FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 01 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AKILAH YOUNG, No. 10-16545
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00741-JCM-
PAL
v.
ZAPPOS.COM, INC.; et al., MEMORANDUM *
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 25, 2011 **
Before: TROTT, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Akilah Young appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
her employment action alleging violations of Title VII and state law. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Vasquez v. County of
Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Young’s sexual
harassment claims because Young failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of her employment, and whether Zappos.com, Inc. took adequate
corrective action once it had notice of the alleged harassment. See Swenson v.
Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining plaintiff’s burden in
establishing a harassment claim under Title VII and employer’s responsibility to
take corrective action); Pope v. Motel 6, 114 P.3d 277, 280 (Nev. 2005) (Nevada
courts look to Title VII cases for guidance in analyzing state discrimination
claims).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Young’s
retaliation claims because Young failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether there was a causal link between her protected activities and
termination, and whether Zappos.com, Inc.’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for Young’s termination were pretextual. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646-47
(explaining plaintiff’s burden in establishing a retaliation claim).
The district court properly concluded that Young’s tort claims were
preempted by Nevada’s workers’ compensation scheme. See Wood v. Safeway,
Inc., 121 P.3d 1026, 1031-34 (Nev. 2005) (per curiam) (employee’s tort claims
2 10-16545
arising from sexual assault by co-worker at their workplace preempted by
Nevada’s workers’ compensation scheme).
Young’s remaining contentions, including those regarding her breach of
contract claim, are unpersuasive.
We do not consider Young’s contentions raised for the first time on appeal.
See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.
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