UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4643
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEROME SAUNDERS, II,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:08-cr-00049-1)
Submitted: October 14, 2011 Decided: October 20, 2011
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, David R. Bungard,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney,
William B. King II, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jerome Saunders II appeals the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to the
statutory maximum of twenty-four months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Saunders argues that the district court imposed a
plainly unreasonable sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
In examining a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release, this court “takes a more ‘deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion’ than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines
sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439
(4th Cir. 2006)). A sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release should be affirmed if it is within the
statutory maximum and not plainly unreasonable. * Crudup, 461
F.3d at 437. In reviewing a revocation sentence, we first
consider “whether the sentence is unreasonable,” following the
same general principles we apply to our review of original
sentences. Id. at 438. Only if we find that a sentence is
*
To the extent Saunders asks this court to revisit the
standard of review established in Crudup, we decline to do so.
See United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 246 (4th Cir. 2011)
(stating that one panel of this court cannot overrule precedent
set by another panel).
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either procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we
determine whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court has considered both the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors and the policy statements set forth in Chapter 7
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) (2010). Crudup,
461 F.3d at 439. The district court also must provide an
explanation of its chosen sentence, although this explanation
“need not be as detailed or specific” as is required for an
original sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547
(4th Cir. 2010). A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court states a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 440. “[T]he court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke
its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to
the statutory maximum.” Id. at 439 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
With these standards in mind, we conclude that
Saunders’ sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively
unreasonable. The district court explicitly stated that it had
considered the required statutory factors and Guidelines
provisions and provided a clear rationale for imposing the
maximum statutory sentence. Given the court’s broad discretion
to revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment
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up to the statutory maximum, Saunders’ sentence is reasonable.
Therefore, we conclude that Saunders’ sentence is not plainly
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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