
IRVING H. BLUMENTHAL, JR.,
individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated insured of New York
Life Insurance and Annuity
Corporation, No. 10-6246
(D.C. No. 5:08-CV-00456-F)
Plaintiff-Appellant, (W.D. Okla.)
v.
NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE
AND ANNUITY CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Irving H. Blumenthal, Jr. appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to New York Life Insurance and Annuity Corporation (NYLIAC) in this
suit concerning a universal life insurance policy that NYLIAC sold to
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Mr. Blumenthal in 1999. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
Background
NYLIAC issued to Mr. Blumenthal a universal life insurance policy dated
June 12, 1999, that provided a death benefit of $1,000,000. The policy had a
maturity date of June 12, 2032, and called for monthly premium payments of
$4,420.50. But $4,420.50 per month was not enough to keep the policy in force
through its maturity date. Without additional premium payments, the policy’s
cash value and death benefit would lapse at some point; exactly when depended
on the credited interest rate and costs. Mr. Blumenthal asserted that he did not
learn these critical facts until November 2006, when NYLIAC provided him with
an illustration showing that the policy’s cash value and death benefit would be
zero as early as year 13 or as late as year 17 of the policy. After receiving this
information, he cancelled the policy.
In April 2008, Mr. Blumenthal filed suit against NYLIAC for fraud and
misrepresentation, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and recission. The
district court granted NYLIAC’s motion for summary judgment on the ground
that each claim was barred by the applicable Oklahoma statutes of limitation. The
court concluded that certain written materials provided to Mr. Blumenthal in
connection with the issuance of the policy were sufficient to put him on notice of
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the basis of his claims in 1999, making his 2008 suit untimely. Mr. Blumenthal
appeals.
Analysis
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See
Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Wright v.
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 1991) (“We review a district
court’s ruling on the applicability of a statute of limitations de novo.”). “The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[I]f the statute of limitations depends on
disputed [material] facts, then summary judgment is inappropriate.” Wolf v.
Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1984).
Having considered the briefs and the record, we conclude that the district
court did not err in determining that Mr. Blumenthal should have been on notice
of the basis of his claims long before November 2006. It is undisputed that in
July 1999, Mr. Blumenthal was provided pages 5 and 6 of a certain policy
illustration. The information set forth in those pages would put a reasonable
person on notice that the anticipated premiums might be insufficient to maintain
the policy until its maturity date, and that the policy coverage could end as early
as year 6. Mr. Blumenthal admitted that he never would have bought the policy if
he had read this information when it was provided to him. Accordingly, for
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substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its Order filed on
September 27, 2010, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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