UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5267
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO MARCIAL NAVARETTE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00139-BR-1)
Submitted: September 15, 2011 Decided: November 1, 2011
Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert J. McAfee, MCAFEE LAW, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina,
for Appellant. George Edward Bell Holding, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Marcial Navarette pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute and distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006); and use
of a telephone with the intent to commit a murder for hire, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1958 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). The
district court sentenced Navarette to a total of 262 months of
imprisonment and he now appeals. Appellate counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether Navarette’s trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance. Navarette filed a pro se supplemental
brief raising additional issues. * Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, appellate counsel and Navarette question
whether Navarette’s trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s performance
was deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). With respect to the first prong, “the
defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In
*
We have considered the issues raised in Navarette’s pro se
brief and conclude they lack merit.
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addition, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Under the second prong of the
test in the context of a conviction following a guilty plea, a
defendant can show prejudice only by demonstrating “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Moreover, we may address a claim of ineffective
assistance on direct appeal only if the lawyer’s ineffectiveness
conclusively appears on the record. United States v.
Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). We have
thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that ineffective
assistance does not conclusively appear on the record. We
therefore decline to address this argument on direct appeal.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Navarette, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Navarette requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Navarette. We dispense
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with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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