FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 31 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEONARDO JIMENEZ-ARIZA, Nos. 04-76778
09-70613
Petitioner,
Agency No. A029-881-960
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, MEMORANDUM *
Respondent.
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 25, 2011 **
Before: TROTT, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated petitions for review, Leonardo Jimenez-Ariza, a native
and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) orders dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order
and denying his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review de novo constitutional claims and questions of law, and for abuse of
discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Hernandez-Velasquez v. Holder, 611
F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010). In a July 8, 2008, memorandum disposition we
previously denied the petition for review in No. 04-76778, but we later stayed
issuance of the mandate and consolidated the petition with No. 09-70613. We now
order the mandate to issue. In No. 09-70613, we deny the petition for review.
The BIA did not violate Jimenez-Ariza’s equal protection rights when it
determined that the pardon of his 1990 Georgia conviction for possession of
cocaine did not eliminate its immigration consequences under Lujan-Armendariz v.
INS, 222 F.3d 728, 735 (9th Cir. 2000), because a pardon under Ga. Const. art. IV,
§ 2 is “generally dissimilar” to an expungement under the Federal First Offender
Act (“FFOA”). De Jesus Melendez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir.
2007); cf. Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-60 et seq. (Georgia First Offender Act).
Contrary to Jimenez-Ariza’s contention, the pardon of his conviction does
not render him immune from removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). See
Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contrary to
[petitioner’s] argument that a state pardon removes all legal consequences of a
conviction, [petitioner’s] state pardon does not entitle him to a waiver that does not
exist in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).”).
2 04-76778
In No. 04-76778: MANDATE SHALL ISSUE, CONCURRENTLY
WITH 09-70613.
In No. 09-70613: PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3 04-76778