FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 01 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KULVINDER SINGH, No. 10-71136
Petitioner, Agency No. A075-245-991
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 25, 2011 **
Before: TROTT, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Kulvinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen and
motion to reconsider. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review
for abuse of discretion, Valeriano v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 2007),
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Singh contends he is not subject to the time or number restrictions on
motions to reopen provided by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), because his proceedings, which commenced on
December 9, 1996, were instituted before the effective date of the Act, i.e., April 1,
1997. Singh’s contention lacks merit because the regulatory time and number
restrictions on motions to reopen were promulgated prior to the effective date of
IIRIRA. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2) (1996) (as revised by 61 Fed. Reg. 18900 (April
29, 1996)) (with exceptions “a party may file only one motion to reopen
proceedings ... and that motion must be filed not later than 90 days after the date on
which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be
reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later”); see also Azarte
v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 19-21 (2008) (regulatory time limitation on motions
to reopen promulgated prior to enactment of IIRIRA).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as
untimely where it was filed nearly four years after the BIA’s prior order, see 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish prima facie eligibility for
relief, see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence
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must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief warranting reopening based on
changed country conditions).
In his opening brief, Singh fails to raise any challenge to the BIA’s
dispositive determination that his motion to reconsider was untimely. See
Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not
specifically raised or argued in a party’s opening brief are waived).
Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review Singh’s contentions regarding the
BIA’s April 24, 2002, order, because this petition for review is not timely as to that
order. See Singh v. INS, 315 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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