[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-14932 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 26, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 09-00014-CR-5-RS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER ANTONIO OWENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 26, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Antonio Owens appeals his conviction for illegally possessing a
firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The sole issue
the appeal presents is whether the district court erred by refusing to suppress
firearms found in Owens’s vehicle during the course of a search incident to his
arrest on November 6, 2008. The court found that the search was unlawful in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710,
173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), but that it complied with the law in effect at the time the
search was performed. Because the officers reasonably relied on then-binding
appellate precedent, the court admitted the firearms under the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule.
Owens concedes that the good-faith exception may, in some cases, apply
where the police relied on pre-Gant law. He contends, however, that the exception
should not apply given the particular facts at hand. Specifically, he says that his
arresting officers demonstrated bad faith by targeting him for a traffic stop based
on suspicion of other crimes, and by flagrantly violating his Miranda 1 rights.
We review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies to a search, but
“the underlying facts upon which that determination is based are binding on appeal
unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir.
2002) (quotation omitted). “[W]hen considering a ruling on a motion to suppress,
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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all facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.”
United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000).
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. We have previously held that “a decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation occurred, and [that] an officer’s motive in making the traffic stop
does not invalidate what is otherwise objectively justifiable behavior under the
Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir.
1999) (citation and quotations omitted). Under Florida law, the act of driving on a
suspended license is a criminal traffic offense, punishable as no less than a second-
degree misdemeanor. Fla. Stat. § 322.34(2), (10)(b).
Even when a vehicle has been lawfully stopped, the Fourth Amendment
generally prohibits warrantless searches of the interior. United States v. Magluta,
418 F.3d 1166, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005). There are several exceptions to the warrant
requirement, however, including an exception allowing officers to search incident
to a lawful custodial arrest. United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1521 (11th Cir.
1983). Under Florida law, officers may conduct a warrantless arrest of any
individual who commits a misdemeanor in their immediate presence. Fla. Stat.
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§ 901.15(1).
As to the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest, the Supreme
Court’s 1981 decision in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69
L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), was, for many years, the seminal case on that matter. Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2424, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011)
(discussing Belton). Belton specifically held that “when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile.” 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864. We adopted an expansive view
of Belton, reading it to establish a bright-line rule authorizing the search of a
vehicle’s passenger compartment regardless of whether the arrestee had control
over the compartment at the time of the search. See United States v. Davis, 598
F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010). In Arizona v. Gant, however, the Supreme
Court rejected the expansive view of Belton and implemented a more restrictive
test. 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1719. Since Gant, searches incident to arrest are
permitted only where the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search, or where the officer has a
reasonable belief that the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest. Id. at
__, 129 S.Ct. at 1723.
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“[S]uppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment
violation.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137, 129 S.Ct. 695, 698, 172
L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). Rather, the exclusionary rule applies only where its potential
to deter future violations outweighs the substantial social costs of letting guilty
defendants go free. Id. at 141, 555 U.S. at 701. In light of this limitation, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that suppression is not appropriate where a
Fourth Amendment violation occurs despite the officers’ exercise of “good faith.”
Id. at 142, 555 U.S. at 701. For example, the good-faith exception applies where
officers act in reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant or a
statute later declared unconstitutional. Id. (citing cases). In Davis v. United
States, the Supreme Court recently considered whether the exception applies to
searches authorized by the law in existence at the time they occurred. 564 U.S. at
___, 131 S.Ct. at 2428. After balancing the benefits and costs of suppression, the
Court held: “when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on
binding appellate precedent, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” Id. at ___, 131
S.Ct. at 2427-29, 2434.
In the instant case, the arresting officers stopped Owens with probable cause
to believe that he was driving on a suspended license, and searched the passenger
compartment of his vehicle based on a proper understanding of pre-Gant law.
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Contrary to Owens’s argument on appeal, the Davis decision established a blanket
rule that the good-faith exception applies to searches performed in reasonable
reliance on then-binding appellate precedent. Although the Davis Court discussed
the need to weigh the costs and benefits of suppression, it did so only in the context
of formulating this blanket rule. Accordingly, the Davis analysis does not require
us to consider alleged misconduct that fell short of violating the Fourth
Amendment—as understood at the time of the search—nor does it require
consideration of unrelated constitutional violations.
AFFIRMED.
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