NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 11-1048
______________
BRUCE SCOTT,
Appellant
v.
ALLIED WASTE SERVICES OF BUCKS-MONT
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-10-cv-00105)
Honorable Berle M. Schiller, District Judge
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 6, 2011
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, and FUENTES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 19, 2011)
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before this Court on appeal from a final order entered in
favor of Allied Services of Bucks-Mont on December 23, 2010, in this multi-claim
employment discrimination action that plaintiff-appellant Bruce Scott brought against
Allied Services following its termination of Scott’s employment. Scott brought this
action invoking both federal and Pennsylvania state law, the federal claims seeking relief
under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act and the
state claims seeking relief under the parallel provisions of the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act. Allied Services employed Scott prior to his termination as a helper in
picking up trash from residential customers and in cleaning Allied Services’ yard.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), 28 U.S.C. §
1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. On this
appeal we exercise de novo review of the District Court’s judgment and opinion. See
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2004). Consequently, we can affirm the
summary judgment only if there is no dispute as to any material fact and Allied Services
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The District Court set forth the background of this matter in its comprehensive
opinion and therefore we have no need to repeat what it said. Scott attributes the adverse
employment actions of which he complains to discrimination against him attributable to
Allied Services’ and its employees’ view of him on account of his mental state and his
need to care for his son who suffered from hemophilia.
In reviewing Scott’s federal claims we employ the burden shifting framework that
the Supreme Court adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817 (1973), for employment discrimination cases and that the courts later have
followed in other contexts. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff initially must establish
2
that he can demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff cannot make
that showing he loses his case. If he can make that showing the defendant has the burden
to produce evidence that it engaged in the adverse employment action of which the
plaintiff complains for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. If the defendant satisfies
the burden of producing that evidence but the jury nevertheless finds that the defendant
discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of an unlawful ground under a
discrimination law, it can return a verdict for the plaintiff. See St. Mary’s Honor Center,
509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749-50 (1993). In applying the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act we use the same burden-shifting process. See Rinehimer v.
Cemcolift Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2002).
Though not definitively so holding, the District Court decided the case on the
assumption that Scott satisfied his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. The Court, however, found that considering the undisputed material facts
Scott did not demonstrate that Allied Services’ facially legitimate explanations for its
adverse employment actions were pretextual. After our review of this matter we agree
with the Court but add two things. First, Allied Services, which we note had employed
Scott for five years, took considerable steps during his employment to accommodate
Scott’s problems. Second, though Scott complains of what he regards was Allied
Services’ requirement that he submit to an unjustified “illegal medical examination,”
considering the information that had come to Allied Services’ attention prior to it
requiring the examination it almost was compelled to take some steps to ensure Scott’s
3
and its other employees’ safety. In fact, in our experience we sometimes see cases in
which plaintiffs seek to impose liability on a defendant when in situations like that Allied
Services confronted here they have not taken appropriate protective steps that may
include requiring that medical examinations be made. We recognize that Scott considers
that it was wrongful for Allied Services to require that he submit to an examination based
on the hearsay information that Allied Services had regarding him. We, however, reject
his argument for in conducting its affairs an employer need not follow the procedure used
in court proceedings and thus it is free to act on the basis of what it regards as sufficient
information even if it is hearsay. We reiterate that on the basis of the information it had
with respect to Scott’s mental state Allied Services would have been remiss if it had not
required the medical examination.
The Order of December 23, 2010, will be affirmed.
4