FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN DOE,
Petitioner-Appellee, No. 08-55165
v. D.C. No.
TIMOTHY E. BUSBY, Warden, CV-04-02990-AHM
Respondent-Appellant.
JOHN DOE, No. 08-55280
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. D.C. No.
CV-04-02990-AHM
TIMOTHY E. BUSBY, Warden,
OPINION
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
A. Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
June 23, 20111—Pasadena, California
Filed October 24, 2011
Before: Harry Pregerson, Robert R. Beezer, and
Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.
1
This case was originally argued and submitted to this court in April
2010. Following the passing of Judge David R. Thompson, Judge M.
Smith was added to the panel. The case was re-argued in June 2011.
19213
DOE v. BUSBY 19217
COUNSEL
Michael Katz, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, for the respondent-appellant.
Alexandra Wallace Yates, Federal Public Defender, Los
Angeles, California, for the petitioner-appellee.
OPINION
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Respondent Timothy E. Busby, the warden of Ironwood
State Prison in California (collectively with the state prosecu-
tion, the State), appeals the district court’s order granting Peti-
tioner John Doe a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The
district court granted the writ on the ground that the California
state jury which convicted Doe was improperly charged that
it could find him guilty of murder and domestic violence so
long as it found by a preponderance of the evidence that he
had perpetrated prior unadjudicated acts of domestic violence.
Following an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Doe’s
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the Petition) was
timely, the magistrate judge concluded that it was and further
concluded that a conditional writ should issue in light of the
deficient jury instructions, the 1996 versions of California
Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC) Nos. 2.50.02 and
2.50.1. The district court made additional findings regarding
Doe’s diligence in attempting to timely file the Petition,
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and issued a
19218 DOE v. BUSBY
conditional writ. The State appeals the district court’s deter-
mination that the Petition was timely and the decision to grant
a conditional writ. Doe cross-appeals that the district court
erred by not granting habeas relief on the alternative ground
that retroactive application of California Evidence Code
§ 1109 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution. We reject the arguments of both appeals, and
affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. State-Court Trial & Conviction
In an Information filed March 4, 1997, the State charged
Doe with murdering his wife, Jane Roe, as well as perpetrat-
ing acts of domestic violence and making threats against Roe.2
Count 1 of the Information charged that Doe used a firearm
to commit first-degree murder of Roe on December 6, 1996,
and Count 2 charged that he committed grand theft of the fire-
arm used in the killing. The State made special allegations
that Counts 1 and 2 occurred while Doe was out of custody
on bail. See Cal. Penal Code § 12022.1. Counts 3, 4, and 5
alleged respectively that Doe committed assault and battery
and made terrorist threats against Roe during an argument on
October 10, 1996. Doe pled not guilty to all charges and
denied the special allegations.
At a pretrial hearing on June 20, 1997, the trial court
granted the State’s motion to allow testimony about prior
instances of domestic violence allegedly perpetrated by Doe.
The trial court denied Doe’s motion to sever the murder
charges and domestic violence charges.
2
The facts are principally drawn from the California Court of Appeal’s
opinion affirming Doe’s conviction. The entirety of the California court’s
factual summary is contained in the magistrate judge’s report and recom-
mendation.
DOE v. BUSBY 19219
The evidence adduced at Doe’s trial showed that on Octo-
ber 10, 1996, Roe called the police, accusing Doe of physical
abuse. Doe was arrested and released on bail posted by his
former girlfriend. The Los Angeles County District Attor-
ney’s Office filed spousal abuse and terrorist-threat charges
against Doe. Doe was scheduled to be arraigned on these
charges on December 6, 1996.
On the morning of December 6, Roe drove Doe to court for
his arraignment. During the drive, Roe and Doe stopped at the
former girlfriend’s house so that Doe could obtain money
from the former girlfriend. The California Court of Appeal
summarized Doe’s version of the events which culminated in
Roe’s death from a gunshot wound to her shoulder:
[Roe] was driving [Doe] to court when she stopped
at [the former girlfriend’s] house so that [Doe] could
get some money. [Doe] asked [the former girlfriend]
to bring the money down, but [the former girlfriend]
told [Doe] to come upstairs. [Roe] told [Doe] that
she would shoot and kill him if he got out of the car.
[Roe’s] hand was in her purse. When [Doe] told [the
former girlfriend] he was not coming upstairs, [the
former girlfriend] said to send [Roe] up. [Roe] said,
“I will get that bitch,” then drove her car backwards
through a stop sign and said to [Doe], “I know you
are gonna to leave me.” [Roe] accused [Doe] of hav-
ing sex with [the former girlfriend], then pulled a
gun out of her purse and pointed it at [Doe]. As
[Doe] struggled with [Roe] for the gun, it fired.
[Doe] called [the former girlfriend] because, when
he tried to call 9-1-1, he got a busy signal. [Doe]
maintained that he did not intend to shoot [Roe] but
struggled with her for the gun to prevent [Roe] from
shooting him.
Pursuant to California Evidence Code § 1109,3 the State
3
Section 1109 at the time of Doe’s trial provided, inter alia, that “in a
criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving
19220 DOE v. BUSBY
introduced evidence of Doe’s prior unadjudicated acts of
domestic violence against women. The California Court of
Appeal summarized that this evidence “established that [Doe]
has hit and slapped several women, including murder victim
[Jane Roe].” The prosecution introduced evidence about the
alleged October 10, 1996 assault by Doe against Roe that
resulted in the initial charges against Doe.4 Specifically, wit-
nesses recounted that Roe had told the police, when obtaining
a temporary restraining order against Doe, that Doe had
punched her “on the face and body several times.”
The former girlfriend testified that when she dated Doe,
each of them had hit and slapped the other. The former girl-
friend also testified that she had reported abusive behavior by
Doe to the police and had obtained a restraining order against
him.5 Another of Doe’s prior girlfriends testified that he had
abused her during their relationship by slapping her in the
face on two separate occasions. The woman testified that she
also obtained a restraining order against Doe, but that they
continued to have some contact with one another despite the
restraining order.
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other
domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101,” Cal. Evid.
Code § 1109(a) (1996), which “bars evidence of a person’s character or
a trait of his or her character. . . offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a).
4
Roe testified at a preliminary hearing on the State’s charges against
Doe that Doe did not cause the physical injuries others observed on Octo-
ber 10, 1996.
5
During Doe’s trial, The former girlfriend repeatedly denied that many
of the abusive incidents she had previously reported to police had
occurred. The former girlfriend claimed that she was “being vindictive”
when she obtained the restraining order because she was angry at Doe for
ending their relationship. The State introduced testimony from a police
officer that contradicted some of the former girlfriend’s recantations, as
the officer recalled observing the former girlfriend’s injuries.
DOE v. BUSBY 19221
At the close of evidence, the trial court dismissed Count 4,
which alleged assault with a deadly weapon during the Octo-
ber 10, 1996 incident, as duplicative of Count 3 concerning
infliction of corporal injury to a spouse. When the trial court
then instructed the jury, it gave instructions on the substantive
crimes in the following order. First, the trial court instructed
the jury on Count 1 for murder, Cal. Penal Code § 187, and
its lesser-included offenses and other related issues. The trial
court then charged the jury on Count 2 for theft by larceny,
Cal. Penal Code § 487, and related issues. Then, the trial court
charged Count 3 for spouse or cohabitant beating, Cal. Penal
Code § 273.5, and personal use of a dangerous and deadly
weapon, Cal. Penal Code § 12022(b). The trial court then read
two charges from the 1996 version of CALJIC Nos. 2.50.02
and 2.50.1. Those instructions provided:
[CALJIC 2.50.02]
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of
showing that the defendant engaged in an offense
involving domestic violence6 (on one or more occa-
sions) other than that charged in the case. . . .
...
If you find that the defendant committed a prior
offense involving domestic violence, you may, but
6
The trial court defined “domestic violence” and “abuse” as follows:
“Domestic violence” means abuse committed against an adult
or a fully emancipated minor who is a spouse, former spouse,
cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with whom the defen-
dant has had a child or is having or has had a dating or engage-
ment relationship.
“Abuse” means intentionally or recklessly causing or attempt-
ing to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reason-
able apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or
herself, or another.
19222 DOE v. BUSBY
are not required to, infer that the defendant had a dis-
position to commit the same or similar-type offenses.
If you find that the defendant had this disposition,
you may, but are not required, to infer that he was
likely to commit and did commit the crime of which
he is accused.
You must not consider this evidence for any other
purpose.7
[CALJIC 2.50.1]
Within the meaning of the preceding instruction,
the prosecution has the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that [the] defendant
committed the crimes other than that for which he is
on trial.
You must not consider this evidence for any pur-
pose unless you find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that [the] defendant committed other crimes.
The trial court defined the preponderance standard and then
read instructions relating to the lesser-included offense of
Count 3 for battery, Cal. Penal Code § 243(e). The trial court
read the terrorist threats charge, Cal. Penal Code § 422, and
other concluding instructions not relevant for our purposes.
7
In 1999, CALJIC 2.50.02 was amended to include the following addi-
tional instructions regarding reasonable doubt:
However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed a prior crime or crimes involving domestic
violence, that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that he committed the charged offense[s]. If you deter-
mine an inference properly can be drawn from this evidence, this
inference is simply one item for you to consider, along with all
other evidence, in determining whether the defendant has been
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime.
CALJIC 2.50.02 (7th ed. 1999).
DOE v. BUSBY 19223
The jury convicted Doe on Count 1 for first degree murder,
Count 3 for committing corporal injury to a spouse, and
Count 5 for making terrorist threats. The jury acquitted Doe
on Count 2 for grand theft of the firearm that killed Roe. Doe
was sentenced to a term of thirty-one years to life imprisonment.8
The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and
sentence on March 24, 1999. The California Supreme Court
denied Doe’s petition for review on June 24, 1999.9
II. Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings
Although Doe’s state conviction became final in September
1999, see Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, Doe did not file the instant federal
Petition until April 28, 2004. The pro se Petition was referred
to Magistrate Judge Walsh. The State moved to dismiss the
petition as untimely under the one-year limitations period
established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The magistrate judge
recognized Doe might be entitled to tolling and appointed
Doe counsel before convening an evidentiary hearing on the
timeliness of the Petition.
In an Order dated February 1, 2005, the magistrate judge
determined that Doe was entitled to equitable tolling on his
Petition and denied the State’s motion to dismiss. The magis-
trate judge summarized the events which delayed the filing:
[I]n July 1999, [Doe] paid $20,000 to an attorney
to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus on [Doe’s]
behalf in [the District] Court. Unbeknownst to
8
The sentence consisted of a term of 25 years to life for the murder
offense, plus an additional six years for the two enhancements of person-
ally using a firearm and committing the offense while on bail. On Counts
3 and 5, Doe was sentenced to determinate five-year terms to run concur-
rently with the sentence on Count 1.
9
The California Supreme Court denied Doe’s petitions for review and
for habeas corpus without issuing a written opinion.
19224 DOE v. BUSBY
[Doe], the lawyer had never filed a federal petition
before and did not know that there was a one-year
statute of limitations governing the filing of a peti-
tion. Surprisingly, however, [Doe] knew of the dead-
line and, beginning in 1999, began writing to his
counsel to encourage him to file a petition on time,
i.e., by September 2000. [Doe] also spoke with his
counsel and with his counsel’s paralegal on the tele-
phone. Despite [Doe’s] efforts, his counsel missed
the filing deadline.
[Doe] wrote to counsel immediately after learning
that he had not filed a petition on time and asked
what he intended to do about it. Counsel and his par-
alegal convinced [Doe] that there was a way around
the statute of limitations if they were able to uncover
new evidence, which they intended to do.
Meanwhile, [Doe] filed a disciplinary complaint
with the California State Bar Association against his
counsel. Thereafter, counsel’s paralegal visited
[Doe] in jail at counsel’s behest and convinced [Doe]
that, if he dropped the disciplinary action, she and
[Doe’s] counsel would vigorously pursue [Doe’s]
case and find a way around the statute of limitations.
She informed him that, if he did not drop it, they
would no longer work on his case because it would
be a conflict of interest. [Doe] agreed and dropped
the bar complaint.
Throughout 2001, 2002, and 2003, [Doe] continu-
ally pleaded with counsel to file a petition for him,
but to no avail. Finally, in October 2003, [Doe’s]
counsel wrote [Doe] and told him he would no lon-
ger represent him. [Doe] subsequently requested that
counsel return his files, which counsel did not do
until April 2004. Ten days later, [Doe] filed the
instant Petition.
DOE v. BUSBY 19225
Excerpts of Record at 36-37. The magistrate judge reasoned
that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled
because Doe had exercised “reasonable diligence” in the face
of “sufficiently egregious” attorney misconduct.
On May 25, 2007, the magistrate judge issued a Report and
Recommendation that the Petition be granted because the
state trial court’s combined use of CALJIC Nos. 2.50.02 and
2.50.1 had, per our holding in Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812
(9th Cir. 2004), unconstitutionally “lessened the prosecutor’s
burden of proof,” making those instructions “contrary to
clearly established federal law.” The magistrate judge recom-
mended denying the State’s procedural default arguments as
well as Doe’s other grounds for relief based on purported due
process, ex post facto, Confrontation Clause, equal protection,
and prosecutorial misconduct violations.
The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation
and granted Doe’s Petition. With respect to equitable tolling,
the district court held that the reasons for delay were “extraor-
dinary” and stated, “[a] three-and-a-half year delay is indeed
lengthy. But it was largely attributable to [Doe] having been
deceived, bullied and lulled by an apparently inept and unethi-
cal lawyer.”
The State and Doe timely cross-appeal the district court’s
Order.
JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.
Doe filed his Petition after AEDPA’s effective date, and
thus AEDPA applies here. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.
320, 326-27 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not
grant a habeas corpus petition unless the last reasoned state
court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
19226 DOE v. BUSBY
by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly
established federal law if it applies a rule that contradicts
Supreme Court case law or if it reaches a conclusion different
from the Supreme Court’s decision in a case involving materi-
ally indistinguishable facts. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
73 (2003). A state court decision is an “unreasonable applica-
tion of” clearly established federal law if the state court iden-
tified the correct governing legal rule but unreasonably
applied it to the facts at hand. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 407-08 (2000). “Clearly established Federal law” refers
to the holdings of the Supreme Court at “the time of the rele-
vant state-court decision.” Id. at 412.
We conduct a de novo review of the district court’s issu-
ance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Christian v. Frank, 595 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 131 S. Ct. 511 (2010). When “the facts underlying a
claim for equitable tolling are undisputed, the question
whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled is
also reviewed de novo.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799
(9th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
There are three distinct issues in these appeals. The position
advanced by the State is as follows. First, Doe’s Petition, filed
more than four years after his state conviction became final,
was untimely under AEDPA. Doe is not entitled to equitable
tolling because although his attorney was “incompetent,” Doe
himself did not exercise reasonable diligence, and he acted
unreasonably in relying on an attorney whose performance he
knew was substandard. Thus the district court erred in deny-
ing the State’s motion to dismiss the Petition. Second, even
assuming the Petition is deemed timely, there was no error in
the state court’s jury instructions. The instructions did not
DOE v. BUSBY 19227
misrepresent or lower the burden of proof, because the prose-
cutor and defense repeatedly emphasized the reasonable doubt
standard, and intervening case law holds that even if there
were error, it is harmless.
On cross-appeal, Doe argues that the district court erred by
not granting habeas relief on the alternative ground that retro-
active application of California Evidence Code § 1109 vio-
lated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
We address and reject each of the preceding arguments in
turn.
I. Equitable Tolling of the Petition
[1] Under AEDPA, a prisoner in state custody must file a
federal habeas petition within one year from the conclusion of
direct review of the criminal conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d);
Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006). The
AEDPA limitations period may be tolled when state post-
conviction remedies are pending, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),
and when it is equitably required. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010); see also Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d
796, 799-802 (9th Cir. 2003). Where, as here, equitable toll-
ing is sought, a petitioner seeking tolling bears the burden of
showing (1) that he diligently pursued his rights and (2) that
an extraordinary circumstance prevented a timely filing. Hol-
land, 130 S. Ct. at 2562; Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (citing Still-
man v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003)). Like
any equitable consideration, whether a prisoner is entitled to
equitable tolling under AEDPA will depend on a fact-specific
inquiry by the habeas court which may be guided by “deci-
sions made in other similar cases.” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at
2563; see also Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799; Whalem/Hunt v.
Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per
curiam) (rejecting argument that lack of access to library
materials categorically requires tolling).
19228 DOE v. BUSBY
[2] Doe seeks equitable relief on account of his former
attorney’s misconduct, primarily in failing to file a petition
after misleading Doe to believe a filing would occur. Equita-
ble tolling may be warranted in instances of unprofessional
attorney behavior; however, the AEDPA deadline will not be
tolled for a garden variety claim of excusable attorney neglect
or mistake. See Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 800-02; see also Irwin v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“[T]he
principles of equitable tolling described above do not extend
to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable
neglect.”). Thus, in cases where a petitioner claims his attor-
ney was the cause of the untimeliness, courts must examine
if the claimed failure was one of mere negligence by the attor-
ney, such as inadvertently miscalculating a filing deadline in
a non-capital case, see Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146
(9th Cir. 2001), or a sufficiently egregious misdeed like mal-
feasance or failing to fulfill a basic duty of client representa-
tion, see Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 801 (citing Baldayaque v.
United States, 338 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2003)).
The State does not seriously contest that “extraordinary cir-
cumstances” prevented a timely filing of the Petition; the
State’s papers describe Doe’s former attorney, among other
things, as “incompetent” and having “utterly fail[ed] him.”
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 36, 38; Appellant’s Third Br. on
Cross-Appeal at 5. The State, along with the magistrate judge
and district court, are correct to have observed that the ser-
vices rendered by Doe’s former counsel were utterly deficient
and unprofessional and thus constituted an extraordinary cir-
cumstance preventing the timely filing of this Petition.
[3] Doe hired his former counsel to file a federal habeas
petition more than one year prior to the AEDPA deadline, and
paid him a handsome $20,000 advance for this service. Doe
provided that counsel with his files and repeatedly made
inquires on the progress of his case. Not only did the attorney
not file a timely habeas petition, he filed no petition at all, in
spite of his numerous promises to the contrary. When Doe
DOE v. BUSBY 19229
eventually sought his files from the attorney, the attorney took
six months to return them. These circumstances are far more
egregious than those we encountered in Spitsyn v. Moore,
where we found tolling could be justified when a petitioner
thrice contacted his counsel but received no responses and
filed two grievances with the state bar association. The coun-
sel then terminated the representation two weeks prior to the
habeas deadline and returned the petitioner’s files two months
after the deadline lapsed. 345 F.3d at 800-01; see also Bal-
dayaque, 338 F.3d at 152 (finding equitable tolling may be
justified where an attorney “failed to file . . . a petition at all”
despite being specifically directed by his client to do so);
Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding
equitable tolling could be shown if evidence supported allega-
tions that attorney informed petitioner that “she was going to
file the federal habeas petition . . . and that there were no time
constraints for filing”), overruled in part on other grounds by
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) as recognized by Laws
v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003).
Whether Doe remained diligent in the face of the above-
described failures by his former attorney is, as the magistrate
judge noted, “less clear” than the relatively obvious point that
Doe faced an extraordinary impediment. The diligence
required for equitable tolling is “reasonable diligence,” not
“maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Baldayaque, 338
F.3d at 153 (“The standard is not ‘extreme diligence’ or
‘exceptional diligence,’ it is reasonable diligence.”). The pur-
pose of requiring a habeas petitioner to show diligence is to
verify that it was the extraordinary circumstance, as opposed
to some act of the petitioner’s own doing, which caused the
failure to timely file. See Roy, 465 F.3d at 973; Spitsyn, 345
F.3d at 802.
[4] To determine if a petitioner has been diligent in pursu-
ing his petition, courts consider the petitioner’s overall level
of care and caution in light of his or her particular circum-
19230 DOE v. BUSBY
stances. See Roy, 465 F.3d at 972 (“In addition to the specific
efforts [petitioners] allege that they made to pursue their
claims, we also consider it important that [petitioners] pur-
sued their claims within a reasonable period of time before the
external impediment . . . came into existence.”); Baldayaque,
338 F.3d at 153 (“[T]he district court should ask: did the peti-
tioner act as diligently as reasonably could have been
expected under the circumstances?”). In a case such as this,
where attorney misconduct is the claimed circumstance caus-
ing the untimeliness, courts consider, inter alia, whether the
petitioner expeditiously secured counsel to file the habeas
petition, see Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 153, the frequency and
nature of the attorney-client communications, see Spitsyn, 345
F.3d at 801, when, in light of the petitioner’s education and
background, he reasonably should have sought new counsel,
Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 153, and whether the petitioner had
the means to consult alternate counsel, id.
The gravamen of the State’s argument is that Doe was
aware, or should have been aware, that his counsel was “in-
competent.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 38. The State says
Doe had an independent, personal, and non-delegable duty to
discover the reality of his attorney’s substandard representa-
tion, and that no later than September 2000 should Doe have
realized that his counsel was “obviously unreliable.” Appel-
lant’s Opening Br. at 41-42. As noted supra, the State repeat-
edly emphasizes Doe’s counsel’s deficient performance to
buttress its argument that Doe lacked diligence in discovering
his attorney’s failings, and thus the statute of limitations
should run. We disagree with the State’s argument, and
uphold the district court’s equitable tolling decision.
[5] The State’s overzealous use of hindsight seeks to push
the diligence required for tolling well outside the realm of
“reasonable.” As the district court detailed, the facts in the
record show Doe “displayed unusual, albeit misguided, tenac-
ity in trying to file a petition” after “having been deceived,
bullied and lulled by an apparently inept and unethical law-
DOE v. BUSBY 19231
yer.” Doe retained his counsel, at a price of $20,000, more
than one year before his habeas petition was due to be filed.
See United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir.
2005) (“[Petitioner] hired [his attorney] well in advance of his
filing deadline.”). Doe wrote numerous letters and made
scores of phone calls from prison to remind his attorney of the
deadline, and received assurances from the attorney that the
petition would be filed. See Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358,
364 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[The attorney] in effect
admitted affirmatively and knowingly misleading [petitioner]
by promising him that he would file the petition before
November 30, 2007 . . . [and] breached that promise when he
failed to follow his client’s instruction, with disastrous conse-
quences that [petitioner] could neither have foreseen nor pre-
vented.”); Martin, 408 F.3d at 1095 (“[Petitioner] and his wife
did everything in their power to stay abreast of the status of
his case, and provided [the attorney] with original documents
to assist in the matter.”). Frustrated by inaction, Doe pursued
grievances with state authorities. See Martin, 408 F.3d at
1095 (“[Petitioner] filed a complaint with the California
Bar.”). When the deadline passed in early 2001, with his state
grievances against his attorney pending, he was cajoled by
that attorney to abandon the ethics complaints and wrongly
informed that new evidence was necessary prior to filing the
petition, but that the search for such evidence was ongoing.
Untrained in the technicalities of habeas law and incarcerated,
Doe was in no position to question a plausible explanation for
the attorney’s delay or to observe the thoroughness of the
attorney’s supposedly ongoing investigation for evidence.
Reasonable diligence does not require a petitioner to identify
the legal errors in his attorney’s advice and thereupon fire the
attorney because such errors would have been evident to a
trained lawyer, nor does it require a petitioner to proceed pro
se without an obvious reason for doing so. See Brown v. Roe,
279 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, Doe, having
already turned over $20,000 and the case materials to the
attorney, was hardly in the position to proceed pro se. In Spit-
19232 DOE v. BUSBY
syn, we rejected an argument that the petitioner represented
by deficient counsel was obligated to retain another attorney
to timely file a habeas petition. See 345 F.3d at 801. We
might further observe that adopting the State’s position and
requiring a represented petitioner to proceed on a dual track
with his own petition could pose other technical and proce-
dural hurdles for incarcerated prisoners. See, e.g., Downs v.
McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1324 n.10 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting
practice of district court to “routinely strike[ ] and return[ ]
pro se filings of parties who are represented by counsel,
which means that ‘even a savvy petitioner, who may see the
clock running out on his habeas time, can only cajole [or]
plead with his counsel to file the petition timely’ ” (quoting
Thomas v. McDonough, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1206-07 (M.D.
Fla. 2006)).
Nor can we identify any analysis in the numerous cases
cited to us by the State which might explain why Doe should
be held to account for his attorney’s affirmative misrepresen-
tations. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 42-46 (citing, inter alia,
Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 76-78 (3d Cir. 2004); Beery
v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 951-52 (8th Cir. 2002); Celaj v. Artuz,
49 F. App’x 331, 332-33 (2d Cir. 2002) (unpublished); Loving
v. Mahaffey, 27 F. App’x 925, 925 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpub-
lished)). The State’s strongest argument comes from Schlueter
v. Varner, where the Third Circuit held that equitable tolling
was not available for a petitioner who claimed attorney mis-
conduct when his attorney, despite representations to the con-
trary, missed a filing deadline for state-court collateral relief,
which necessarily impacted tolling under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2). Schlueter, 384 F.3d at 76-77. The Third Circuit
reasoned that the petitioner could have learned his attorney
had not filed the state-court petition by the date he had prom-
ised, and the petitioner could have filed himself for state col-
lateral relief. Id. at 76. Unlike Schlueter, Doe is not seeking
federal tolling based on bad legal advice in another
proceeding—the claim of misconduct arises in the timely fil-
ing of this federal petition. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563
DOE v. BUSBY 19233
(distinguishing between tolling due to untimely state filings
which implicates federalism concerns and tolling untimely
federal filings). Moreover, Schlueter did not involve an attor-
ney affirmatively misrepresenting the status of a case to
assuage his doubting client; indeed, the Third Circuit
acknowledged its prior holding that “[an] attorney’s affirma-
tive misrepresentation to his client coupled with the plaintiff’s
extreme diligence in pursuing her claim . . . ‘created a situa-
tion appropriate for tolling.’ ” Schlueter, 384 F.3d at 76 (quot-
ing Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236,
242 (3d Cir. 1999)).10
The State makes too much of the solitary fact that it took
three years for the Petition to be filed after the deadline had
passed. The State says that we would not hesitate to find a
lack of diligence where a petitioner “waited another twenty
years to file a pro se petition,” Appellant’s Third Br. on
Cross-Appeal, at 4, nor would we condone a ten year, seven
year, or five year wait. But untimeliness alone does nothing
to resolve an issue of equitable tolling; the court must adduce
the reasons for the delay regardless of the length. AEDPA sets
a statute of limitations not a period of repose, Holland, 130
S. Ct. at 2560-61, and the passage of time alone is not deter-
minative. While we do not doubt that tolling a case for twenty
years would be difficult to justify, because AEDPA “does not
set forth an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever its
clock has run,” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560 (internal quotation
marks omitted), we cannot say the circumstance will never
arise. Equitable tolling is not the arena of bright-lines and
dates certain; “determinations . . . whether there are grounds
10
The State also points to Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d at 948, in support of
its diligence argument. Not only does Beery concern a claim of attorney
error in a state-court post-conviction proceeding, the case involves
whether the misconduct met the “extraordinary circumstances” prong of
tolling: “[W]e conclude no extraordinary circumstance beyond Beery’s
control prevented him from filing a timely habeas petition.” Id. at 952.
The case is inapposite.
19234 DOE v. BUSBY
for equitable tolling are highly fact-dependent.”
Whalem/Hunt, 233 F.3d at 1148.
[6] The standard for reasonable diligence does not require
an overzealous or extreme pursuit of any and every avenue of
relief. It requires the effort that a reasonable person might be
expected to deliver under his or her particular circumstances.
We conclude that a reasonable litigant in Doe’s situation who
is represented by experienced counsel, if asked about the sta-
tus of his or her lawsuit, would be justified in replying, “My
lawyer is handling it.” Cf. Martin, 408 F.3d at 1095 (“We will
not fault Martin for relying on his attorney here.”); see also
Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 3-110(A) (“A member shall not inten-
tionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal ser-
vices with competence.”). Even had Doe known his attorney
had not handled a habeas petition before, his reliance would
still have been reasonable. See Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 3-
110(C) (“If a member does not have sufficient learning and
skill when the legal service is undertaken, the member may
nonetheless perform such services competently by 1) associat-
ing with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting
another lawyer reasonably believed to be competent, or 2) by
acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is
required.”). When Doe’s attorney finally informed him that no
petition was forthcoming after four years of representations to
the contrary and then delayed six months in returning Doe’s
files, Doe managed to file this Petition in ten days. We agree
with the district court that Doe did not relent in his efforts and
that he is entitled to equitable tolling for his diligence in the
face of his counsel’s deceit. Therefore, we turn to the merits
of Doe’s Petition.
II. Jury Instructions on Unadjudicated Acts of Domestic
Violence
[7] In a criminal trial, whether at the state or federal level,
“[t]he prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of
the offense charged, and must persuade the factfinder ‘beyond
DOE v. BUSBY 19235
a reasonable doubt’ of the facts necessary to establish each of
those elements.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78
(1993) (citations omitted); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
363-64 (1970) (“The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital
role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a
prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting
on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for
the presumption of innocence—that bedrock axiomatic and
elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation
of the administration of our criminal law.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
[8] Sullivan provides that “the essential connection to a
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ factual finding cannot be made
where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of
the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury’s findings.”
508 U.S. at 281. The Court in Sullivan also engages in a use-
ful discussion of structural versus harmless errors. Id. at
278-82. The Court cites to Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 308-10 (1991), which discusses the distinction between
potentially harmless “trial errors,” and never-harmless “struc-
tural errors.” Trial errors are problems which occur during a
case’s presentation to the trier of fact and may be assessed in
the context of other evidence. They may be harmless and are
harmless if the error can be examined against the other trial
evidence and a determination made that the error was not seri-
ous enough that it would have caused the jury to have a rea-
sonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. See id. at 310. In
contrast, structural errors are “violations . . . in the constitu-
tion of the trial mechanism,” and are “defect[s] affecting the
framework within which the trial proceeds” which inhibit the
trial’s “ ‘function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence.’ ” Id. at 309-10 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 578 (1986)). They are never harmless.
[9] In Gibson v. Ortiz, we held that the CALJIC instruc-
tions identical in all relevant respects to those given at Doe’s
trial violated due process and their use was contrary to clearly
19236 DOE v. BUSBY
established federal law under AEDPA. 387 F.3d at 817 n.4
(“The jury also received CALJIC No. 2.50.02, which is iden-
tical in all aspects to No. 2.50.01, except that it addresses
prior acts of domestic violence.”). In Gibson, the State had
presented at trial “evidence of the prior uncharged sexual
assaults that [Gibson] committed . . . under Cal. Evid. Code
§ 1108, which allows such evidence to be introduced as long
as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial value.” Id. at 817. The trial court read the 1996
CALJIC instructions, and the jury convicted Gibson. Id. at
817-18. In affirming the district court’s grant of a conditional
habeas writ, we explained that “the interplay of the two
instructions allowed the jury to find that Gibson committed
the uncharged . . . offenses by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and thus to infer that he had committed the charged
acts based upon facts found not beyond a reasonable doubt,
but by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 822. Because
the instructions on the burden of proof are not ambiguous, id.
at 822 n.8, “[t]he 1996 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 runs
directly contrary to Winship’s maxim that a defendant may
not be convicted except ‘upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.’ ” Id. at 822 (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. at 364).
[10] We further held in Gibson that by “permitt[ing] the
jury to find Gibson guilty of the charged sexual offenses by
merely a preponderance of the evidence,” the use of the jury
instruction “constituted structural error within the meaning of
Sullivan [v. Louisiana].” Id. at 824. We explained the connec-
tion to Sullivan:
In Sullivan, the trial court gave the jury a definition
of reasonable doubt that had previously been held
unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39
(1990). In invalidating Sullivan’s conviction because
of the unconstitutional standard of proof, the
Supreme Court tied the Fifth Amendment require-
DOE v. BUSBY 19237
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial, holding that “the
jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a
jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” A
Sullivan error precludes harmless error review
because no verdict within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment has been rendered.
Gibson, 387 F.3d at 824-25 (citations and emphasis omitted).
We also held that the reading of “at least one correct reason-
able doubt instruction (CALJIC No. 2.01) and [an instruction]
on the presumption of innocence (CALJIC No. 2.90)” were
not enough to “remove[ ] the use of CALJIC No. 2.50.01
from the realm of constitutional error.” Id. at 825.
Doe’s Petition follows Gibson and asserts that his trial was
constitutionally infirm because the trial court’s use of the
1996 CALJIC Nos. 2.50.02 and 2.50.1 allowed the jury to
convict him of, among other things, first degree murder if it
found by a mere preponderance of evidence that certain acts
of domestic violence occurred. The district court granted
Doe’s Petition in light of our precedent in Gibson that reading
the prior versions of CALJIC Nos. 2.50.02 and 2.50.1 violates
an accused’s due process rights. The State argues that the dis-
trict court erred because intervening case law blunts Gibson’s
holding, and indeed supersedes it. Specifically, the State
argues that the Court’s decision in Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555
U.S. 57 (2008) (per curiam), and our decisions in Mendez v.
Knowles, 556 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2009), and Byrd v. Lewis,
566 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2009), require us to apply harmless
error review, as opposed to deeming the reading of the
instructions as structural error. Viewed in context, the State
argues that because “both the prosecutor and the defense
attorney repeatedly stressed in all three closing arguments that
the burden of proof was beyond a reasonable doubt,” Appel-
lant’s Opening Br. at 47, a Gibson error did not occur.
Absent the attorney misconduct catalogued above, Doe’s
Petition would likely have come to us several years ago, and
19238 DOE v. BUSBY
we would have routinely granted his writ for the Gibson due
process violation. See, e.g., Mackey v. Newland, 212 F. App’x
656, 657 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting habeas relief for Gibson
error); Griffey v. Hubbard, 176 F. App’x. 759, 759 (9th Cir.
2006) (same); Miler v. Butler, 155 F. App’x 377, 378 (9th Cir.
2005) (same); Lea v. Alameida, 153 F. App’x. 990, 991 (9th
Cir. 2005) (same); see also Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036,
1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he government does not contest
[petitioner’s] argument with respect to the rape convictions;
it has conceded that Gibson v. Ortiz is materially indistin-
guishable and therefore mandates a grant of [petitioner’s]
habeas petition for the forcible rape charges.” (emphasis
added)). We would have granted the Petition because the defi-
ciencies we highlighted in Gibson are equally present at
Doe’s trial.
A habeas court must presume that jurors follow the jury
instructions. Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 782 (9th Cir.
2007) (en banc); Gibson, 387 F.3d at 822 (“We presume that
the jury followed these instructions and proceeded on the
basis that if it found Gibson had committed prior sexual
offenses, it was then permitted to infer that Gibson had com-
mitted the charged offenses.” (citation omitted)). “Any chal-
lenged instruction must be considered in light of the full set
of jury instructions and the trial record as a whole.” Gibson,
387 F.3d at 821 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,
146-47 (1973)). This is because “isolated statements taken
from the charge” may seemingly be prejudicial but in fact
“are not so when considered in the context of the entire record
of the trial.” United States v. Silla, 555 F.2d 703, 706 (9th Cir.
1977) (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674-75
(1975)) (quotation marks omitted). Although CALJIC Nos.
2.50.02 and 2.50.1 were read by the trial court during its
instructions on Count 3, concerning domestic violence, the
State then made statements to the jury during closing argu-
ment so it would not limit its use of the preponderance
instruction to only Count 3; after being admonished by the
DOE v. BUSBY 19239
trial court to focus her closing argument on the evidence in
the case, the prosecutor told the jurors:
As I left off, what this is all about is a murder sui-
cide. That was the Defendant’s intention all along,
that premeditation and deliberation started early on.
It actually started in the beginning of the relation-
ship, because there is an instruction that you will be
hearing, that if you believe the domestic violence
assaults in the past occurred not only between the
Defendant and [Jane Doe] but between the Defen-
dant and all of his women . . . that you can then infer
that the domestic violence that he committed this
time, in fact, he had a disposition to do so.
So you can use that for all counts. You can use
that for the counts of the domestic violence in Octo-
ber. That’s Count 3, the spousal battery with the per-
sonal use of the knife, and you can use it for the
homicide, because the homicide, the murder, is
another act of domestic violence. It is the final act of
domestic violence.
Excerpts of Record at 637-38 (emphasis added). The use of
the preponderance instruction, with the prosecutor’s statement
that it could cover more than Count 3, was not tangential or
insignificant in light of the overall instructions. See United
States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284, 287 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We
cannot find harmless error in the deliberate ignorance instruc-
tion. . . . The prosecutor read the deliberate ignorance instruc-
tion in his closing argument, using it effectively to assist the
jury in evaluating the mental element.”).
[11] Because Doe is clearly entitled to relief under Gibson
if that case remains good law in our circuit, we turn to the
seemingly more difficult question of whether it remains good
19240 DOE v. BUSBY
law given the intervening cases of Pulido, 555 U.S. 57,
Mendez, 556 F.3d 757, and Byrd, 566 F.3d 855.
In Hedgpeth v. Pulido, the Supreme Court held that where
a jury is instructed on multiple theories of guilt11 and one the-
ory is legally incorrect, that erroneous jury instruction is not
“structural,” and instead must be analyzed under the harmless
error standard to determine whether “the flaw in the instruc-
tions ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.’ ” 555 U.S. at 58 (quoting
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). In Pulido,
the Court reiterated its rule from Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1 (1999), that “harmless-error analysis applies to instruc-
tional errors so long as the error at issue does not categori-
cally ‘vitiat[e] all the jury’s findings.’ ” Pulido, 555 U.S. at 61
(quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 11). “An instructional error aris-
ing in the context of multiple theories of guilt no more vitiates
all the jury’s findings than does omission or misstatement of
an element of the offense when only one theory is submitted.”
Id.
We first addressed the import of Pulido in a case involving
CALJIC 2.50.1 in Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d at 757.
There, the petitioner sought habeas on the same ground on
which it was granted in Gibson. We denied habeas because
the prior bad acts were criminal offenses proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt (through guilty pleas). Id. at 769-70. Mendez
acknowledged Gibson’s holding: “When a jury instruction is
erroneous because it misdescribes the burden of proof, it ‘viti-
ates all the jury’s findings,’ and no verdict within the meaning
of the Sixth Amendment is rendered. ‘Where such an error
exists, it is considered structural and thus is not subject to
11
“Pulido sought to vacate his conviction on the ground that the jury
instructions were erroneous: They permitted the jury to find him guilty of
felony murder if he formed the intent to aid and abet the underlying felony
before the murder, but they also permitted the jury to find him guilty if he
formed that intent only after the murder.” Pulido, 555 U.S. at 59.
DOE v. BUSBY 19241
harmless error review.’ ” Id. at 768 (quoting Sullivan, 508
U.S. at 281; Gibson, 387 F.3d at 820). Mendez highlighted
that in Gibson we had opined that CALJIC 2.50.01, which
permitted the jury to infer that Gibson committed the charged
crimes if it concluded that he had committed the prior sexual
offenses, was constitutionally valid standing alone. Id. at 769.
“Thus, so far as our Gibson precedent is concerned, it was
constitutionally valid for the jury to infer that Gibson commit-
ted the charged crime based on the previous . . . uncharged
sexual offenses so long as those previous offenses were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We described our
concern in Gibson as “the interplay of CALJIC 2.50.01 and
2.50.1.” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Gibson, 387 F.3d at
822). We accepted as valid the distinction that “because the
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendez
had been convicted of at least one of the prior sexual offenses,
the jury could not have convicted Mendez of the charged
offenses on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. We then stated that we were “comfortable that the
jury did not rely upon an incorrect burden of proof in convict-
ing Mendez. Mendez’s jury specifically found beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that Mendez had been convicted of one of the
two prior sexual offenses. Because the jury made this specific
finding, it necessarily did not find that Mendez committed the
prior sexual offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
at 769-70.12
12
Despite our acknowledgment of Gibson as structural error, in Mendez,
we gave further reasons for its holding which appear to apply to some
degree a quasi-harmless-error standard:
Additional differences between Mendez’s case and Gibson
buttress our conclusion that the jury did not convict Mendez
based on a constitutionally deficient burden of proof. First, in
Mendez’s case, several instructions regarding the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard were read to the jury after the jury was
given the preponderance of the evidence instruction; whereas in
Gibson, once the preponderance of the evidence standard was
read to the jury, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was not
included in any subsequent instructions. Second, the prosecutor
in Mendez’s case, unlike the prosecutor in Gibson, did not dis-
19242 DOE v. BUSBY
Several months after we issued Mendez, we decided Byrd
v. Lewis, 566 F.3d at 855. Byrd involved none of the Califor-
nia jury instructions at issue in Gibson, Mendez, or here.
Rather, the petitioner in Byrd sought habeas relief for an auto-
mobile theft conviction. Id. at 858-59. One of Byrd’s chal-
lenges was to the trial court’s scope-of-consent instruction,
which provided:
The failure to return a vehicle that was obtained by
consent in a timely manner does not by itself estab-
lish a violation of section 10851. . . . You should
determine from the circumstances whether the con-
tinued use of a vehicle both as to the length of time
and the manner clearly and substantially exceeded
the scope of the consent given. If it does not clearly
and substantially exceed the scope of the consent
given, then the required criminal intent would not be
clearly established.
Id. at 861 (emphasis omitted). Byrd argued that “[t]his
instruction diluted the prosecution’s burden of proof, thereby
violating his right to due process.” Id. The California Court of
Appeal had reasoned that “because a ‘clearly established’
standard was applied to define the requisite criminal intent, ‘it
is reasonably likely the jury did not find that [Byrd] exceeded
[the owner’s] scope of consent beyond a reasonable doubt,’ ”
cuss, much less emphasize, the preponderance of the evidence
standard in her closing argument. Third, the victim of Gibson’s
prior sexual offenses and the charged offense was the same,
whereas Mendez’s prior sexual offenses involved different vic-
tims than those involved in his charged offenses. We conclude
that no rational juror would have understood the instructions on
evidence of prior sexual misconduct to relieve the jury of its duty
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendez had committed
the charged offenses. We therefore uphold Mendez’s convictions
as constitutionally sound.
Id. at 770.
DOE v. BUSBY 19243
but nevertheless concluded the error was ultimately harmless.
Id. (quoting People v. Byrd, No. C034582, 2001 WL
1480516, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2001)). Thus, we
were presented with the question of whether the California
court’s use of a harmless error standard was an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent under AEDPA. Id. at
861-64.
After chronicling a number of Supreme Court cases,
including Sullivan and Pulido, we concluded that it was not
an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Id. at
862-64. We continued: “We recognize that our decision in
Gibson reaches a different outcome.” Id. at 865. After
describing the facts in Gibson, we stated:
In granting relief to Gibson, we concluded that the
instructions addressing the prior uncharged acts
impermissibly lowered the burden of proof “for the
permissive inference” to be drawn from the
uncharged acts. We held that the error was structural
because the instructions “permitted the jury to find
Gibson guilty of the charged sexual offenses by
merely a preponderance of the evidence . . .” Fur-
ther, we found this to be clearly established constitu-
tional law.
However, Pulido instructs that “[a]n instructional
error arising in the context of multiple theories of
guilt” does not vitiate all the jury’s findings. The
jury could have convicted Gibson on the theory that
the inference from the prior uncharged acts war-
ranted a finding of guilt, or it could have convicted
Gibson on the theory that the direct testimony of the
victim regarding the charged offenses warranted a
finding of guilt, or on some combination of the two
theories. . . .
Although we are reluctant to do so, we must over-
rule Gibson to the extent that it applies structural
19244 DOE v. BUSBY
error review to an instructional error that affects only
an element of the offense, a permissible evidentiary
inference, or a potential theory of conviction, as
opposed to an instructional error that affects the
overarching reasonable doubt standard of proof.
Id. at 865-66 (citations omitted).
In Byrd, Judge Wallace concurred only in the result and
took exception to the panel’s decision “to attempt to ‘over-
rule’ the prior three-judge panel decision in Gibson v. Ortiz.”
Id. at 867 (Wallace, J., concurring); see also id. at 869 (“The
majority sees the need to ‘overrule’ Gibson because it
assumes that Gibson controls the outcome of this case. How-
ever, there is a principled distinction between the jury instruc-
tions at issue in Gibson and the instructions at issue here.”).
Judge Wallace explained, “The erroneous jury instructions in
Gibson were not limited to a single element of the crimes
charged. Rather, the instructions allowed the jury to find by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was guilty
of the entire crime charged, requiring, the court held, struc-
tural error review.” Id. at 869. In contrast, in Byrd, “the
alleged erroneous instruction allowed the jury, at most, to test
only the element of consent at a lower burden.” Id.
[12] We might first observe that the intervening authority
has generated more questions than it has answered. Neverthe-
less, we believe there is a way to reconcile all these prece-
dents, giving due respect to the holdings of each. Ultimately,
we are unpersuaded that Mendez has much bearing on this
case, due to its unique factual situation, or that the holdings
of Pulido and Byrd address the specific issue raised in Gibson
or here—the interplay of two instructions combining to allow
for a criminal conviction by a preponderance of the evidence.
Mendez, despite its involvement with the CALJIC instruc-
tions at issue here, does not address the specific legal question
before us. Our focus in Mendez was that the State had intro-
DOE v. BUSBY 19245
duced prior criminal convictions as opposed to uncharged bad
acts based on guilty pleas Mendez had entered. By contrast,
in Gibson (and here), the State introduced evidence of prior
unadjudicated acts, as opposed to convictions. These crimes
have never been found to have occurred by a jury, nor has
Doe ever admitted to such acts. Whereas in Mendez, “the
defendant’s uncontested prior convictions allay the concerns
articulated in Gibson that the defendant could have been con-
victed on proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt,” 556
F.3d at 770, such concerns remain at the forefront here. The
State concedes this crucial distinction at Page 49 of its open-
ing brief here: “Mendez was primarily based on a factor not
present here, that the jury found the defendant’s prior convic-
tions were true beyond a reasonable doubt.” Mendez never
purports to contradict Gibson, and its unique holding ulti-
mately has no bearing on this case.
Pulido and Byrd “emphasize[ ] the breadth of trial errors
that are subject to harmless error review.” Byrd, 566 F.3d 864.
That is, in all cases where an instructional error does not “viti-
ate” the jury’s findings, harmless error review applies. See
Pulido, 555 U.S. at 61; Byrd, 566 F.3d at 864. In Pulido, the
state court instructed the jury on multiple substantive theories
of guilt,13 one of which was legally incorrect under state law.
555 U.S. at 59. The Supreme Court recounted the types of
instructional errors subject to harmless error review: (1) omis-
sion of an element of the offense, id. at 60-61 (citing Neder,
527 U.S. at 1), (2) erroneous aider and abettor instruction, id.
at 61 (citing California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996) (per
curiam)), (3) misstatement of an element of the offense, id.
(citing Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)), and (4) errone-
ous burden shifting, id. (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570
13
More specifically, the jury received an erroneous felony-murder-
liability instruction which allowed a “late-joining” aider and abettor to
nevertheless be convicted. See Pulido, 555 U.S. at 63-64 (Stevens, J. dis-
senting); see also People v. Pulido, 936 P.2d 1235, 1238-39, 1244-45
(Cal. 1997).
19246 DOE v. BUSBY
(1986)). To that list, Pulido adds error in instructing on multi-
ple theories of guilt. Id. (“An instructional error arising in the
context of multiple theories of guilt no more vitiates all the
jury’s findings than does omission or misstatement of an ele-
ment of the offense when only one theory is submitted.”).
Because Byrd involved a review of Supreme Court cases for
AEDPA purposes, Byrd takes the holding in Pulido and over-
rules Gibson to the extent it is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s holdings solely for purposes of AEDPA review. Byrd,
566 F.3d at 866-67.
[13] However, Byrd has one observation that has caused
confusion in this appeal—its characterization that Gibson was
a case about multiple theories of guilt, which meant there was
no error under Sullivan. See 566 F.3d at 867. But this particu-
lar characterization of Gibson, which had no bearing on the
ultimate holding in Byrd, directly contradicts what the Gibson
panel believed and decided Gibson was about: “CALJIC No.
2.50.01 permitted the jury to find Gibson guilty of the charged
sexual offenses by merely a preponderance of the evidence,
and therefore constituted structural error within the meaning
of Sullivan.” Gibson, 387 F.3d at 824. We agree with Judge
Wallace that Byrd’s post-hoc observation about Gibson was
pure dictum, by which we are not bound, and to which we
give no deference. See Export Grp. v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54
F.3d 1466, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1995). This case and Gibson
concern instructional errors which vitiate the jury’s findings
by lowering the ultimate burden of proof below a reasonable
doubt. As we made clear in Gibson, “the interplay of the two
instructions” leaves a verdict that does not meet the minimum
standard under the Sixth Amendment. See Gibson, 387 F.3d
at 822; see also id. at 825 (“A Sullivan error precludes harm-
less error review because no verdict within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment has been rendered.”); Sullivan, 508 U.S. at
280 (“[T]he most an appellate court can conclude is that a
jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt—not that the jury’s actual finding of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been differ-
DOE v. BUSBY 19247
ent absent the constitutional error. That is not enough.”). In
short, when a court’s erroneous jury instruction impermissibly
lowers the burden of proof, that error requires structural error
review, not harmless error review. Mendez, 556 F.3d at 768.
The jury in Doe’s case was given instructions that permit-
ted a murder conviction based on a preponderance of the evi-
dence that prior uncharged crimes occurred. This instruction,
lowering the burden of proof for all charged offenses, is not
akin to a prosecutor uttering a false theory of the case or even
a judge misstating the elements for conviction under state law.
Pulido, 555 U.S. at 60-61. Misstating the correct burden of
proof is in the category of errors that cannot be balanced or
offset by the consideration of competing evidence. Not only
is the judge’s misstatement of the burden of proof not an evi-
dentiary issue for the fact-finder, the error occurs after the
taking of evidence and necessarily impacts the whole of trial
because the judge has allowed the properly received evidence
to be filtered through what we called in Gibson “an unconsti-
tutional lens.” 387 F.3d at 824.
[14] When the jury heard the preponderance instruction in
tandem with the reasonable doubt instruction and without a
reconciliation from the trial court, the jurors were left to guess
which standard to apply. Id. at 823-24 (“We are unpersuaded
by the warden’s argument that the jury would be able to dis-
card that portion of CALJIC No. 2.01 providing that each fact
that supports an inference must be based upon a reasonable
doubt (as CALJIC No. 2.50.01’s standard negates), but would
nevertheless follow the portion of CALJIC No. 2.01 that
requires all facts essential to establishing guilt to be found
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). While we presume jurors fol-
low the instructions they are given, we cannot equally assume
they can sort out legal contradictions. The instructions
directed the jury to consider evidence of Doe’s prior unad-
judicated acts of domestic violence, most of which were
wholly unrelated to the crimes with which he was charged, to
convict him, among other things, of first-degree murder. This
19248 DOE v. BUSBY
was error under Sullivan and Gibson, and we affirm the dis-
trict court’s issuance of a conditional writ.
III. Petitioner’s Ex Post Facto Argument
Doe cross-appeals,14 arguing that the district court erred by
not granting habeas relief on the alternative ground that retro-
active application of California Evidence Code § 1109 vio-
lated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution. The magistrate judge did not recommend issuing
a writ of habeas corpus on this issue, and the district court did
not address the issue in its order granting Doe’s Petition. We
hold that Doe’s argument lacks merit.
[15] The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits “states from
enacting laws that criminalize an act already performed.”
Schroeder v. Tolton, 493 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2007).
When examining a rule of evidence to determine if it violates
this prohibition, courts examine whether the evidentiary rule
“affect[s] the quantum of evidence sufficient to convict” the
defendant. Id. at 1088; see also Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S.
513, 530 (2000).
Here, Section 1109 became effective on January 1, 1997,
approximately one month after Roe was killed and five
months before Doe’s trial began. The statute permits the intro-
duction of evidence of prior domestic violence to demonstrate
a defendant’s propensity for such behavior. Cal. Evid. Code
§ 1109. At Doe’s trial, the California trial court relied on Sec-
tion 1109 to permit the prosecution to introduce evidence of
prior acts of domestic violence against Roe and Doe’s former
girlfriends.
[16] The decision of the California courts to retroactively
apply Section 1109 and allow admission of these prior acts
14
The district court granted Doe’s application for a Certificate of
appealability on this issue.
DOE v. BUSBY 19249
was not contrary to clearly established federal law. See
Schroeder, 493 F.3d at 1088. Section 1109 does not alter the
quantum of evidence needed to convict a defendant. Cf. id.
(“Nothing in the text of [the section] suggests that the admis-
sible propensity evidence would be sufficient, by itself, to
convict a person of any crime. [The] [s]ection [ ] relates to
admissibility, not sufficiency.”). Because the enactment
merely permitted the admission of a type of evidence that was
previously excluded for the purpose of showing propensity,
id. at 1088, the use of the evidence at Doe’s trial did not con-
travene the Ex Post Facto Clause.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order granting
a conditional writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.