Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GARY SMALLWOOD, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., and
SIRVA, INC., Delaware companies,
DBA Allied International, No. 09-56714
Defendants-Appellants,
D.C. No.
and  3:08-cv-02196-
ALLIED PICKFORDS, LLC (ABU BTM-WVG
DHABI), a UAE limited liability OPINION
company, DBA Allied
International; ATLAS TRANSFER &
STORAGE CO., a California
company, DBA Allied
International,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
February 9, 2011—Pasadena, California

Filed October 18, 2011

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Michael Daly Hawkins
and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

19073
19076 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES

COUNSEL

Andrew G. Wagner and Michael A. Hession (argued), Clyde
& Co US LLP, San Francisco, California, for the defendants-
appellants.

Haig V. Kalbian, Michelle D. Douglas (argued) and Damira
Kamchibekova, Kalbian & Hagerty, LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Gary Smallwood contracted with Allied Van Lines, Inc.
and SIRVA, Inc. (collectively, AVL) to move some of his
household goods from southern California to the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) and to move the remainder of the goods —
including a box full of firearms and ammunition — to storage.
Instead, AVL shipped his weapons to the UAE. When UAE
officials discovered Smallwood’s weapons, they arrested him,
imprisoned him for 11 days and tricked him into pleading
 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES 19077
guilty to smuggling firearms. Smallwood alleges that he is
facing deportation from the UAE and sues AVL based on var-
ious tort and contract theories. We must decide whether AVL
may compel Smallwood to arbitrate pursuant to a foreign
arbitration clause in their shipment contract. We hold that the
contract’s foreign arbitration clause is unenforceable.

The district court denied AVL’s motion to compel arbitra-
tion, concluding that the shipment was governed by the Car-
mack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, and that the statute
precludes enforcement of foreign arbitration clauses.1 AVL
argues that the district court misinterpreted Carmack and cre-
ated an unnecessary conflict with federal arbitration law,
which, according to AVL, requires enforcement of the arbitra-
tion clause regardless of the Carmack Amendment. We affirm
because the district court correctly interpreted Carmack to
preclude foreign arbitration clauses; and Carmack, having
been enacted subsequent to the federal arbitration statutes,
controls this case.

I. Background

Because this case is still at the pleading stage, we assume
the facts alleged in the complaint to be true. Smallwood is a
U.S. citizen who resided in San Diego, California until Sep-
tember 2007, when he accepted a job in Abu Dhabi, UAE.
Smallwood contracted with a UAE company, Allied Pick-
fords, to ship some of his belongings to the UAE and to store
the remainder in California. Allied Pickfords engaged three
affiliates incorporated in the United States — Atlas Transfer
& Storage Co. (Atlas), Allied Van Lines and SIRVA — col-
1
Carmack has been codified at several different sections of Title 49
since its enactment. Originally codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20(11), Carmack
was recodified in 1978 at 49 U.S.C. § 11707 and then recodified again in
1996 at 49 U.S.C. §§ 11706, 14706. The current version of Carmack
applicable to motor carriers, including the defendants-appellants in the
present case, is 49 U.S.C. § 14706.
19078 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES
lectively referred to in the complaint as “Allied International”
— to assist with the move and storage. In September 2007, an
Allied International representative met Smallwood at his
home in San Diego, took note of which goods were destined
for shipment to the UAE and which for storage in California
and then packed up Smallwood’s belongings. The goods were
boxed separately but loaded onto one truck. Shortly thereafter,
Smallwood moved to the UAE.

Smallwood did not receive a bill of lading when Allied
International received his goods in September 2007. Instead,
he received two forms — one entitled “Local Household
Goods Descriptive Inventory” that listed the goods destined
for storage and one entitled “Descriptive Inventory” that listed
the goods destined for the UAE. After Smallwood moved to
the UAE, he received a document on Allied Pickfords’ letter-
head entitled “Acceptance of Quotation.” The document is a
contract, but does not style itself as a through bill of lading.
Importantly, the Acceptance of Quotation includes an arbitra-
tion clause:

Any disputes in relation to the conclusion, imple-
mentation, interpretation, cancellation, dissolution or
invalidity of the contract or stemming therefrom or
connected thereto in any form shall be referred to
arbitration in accordance with the Dubai Chamber of
Commerce and Industry Commercial Conciliation
and Arbitration Regulation.

The Acceptance of Quotation was the last written agreement
between the parties before Allied International allegedly
shipped some of the storage goods, including the box of fire-
arms, to the UAE. When UAE officials discovered Small-
wood’s firearms, an Allied International employee asked
Smallwood to come to the port in Abu Dhabi to “straighten
things out.” UAE police arrested Smallwood when he arrived
at the port. He was later interrogated, imprisoned and con-
 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES 19079
victed of gun smuggling. Smallwood is currently in deporta-
tion proceedings.

Based on the mistaken shipment of his firearms, Small-
wood filed suit in California state court, alleging six causes of
action: (1) negligence and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3)
defamation, (4) breach of fiduciary duty, (5) fraudulent deceit
and (6) breach of contract. He named as defendants Allied
Van Lines, SIRVA, Allied Pickfords and Atlas. The defen-
dants removed the case to federal court on the theory that the
Carmack Amendment preempted Smallwood’s state-law
claims.

Once in federal court, AVL moved to dismiss Smallwood’s
state law claims as preempted by the Carmack Amendment.
The district court agreed in part, dismissing counts 1, 2 and
4, but granting Smallwood leave to amend his complaint to
reinstate these claims under Carmack. The court concluded
that the contract claim was preempted only insofar as it
related to the agreement to ship his goods to the UAE, not to
the extent it related to the agreement to store goods in Califor-
nia. The court found his remaining claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, defamation and fraudulent
deceit not preempted.

AVL also moved to compel arbitration. The district court
concluded that “the arbitration clause included in the bill of
lading is unenforceable” with respect to Smallwood’s Car-
mack claims.2 AVL appeals that decision. We must decide the
extent to which Smallwood can be compelled to arbitrate his
claims in light of the district court’s preemption ruling. We
have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) to review the
district court’s order refusing to compel arbitration and juris-
2
The district court explicitly clarified that it was not deciding whether
the arbitration clause could be enforced with regard to non-Carmack
claims.
19080 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to review the meaning of the
Carmack Amendment.3

II. Jurisdiction

[1] Before reviewing AVL’s motion to compel arbitration,
we address whether the district court had subject matter juris-
diction. Generally, “[t]he presence or absence of federal-
question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded com-
plaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists
only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Additionally, “[u]nder
the ‘artful pleading’ doctrine, a well-pleaded state law claim
presents a federal question when a federal statute has com-
pletely preempted that particular area of law.” Hall v. N. Am.
Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). Here, the district court had subject matter jurisdic-
tion if at least one of Smallwood’s claims was completely pre-
empted by the Carmack Amendment. See id. at 687-88.4

[2] Smallwood argues that none of his claims is preempted
by the Carmack Amendment because all involve only a con-
tract for intrastate storage. We disagree. “It is well settled that
the Carmack Amendment is the exclusive cause of action for
interstate-shipping contract claims alleging loss or damage to
property” and thus completely preempts such claims. Id. at
688. Smallwood’s breach of contract claim alleges that “Al-
lied International breached the contract by failing to detect
that shipment of the Weapons . . . was in violation of U.S.,
international and UAE law.” This breach plainly arises from
an interstate shipping contract, making Carmack the exclusive
3
The partial grant of AVL’s motion to dismiss the complaint was not a
final order and is thus not before us on appeal. See California v. Harvier,
700 F.2d 1217, 1218 (9th Cir. 1983).
4
The parties are not diverse, so the district court needed federal question
jurisdiction for removal to be proper.
 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES 19081
cause of action. Because at least one of Smallwood’s claims
was preempted by the Carmack Amendment, the district court
had subject matter jurisdiction.5

We review de novo both the denial of a motion to compel
arbitration, see Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 360
F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004), and the meaning and appli-
cation of the Carmack Amendment, see Regal-Beloit Corp. v.
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 557 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir.
2009), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2433.

III. Discussion

AVL argues that the district court erred for either of two
reasons: (1) the Carmack Amendment permits foreign arbitra-
tion clauses; or (2) the Federal Arbitration Act requires
enforcement of the arbitration clause even if it conflicts with
the Carmack Amendment. We reject both arguments.
5
Carmack plainly governs this shipment. “Carmack applies only to
transport of property for which Carmack requires a receiving carrier to
issue a bill of lading, regardless of whether that carrier erroneously fail[ed]
to issue such a bill.” Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp.,
130 S. Ct. 2433, 2444 (2010); see also 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1) (“Failure
to issue a receipt or bill of lading does not affect the liability of a carri-
er.”). A bill of lading is required if two conditions are met. First, the motor
carrier must “provid[e] transportation or service subject to jurisdiction” of
the Surface Transportation Board (STB). 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). Sec-
ond, that carrier must “receiv[e]” the property “for transportation under
this part,” where “this part” is the STB’s jurisdiction over domestic motor
transport. Id.; see also Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2443 (describing the same
two-step process for rail carriers under 49 U.S.C. § 11706). The STB’s
jurisdiction extends to carriage that occurs “between a place in the United
States and a place in a foreign country.” § 13501(1)(E); see id.
§ 10501(a)(2)(F). Here, Smallwood concedes that he contracted with
Allied International for interstate shipment, and it is undisputed that Atlas
received Smallwood’s property in California destined for the UAE. Atlas
thus received the property and provided for service subject to the STB’s
jurisdiction. As a result, Atlas was required to issue a Carmack compliant
bill of lading, and the shipment is covered by Carmack.
19082 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES
A. The Carmack Amendment

[3] The Carmack Amendment governs the terms of inter-
state shipment by domestic rail and motor carriers. See Regal-
Beloit, 557 F.3d at 990.6 Carmack was enacted in 1906 as an
amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. See id. It has
since been amended repeatedly, but its purpose has always
been “to relieve cargo owners ‘of the burden of searching out
a particular negligent carrier from among the often numerous
carriers handling an interstate shipment of goods.’ ” Kawa-
saki, 130 S. Ct. at 2441 (quoting Reider v. Thompson, 339
U.S. 113, 119 (1950)). Part of the relief guaranteed to ship-
pers was “the right of the shipper to sue the carrier in a conve-
nient forum of the shipper’s choice.” Aaacon Auto Transp.,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 648, 654 (2d
Cir. 1976).

When interpreting Carmack:

Our analysis begins, as it must, with the text of the
statute in question. Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d
1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the “plain mean-
ing” rule, “[w]here the language [of a statute] is
plain and admits of no more than one meaning the
duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules
which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discus-
sion.” Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.,
270 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(1917)).

Campbell v. Allied Van Lines Inc., 410 F.3d 618, 620-21 (9th
Cir. 2005) (alteration in original).
6
Smallwood’s goods were received by a motor carrier, so we focus on
those provisions of Carmack.
 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES 19083
[4] Carmack’s statutory scheme is clearly intended to pro-
tect shippers from being forced to submit to foreign arbitra-
tion as a condition of contracting with a carrier of household
goods. To begin with, Carmack expressly prohibits carriers of
household goods from contracting around the statute’s
requirements. See 49 U.S.C. § 14101(b)(1) (“A carrier provid-
ing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under
chapter 135 may enter into a contract with a shipper, other
than for the movement of household goods described in sec-
tion 13102(10)(A), to provide specified services under speci-
fied rates and conditions.”). It is undisputed that AVL is a
carrier of household goods and therefore prohibited from con-
tracting around Carmack’s conditions.

[5] One of these inalienable requirements is that the ship-
per be permitted to sue in certain venues when a dispute
arises. Carmack provides that, when suing the delivering car-
rier, “[a] civil action . . . may be brought . . . in a district court
of the United States . . . in a judicial district . . . through which
the defendant carrier operates.” 49 U.S.C. § 14706(d)(1). Or,
when suing the carrier alleged to have caused the damage,
“[a] civil action . . . may be brought . . . in the judicial district
in which such loss or damage is alleged to have occurred.” Id.
§ 14706(d)(2). These provisions assure the shipper a choice of
forums as plaintiff. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air
Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (“‘Statutory
construction must begin with the language employed by Con-
gress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’ ”)
(quoting Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).7
7
The parallel section of Carmack governing rail carriers, § 11706, states
that shippers’ suits against rail carriers “may only be brought” in enumer-
ated venues. 49 U.S.C. § 11706(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Interpreting
§ 11706, we previously held that “forum selection clauses are generally
forbidden under Carmack” because the statute “narrowly limits the venues
in which a claim against carriers under the Board’s jurisdiction may be
19084 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES
The requirement that the shipper not be forced to select a
forum at the time of contracting is confirmed by Carmack’s
own arbitration provision. Section 14708 mandates that motor
carriers offer arbitration to shippers of household goods
shipped collect-on-delivery. 49 U.S.C. §§ 14708(a), (f). Such
arbitration, however, is permissible only when the shipper
agrees to arbitrate after the dispute arises. See id.
§ 14708(b)(6) (“The carrier must not require the shipper to
agree to utilize arbitration prior to the time that a dispute
arises.”). Moreover, if a shipper elects to arbitrate, an oral pre-
sentation of the dispute may be required only if “all parties to
the dispute expressly agree to such presentation,” id.
§ 14708(b)(7), so the shipper cannot be required to appear in
an inconvenient forum even if he chooses arbitration.

[6] These provisions operate together to protect the shipper
from being forced to arbitrate his claims as a condition to con-
tracting with a household carrier. Thus, under the plain mean-
ing of the statute, after a dispute arises the shipper may either
accept a carrier’s offer to arbitrate or decline arbitration and
sue in one of Carmack’s enumerated venues. At the time of
contracting, however, a carrier of household goods may not
force the shipper to relinquish his right to sue in one of those
venues.

[7] AVL’s foreign arbitration clause would allow AVL to
compel Smallwood to arbitrate, probably in the UAE. We

brought.” Regal-Beloit Corp., 557 F.3d at 991. The Supreme Court
reversed Regal-Beloit on other grounds, see Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. 2433,
but indicated in dicta that our holding on forum selection clauses was cor-
rect: “[I]t can be assumed that if Carmack’s terms apply to the bills of lad-
ing here, the cargo owners would have a substantial argument that the
Tokyo forum-selection clause in the bills is pre-empted by Carmack’s
venue provisions,” id. at 2441-42. AVL argues that § 14706 by contrast
does not constrain shippers’ choice of venue because it lacks the modifier
“only.” We are not persuaded. Section 14706 states plainly that shippers
may sue particular carriers in particular venues. We need not decide
whether the permissive language in § 14706 leads to broader venue
options than the “may only” language in § 11706.
 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES 19085
have held that “foreign arbitration clauses are but a subset of
foreign forum selection clauses in general.” See Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co. v. M.V. DSR Atl., 131 F.3d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir.
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties’ foreign
arbitration clause plainly contravenes Carmack’s directive
that Smallwood have recourse in the enumerated venues
unless he agrees to arbitrate elsewhere after the dispute arises.

AVL raises a final argument based on analogy to the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 30701.
COGSA is a regulatory regime for ocean carriage akin to the
Carmack regime for motor and rail carriage. The Supreme
Court has held that COGSA permits foreign forum selection
clauses, see Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995), and we have extended that
rule to foreign arbitration clauses, see Fireman’s Fund, 131
F.3d at 1339. Sky Reefer and COGSA, however, are inappo-
site here. Whereas Carmack explicitly guarantees shippers
certain venues to seek recourse against their carriers, COGSA
only generally prohibits ocean carriers from using contracts
“relieving [their] liability for loss or damage to or in connec-
tion with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure
in the duties and obligations provided in this section, or less-
ening such liability.” COGSA § 3(8), 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note
(quoted by Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 534). Sky Reefer inter-
preted COGSA’s prohibition on contracts lessening liability
to apply only to the liability explicitly articulated in COGSA
and not to extend to procedural issues affecting the shipper’s
ease of recovery. See 515 U.S. at 534-35 (emphasizing the
phrase “duties and obligations provided in this section”).
Because Carmack expressly prohibits carriers of household
goods from contracting around its venue provisions, and
because Smallwood does not rely on a general prohibition on
lessening carriers’ liability, Sky Reefer and its interpretation
of COGSA § 3(8) are inapposite to our interpretation of Car-
mack.8
8
For the same reason, our holding is not affected by the language in Sky
Reefer regarding the role of recourse to a domestic forum to challenge for-
19086 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES
[8] For the foregoing reasons we agree with the district
court’s interpretation of § 14706. Foreign arbitration clauses,
except as provided in § 14708, are unenforceable under Car-
mack because they necessarily involve limiting shippers’
choice of venues enumerated in the statute.

B. Federal Arbitration Law

[9] AVL argues that our interpretation of Carmack con-
flicts with federal arbitration law. We have previously
explained:

Federal arbitration law is codified in the three chap-
ters of Title 9 of the United States Code. The Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), enacted in 1947, comprises
the first chapter. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14. The “Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards,” implementing the treaty of
the same name, was enacted in 1970. This statute,

eign arbitration awards that are “repugnant to the public policy of the
United States.” Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 540. Whereas COGSA creates no
right for shippers to choose their venue, Carmack does; thus Carmack
requires more than that shippers can simply avail themselves of domestic
jurisdiction to challenge foreign arbitration awards.
Sky Reefer does, however, arguably undermine two cases relied on by
the district court. See Aluminum Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Aaacon Auto
Transp., Inc., 549 F.2d 1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1977); Aaacon Auto Transp.,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 648, 653 (2d Cir. 1976).
The Aaacon cases reasoned that Carmack prohibits forum selection
clauses because such clauses are a form of “lessening” carriers’ liability,
which Carmack generally prohibits. That reasoning is similar to the inter-
pretation of COGSA’s prohibition on lessening carriers’ liability that Sky
Reefer rejected. See 515 U.S. at 534 (abrogating Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en banc)). We need not determine
the continuing validity of the Aaacon cases because they considered an
older version of Carmack and did not confront the current language in
§ 14706 that we rely on. See Aaacon, 537 F.2d 648, 653 (citing Interstate
Commerce Act § 20(11) (formerly codified at 49 U.S.C. § 319 (1906))).
 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES 19087
commonly called the Convention Act, comprises the
second chapter. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. The third
chapter, implementing the Inter American Conven-
tion on International Commercial Arbitration, is not
relevant to this case. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307.

Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1152-
53 (9th Cir. 2008). AVL cites both the FAA and the Conven-
tion Act. The Convention Act was “intended to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agree-
ments in international contracts.” Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 538
(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[i]t is well-settled
that ‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.’ ”
Balen v. Holland Am. Line Inc., 583 F.3d 647, 652 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Con-
str. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). That preference, however,
applies only if “there is no independent basis in law or equity
for revocation.” Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 538-39 (citing Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)). “Like
any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act’s mandate may be
overridden by a contrary congressional command.” Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
“The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” Id. at 227.

[10] When Congress intends to create an exception to the
FAA, “such an intent ‘will be deducible from [the statute’s]
text or legislative history,’ or from an inherent conflict
between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.” Id.
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)) (alteration in origi-
nal and citations omitted). As we have explained, the plain
text of Carmack prohibits household carriers from forcing a
shipper to agree to arbitrate his claims as a condition to con-
tracting. Thus, there is “a contrary congressional command”
19088 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES
that overrides the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agree-
ments.

AVL argues that the FAA’s mandate in favor of arbitration
implicitly repealed Carmack because the FAA was more
recently enacted. See In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 581
(9th Cir. 1991) (“[W]here provisions in the two acts are in
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the con-
flict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.”) (empha-
sis omitted) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426
U.S. 148, 154 (1976)). We reject AVL’s argument because
the relevant provisions of Carmack were enacted after the
FAA and the Convention Act.

The Federal Arbitration Act was codified in 1925, see 43
Stat. 883, and enacted in 1947, see 61 Stat. 669. The Conven-
tion Act was enacted in 1970. See 84 Stat. 692. Since 1970,
the Carmack Amendment has been reenacted twice and mate-
rially amended. Carmack was first enacted as 49 U.S.C.
§ 20(11) in 1906, then reenacted as 49 U.S.C. § 11707 in 1978,9
amended by the Staggers Rail Act of 198010 and finally reen-
acted and recodified as sections 11706 and 14706 in 1995.11
Although Carmack as a whole is older than the FAA, the rele-
vant language in Carmack was enacted more recently than the
FAA. Thus, we infer that Congress intended Carmack to be
a minor exception to the FAA. Cf. United States v. Novak,
476 F.3d 1041, 1052 n.10 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting in dicta that
there is “no repeal-by-implication problem when a later stat-
ute simply addresses one particular application [of the former
statute] and carves out an exception” (alteration in original
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
9
An Act to revise, codify, and enact without substantive change the
Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (1978).
10
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, § 211(c), 94 Stat. 1895
(1980) (creating the distinction between venue options for rail and motor
shippers).
11
ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803
(1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
 SMALLWOOD v. ALLIED VAN LINES 19089
Conclusion

[11] The parties’ arbitration clause is unenforceable under
49 U.S.C. § 14706 because it contravenes a shipper’s right to
select his forum after the dispute arises, and thus violates the
plain language of the Carmack Amendment.

AFFIRMED.