FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 18, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
No. 10-6102
v. (D.C. No. 5:09-CR-00283-M-1)
(W. D. Okla.)
TERRANCE LYNN MCGUIRE,
Defendant–Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Terrance Lynn McGuire pled guilty to kidnapping and transporting the victim in
interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). The district court sentenced
McGuire to a term of 500 months’ imprisonment, a sentence more than 14 years above
the range recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. McGuire appeals
his sentence, arguing that it is substantively unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction under
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, we affirm.
I
On January 18, 2007, M.M.G. was riding her bicycle near her home in Texhoma,
Oklahoma, collecting money for a charity. She was ten years old at the time. McGuire
approached the child and asked for directions. M.M.G. told McGuire that she was
unfamiliar with the area, but that her grandfather might know the location. McGuire
offered to contribute toward M.M.G.’s fundraising efforts if she showed him where her
grandfather lived. M.M.G. agreed and got into McGuire’s car.
McGuire drove M.M.G. to a rural area, threatened her with a knife, and sexually
assaulted her. McGuire then restrained the child and drove her to his home in Canyon,
Texas. He placed M.M.G. in the trunk of his car while he waited for his wife to leave for
work. Eventually, McGuire brought M.M.G. into the house and attempted to rape the
child again. Later, he put M.M.G. in a closet and sexually assaulted her for a third time.
Eighteen hours after he abducted M.M.G., McGuire released her in Clovis, New
Mexico. Authorities arrested McGuire more than two years later when his estranged
wife, to whom he had confessed kidnapping M.M.G., reported him to the FBI.
McGuire pled guilty to one count of kidnapping and transporting a minor across
state lines, a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment from twenty years to life.
McGuire’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) recommended three sentencing
enhancements: two levels because he used a knife, six levels because the kidnapping
involved sexual exploitation, and two levels because the victim was vulnerable by virtue
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of her young age. See U.S.S.G § 2A4.1(b)(3); § 2A4.1(b)(5); § 3A1.1. McGuire’s
offense level was decreased by three levels for accepting responsibility. See U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1(a); § 3E1.1(b). His final adjusted offense level corresponded to an advisory range
of 262 to 327 months.
The PSR also described the kidnapping and provided background information
about McGuire. It revealed that police had investigated McGuire for allegedly stalking
two ten-year-old girls in 2005. In addition, the PSR indicated that McGuire had on at
least three occasions sexually molested his fifteen-year-old sister-in-law while she slept.
McGuire did not object to the inclusion of these incidents in the report.
At a sentencing hearing, the district court heard testimony from M.M.G. and her
family describing how the kidnapping had disrupted their lives. More than two years
after the kidnapping, M.M.G. continued to struggle with severe mental health issues. She
had nightmares about being kidnapped again and was afraid to go outside after dark or be
alone with men, even her own father. She had been frequently absent from school, her
grades had dropped, and she had begun to struggle in social settings. M.M.G’s family
also suffered greatly: They had to relocate to a different town to avoid attention,
M.M.G.’s father had attempted suicide, her mother lost her job, and her siblings suffered
from anxiety and depression.
The sentencing court also considered testimony from McGuire, who expressed
remorse for his actions. In addition, the court received a flood of letters from McGuire’s
family and friends. These letters described McGuire as the proud father of two small
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children, a hard worker, a good athlete, and a devout Christian.
Based on detailed oral findings, the district court sentenced McGuire to 500
months’ imprisonment—more than 14 years above the advisory Guidelines range. On
appeal, McGuire challenges the substantive reasonableness of this sentence.
II
A
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 802 (10th Cir. 2008). We must affirm unless the
sentencing court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reasonable choice given the totality of
the circumstances and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v.
Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008). This level of deference is appropriate
because a district court has “an unquestionable institutional advantage over an appellate
court” in determining the length of sentence warranted by the facts of an individual case.
Id.
In the past, this court conducted a more rigorous substantive reasonableness
review when a district court imposed a sentence outside of the recommended Guidelines
range. We have since eschewed that approach. See Smart, 518 F.3d at 809 (rejecting,
pursuant to Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), excessive deference to the
Sentencing Commission’s “macro-level § 3553(a) determinations” at the expense of
deference to the “micro-level determinations reserved for the district courts”). Although
we continue to require a “more significant justification” for substantial departures from
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the Guidelines, see Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, we no longer use the “percentage of a departure
as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific
sentence.” Smart, 518 F.3d at 807. Nor do we require a district court to “provide
‘extraordinary’ facts to justify [a] statutorily permissible sentencing variance.” Id.
Even so, a sentencing judge’s discretion is not unbounded. District courts must
pay more than lip service to the sentencing factors. They must also adhere to the
substantive mandate of the sentencing statute by imposing a term of imprisonment that is
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to facilitate the statute’s goals. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). Such restraint ensures fairness to and between defendants, safeguards our
system’s legitimacy, and avoids imposing on taxpayers the costs of unnecessary
incarceration. Nevertheless, when a district court determines in a “reasoned and
reasonable” decision that a sentence is no greater than necessary, we cannot say that the
court abused its discretion. United States v. Muñoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1149 (10th
Cir. 2008).
B
At McGuire’s sentencing, the district court explained that it had “considered the
advisory guideline range” and “all of the factors” under § 3553(a) before determining that
500 months was appropriate punishment. The court then justified its decision to impose a
sentence outside of the Guidelines by highlighting several aspects of McGuire’s offense
conduct.
The court repeatedly noted the victim’s “innocence,” vulnerability, and young age.
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The court found that McGuire approached the victim “boldly, and with a deviant
purpose.” Describing the kidnapping as the “ride from hell,” the court also emphasized
McGuire’s cruel use of restraints during the kidnapping. The district court also discussed
in detail McGuire’s multiple sexual assaults against M.M.G., and focused on the physical
injuries McGuire caused. Finally, the court found that the victim’s life was “forever
changed because of the bold and deviant conduct” of McGuire. It explained that
[t]he impact of this Defendant’s bold and deviant conduct can never be
measured. The impact of that conduct on this ten year old, now 13, can
never be fully corrected, measured or determined. The impact on her
family, even [the family] of the Defendant, everyone is impacted, to some
immeasurable extent because of this very bold and deviant conduct, which
was merely for sexual gratification.
Considering the “totality” of these circumstances, the court concluded that a 500
month sentence met the objectives set forth by Congress in § 3553(a). Such a sentence
was necessary to “reflect the seriousness of th[e] offense,” to “promote[] respect for the
law and provide[] just punishment for the offense,” and to “provide the Defendant time to
avail himself of . . . correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (D). The court especially emphasized that the 500 month sentence
would “protect[] the public from any further crimes” committed by McGuire. See §
3553(a)(2)(C). “There never needs to be another little girl that receives a ride from hell .
. . because of the desire for sexual gratification of this defendant,” the court stated.
Finally, the court noted that the upward variance would avoid “sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records, who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”
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See § 3553(a)(6).
III
McGuire contends that the district court placed undue emphasis on two factors
already incorporated into the Guidelines recommendation: the defendant’s sexual
exploitation of M.M.G. and her young age. Our case law contemplates, however, that the
Sentencing Commission’s generalized calculation and a district court’s individualized
assessment will “overlap.” Smart, 518 F.3d at 809. District courts may “contextually
evaluate each § 3553(a) factor, including those factors the relevant guideline(s) already
purport to take into account, even if the facts of the case are less than extraordinary.”
Smart, 518 F.3d at 808.
District courts’ individualized assessments are necessary because the Guidelines
adjustments merely approximate offense characteristics. The enhancement McGuire
received for sexual exploitation of the victim, for example, covers a range of conduct. It
does not distinguish a kidnapper who sexually assaults his victim once, from one—like
McGuire—who does so three times. U.S.S.G § 2A4.1(5). Moreover, the Guidelines do
not address the interaction between conduct that result in adjustments. In this case, the
district court was especially concerned with the particularly heinous interplay of the
“sexual exploitation” and “vulnerability” factors—that McGuire sought sexual
gratification from a child. Given the immeasurable harmful effects that sexual abuse has
on prepubescent children, we cannot say that this concern was unreasonable. See
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2677-78 (2008) (Alito, J. dissenting) (“Long term
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studies show that sexual abuse is grossly intrusive in the lives of children and is harmful
to their normal psychological, emotional, and sexual development in ways no just or
humane society can tolerate.”).
McGuire next takes issue with the district court’s statement that a 500 month
sentence would avoid sentencing disparities among defendants found guilty of similar
conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). McGuire’s concern is twofold: First, he argues
that the institutional edge a district judge normally possesses for identifying likely
disparities was reduced in this case, because federal judges typically see very few
kidnapping cases. Second, McGuire contends that because his offense conduct is typical
of kidnappings and because courts rarely vary upwards when sentencing kidnappers, the
district court’s imposition of an above-guideline sentence actually exacerbated sentencing
disparities.
The statistics McGuire offers, however, fail to bear out the latter conclusion. To
demonstrate that his kidnapping offense conduct was typical, McGuire points to a study
showing that in subset of 115 “stereotypical” child kidnappings, 49 percent involved
sexual assault and 43 percent involved children 11 or younger. David Finkelhor et al.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nonfamily Abducted Children: National Estimates and
Characteristics 7, 10 (2002). 1 These statistics do not reveal, however, the percentage of
all kidnappings that involve sexual assault of prepubescent children or even how
1
Available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/196467.pdf.
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frequently kidnappings of children under age eleven involve sexual assault.2 We cannot,
therefore, determine from these statistics whether McGuire’s offense conduct was typical.
Nor do McGuire’s data show that district courts usually impose sentences within or
below the Guideline range for conduct similar to McGuire’s. See U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, tbl. 28. Although the official data
show that courts tend to vary upward from the Guidelines in only a few kidnapping cases
per year, see id., these numbers do not shed light on the particular facts driving those
sentencing decisions. Thus, McGuire has not shown whether he more closely resembles
defendants receiving upwardly variant sentences or those receiving within- or below-
guideline sentences.
It may well be that the sentencing court had less basis for comparison in
McGuire’s case than in many federal cases. We are disinclined, however, to start down a
path that requires us to recalibrate our review depending on the sentencing court’s
familiarity with each particular offense. To do so is unnecessary here, moreover, because
the district court appears to have relied on other sentencing factors more strongly than
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), particularly the seriousness of the offense and protection of the
public. See § 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C). The district court’s decision to weigh some of
the sentencing factors more than others, of course, merits our deference. See Smart, 518
2
Moreover, McGuire’s crime does not qualify as a “stereotypical kidnapping”
under the study’s rubric. See Finkelhor, supra, at 2 (listing as a “stereotypical
kidnapping” characteristic that the child is “held for ransom or abducted with intent to
keep the child permanently, or killed”).
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F.3d at 808.
Finally, McGuire argues that the district court failed to give adequate weight to
evidence that he is more redeemable than the usual kidnapping defendant. As an initial
matter, we are not convinced that this mitigating evidence reflects as favorably on
McGuire’s prospects for rehabilitation as he assumes. While McGuire received a large
number of letters attesting to his “moral fortitude,” the epistlers appear to have held
McGuire in similarly high esteem before and during the time he kidnapped and sexually
abused M.M.G. Far from reassuring us that McGuire has reformed following criminal
conduct, these letters suggest that McGuire led a double life. That said, some mitigating
evidence points more firmly in McGuire’s favor, such as his expressed remorse, his
confession to his wife, and that he released M.M.G. within 24 hours. Were we in the
position of the sentencing court, those factors might have inclined us to find a lower
sentence adequate to meet the goals of § 3553(a).
We do not, however, find ourselves in the position of the sentencing court. A
sentencing judge “sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations, has full
knowledge of the facts, and gains insights not conveyed by the record.” Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. Accordingly, that we might “reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal.” Id. Given the egregiousness of McGuire’s
conduct, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a 500
month sentence.
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IV
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM. The Appellee’s motion to seal its
response brief is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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