UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4393
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GREGORY SENTERRIO SPENCER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:09-cr-00825-CMC-2)
Submitted: September 30, 2011 Decided: October 24, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Charles T. Brooks, III, THE BROOKS LAW OFFICES, LLC, Sumter,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Mark C. Moore, Assistant United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Senterrio Spencer pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and five grams or more
of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The
district court sentenced Spencer to 216 months’ imprisonment.
Through counsel, Spencer now appeals his conviction and sentence
in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
presenting no meritorious grounds and raising no specific
questions for our review. The Government moves to dismiss the
appeal on the basis of a waiver of appellate rights provision in
Spencer’s plea agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part
A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the
right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United States v.
Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This court reviews
the validity of an appellate waiver de novo and will enforce the
waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed falls within the
scope of that waiver. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168
(4th Cir. 2005).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Spencer
knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his
sentence. We note that the language and meaning of the appeal
waiver in this case is clear and unmistakable, and both Spencer
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and his attorney signed the agreement, indicating that Spencer
had been fully advised about and understood the terms of the
plea agreement, including the appellate waiver. Further, the
district court fully questioned Spencer about the appeal waiver
at the properly conducted Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing.
Accordingly, the waiver is valid. Although Spencer does not
allege any specific error as to his sentence, any potentially
meritorious sentencing issues would fall within the scope of the
appellate waiver. We therefore grant in part the Government’s
motion to dismiss and dismiss this portion of the appeal.
The appellant waiver, however, does not preclude our
Anders review of Spencer’s conviction. We have thoroughly
reviewed the record in this case and conclude that the district
court complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting
Spencer’s guilty plea. Thus, we hold that the record
affirmatively shows there was a factual basis for Spencer’s
plea, that Spencer understood the constitutional rights he
waived in pleading guilty, and that Spencer’s guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d
114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). We therefore deny in part the
Government’s motion to dismiss and affirm the conviction.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no unwaived meritorious
issues for appeal. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we
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affirm Spencer’s conviction and grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal as to his sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Spencer, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Spencer requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Spencer. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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