UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4244
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOKARI LEE BARNETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:09-cr-00244-CCB-2)
Submitted: October 4, 2011 Decided: October 13, 2011
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Richard W. Winelander, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Michael Clayton Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jokari Lee Barnett pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to possession with intent to distribute fifty grams
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2006). The district court sentenced Barnett to 120 months’
imprisonment. Barnett appeals.
On appeal, Barnett does not challenge his conviction;
the only issue he raises is the claim that the district court
erred in failing to sentence him in accordance with the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA). Both Barnett and the Government
have moved to remand the case for resentencing in accordance
with the FSA. Accordingly, we affirm Barnett’s conviction, but
vacate Barnett’s sentence and remand the case to the district
court to permit resentencing. By this disposition, however, we
indicate no view as to whether the FSA is retroactively
applicable to a defendant like Barnett whose offenses were
committed prior to August 3, 2010, the effective date of the
FSA, but who was sentenced after that date. We leave that
determination in the first instance to the district court. *
*
We note that at Barnett’s February 11, 2011 sentencing
hearing, the court declined to rule on defense counsel’s
argument for the retroactive application of the FSA. In light
of the Attorney General’s revised view on the retroactivity of
the FSA, as well as the development of case law on this point in
other jurisdictions, we think it appropriate, without indicating
(Continued)
2
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
any view as to the outcome, to accord the district court an
opportunity to consider the matter anew.
3